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Executive summary
TAKING STOCK: SMALL ARMS AND HUMAN SECURITY IN GEORGIA presents
the findings of research conducted on small arms and light weapons (SALW) and
human security issues in Georgia by the non-governmental organisations Saferworld
(UK) and the Caucasus Institute for Peace, Democracy and Development (CIPDD,
Georgia). The report is comprehensive in scope, considering the ownership of small
arms in the country, their use and misuse, their impact on individuals, communities
and the state, public attitudes and perceptions towards arms and security, and the
capacity of state institutions to control the proliferation and misuse of small arms. The
research for this survey was undertaken during a seven-month period from December
2005 to June 2006. A variety of methods were used during the research, including a
nationwide household survey of 1,300 respondents (excluding Abkhazia and South
Ossetia), 14 focus group discussions, interviews with more than 50 key officials and
opinion-formers and a review of official data and media reports.
The report is intended as a practical reference tool to aid policy makers in developing
effective responses to the outstanding small arms problems facing Georgia at this 
time. To this end, periodic consultation meetings were organised as part of the
research process so that officials from the Georgian Government might review 
preliminary research findings and comment on them. The views expressed during
these consultations are reflected in the final research report.
Although this survey analysed the impact on arms proliferation and security of the
two areas of Georgia’s internationally recognised territory that remain outside the
control of the central Government – Abkhazia and South Ossetia – it is focussed 
primarily on those areas currently under Tbilisi’s control. This is purely because of a
variety of practical difficulties related to undertaking such research in these areas 
during 2005–2006.
Background
Small arms proliferation and misuse has had a dramatic and painful impact on 
Georgia since it gained independence from the Soviet Union in 1991, and has been no
more obvious than in the various internal conflicts that afflicted the country in the
early 1990s. These conflicts are still relevant today, not only because of the continued
failure of all sides to reach political agreement over the final status of the regions of
Abkhazia and South Ossetia, but also as a result of the economic decline, decreased
human security, animosity and the large number of internally displaced persons that
accompanied them. This heritage has meant that questions surrounding small arms
ownership and its impact continue to be highly politicised in Georgia, creating
difficulties for open debate and informed policy formulation on the topic. Small arms
control in the country has been further complicated by Georgia’s regional ethnic,
social and political disparities, which mean that some locations exhibit specific small
arms dynamics. This is particularly the case regarding minority areas and the regions
along Georgia’s internal borders with Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
Despite this difficult environment, significant and commendable progress has been
made to improve control over small arms proliferation and misuse, albeit in an 
unco-ordinated manner: the Government has managed to unify the once diffuse
Georgian military under the central control of the Ministry of Defence; an inter-
national arms transfer control system has been established and greater investment has
been made in the management of Georgia’s borders; and, perhaps most importantly,
the police and justice system is undergoing a major overhaul intended to improve its
ability to ensure human security. While this is the case, much still needs to be done to
minimise the risks presented by illegal arms proliferation and misuse.
This summary outlines the priorities facing Georgia’s national small arms controls
system. The following report analyses each of these findings in more detail along with
the key achievements of the Georgian Government regarding small arms control and
human security. Recommendations for future actions are then provided at the end of
the report.
Possession of firearms
■ Licensing and registration of legally held firearms has improved substantially in the
period 2004–2006 through enhanced recording procedures for firearm licences and
reduced corruption within the licensing system.
■ Georgia has introduced strong legislation to regulate civilian small arms ownership
and use. While this is the case, licensing requirements are unduly liberal in a number 
of areas:
■ Those applying for self-defence weapon permits, such as those for pistols and
revolvers, do not need to provide evidence of a threat to their person or property 
in order to receive a licence
■ Successful applicants are not required to undergo an extensive firearms training
course
■ There is no stipulation in legislation allowing police officers to check home storage
conditions or licences and there is no effective system for seizing weapons where
licences have expired, or for enforcing licence renewal.
■ There is no clear categorisation of those weapons that can be legally owned by civilians
and those that are prohibited, as a State Weapons Register has not yet been created,
even though this is required by law.
■ There is no clear framework for disseminating information on the licensing system
within the domestic arms trade or amongst the Georgian population. As a result,
knowledge of the licensing system appears to be poor amongst the general public and
especially low amongst non-ethnic Georgian communities.
■ No specific legislation regulates the provision of private security services and the
licensing of private security companies. This has severely undermined control of this
sector in a number of ways:
■ It is not possible to know exactly how many private security companies are presently
operating in Georgia or the number and type of firearms employed by them
■ No standard training exists in the use of force and firearms
■ There is no formalised relationship between private security companies and 
government agencies, including the police.
■ It is estimated that at least 159,000 registered weapons are in the hands of individual
citizens and legal entities, while upwards of 250,000 weapons are illegally held.
ii TAKING STOCK: SMALL ARMS AND HUMAN SECURITY IN GEORGIA
■ Demand for weapons is primarily due to insecurity, the fear of crime and traditional
affiliations with firearms. Demand for firearms is greater in Kakheti, Mtskheta-
Mtianeti, Kvemo Kartli and Shida Kartli.
■ The agency tasked with combating illegal firearm ownership within the country, the
Special Operative Department, has not conducted an assessment of illegal ownership
patterns or developed a strategy to combat the threat posed by it.
■ Illegal weapon ownership is most widespread in Tbilisi, followed by Imereti, Ajara,
Samegrelo-Svaneti, Kakheti and Shida Kartli. Illegal firearm ownership is also greater
amongst non-Georgian ethnic communities in Kvemo Kartli.
■ Demand for illegal weapons is especially high amongst young men aged between 
18 and 29.
Firearms use and misuse
■ The criminal justice system’s ability to combat firearm crime has improved sub-
stantially with: more firearm crimes recorded by the police due to increased trust in
the police and improved recording procedures; more firearm crimes solved by the
police; increased capacity of the General Prosecutor’s Office to record and track 
criminal procedures.
■ While security provision has improved, a large proportion of victims of crime are still
unwilling to report crime to the police, with levels of trust in the police to provide
security remaining especially low amongst non-ethnic Georgians.
■ While law enforcement has improved, crime prevention has been undermined by the
absence of strategic planning to combat firearm crime and misuse.
■ Fear of crime appears to be lower in Georgia than in many other post-Soviet countries:
only 23 percent of Georgians are afraid that they or their family might become a victim
of crime and crime levels are, on the whole, thought to have diminished over the last
year.
■ Those living in rural areas and the suburbs of large towns, where the Patrol Police are
less active, and residents of Tbilisi, where the fear of crime is increasing, do not feel
increased security to the same degree as the rest of the country.
■ The household survey unveiled a significant fear of gun crime and its impacts, espe-
cially armed robbery: 36 percent of respondents to the household survey stated that
armed robbery was a principal cause of insecurity, behind only murder and robbery.
■ In 2005, gun crime accounted for 4.5 percent of all recorded crime and was most 
common in Tbilisi (56 percent of all such crime) followed by Imereti, Samegrelo-
Svaneti, Shida Kartli and Kvemo Kartli. In addition, rural respondents were also more
likely than urban respondents to name armed crime as a regular occurrence in their
community.
■ The majority of respondents to the household survey perceived the availability or use
of firearms to be a major concern where they lived. 21 percent of respondents to the
household survey stated that it was ‘extremely common’ or ‘quite common’ for
conflicts in their community to involve firearms. Concern over the societal impact of
firearms availability and use was greater in Samtskhe-Javakheti, rural areas and
amongst non-ethnic Georgians.
■ While information on domestic violence involving small arms is not collated at 
present, evidence from focus groups and the national household survey suggests that 
it is a widespread occurrence.
■ While comprehensive mortality and morbidity figures are not collated, research 
indicates that approximately 1,250 firearm-related injuries were treated by Georgian
hospitals in 2005, of which 50 resulted in death.
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Production and trade
■ For the most part, the legislative and regulatory framework controlling the production
and trade of SALW is adequate to meet present needs. Present arms production
appears to be limited to the manufacture of components for sports and hunting
weapons.
■ Due to poor capacity within the Ministry of Justice, regular inspections of gun shops
and production facilities are not conducted at present.
Management of state small arms holdings
■ Reforms of the Georgian security services have resulted in a reduction of the number
of military forces tasked with ensuring security and defence under the Georgian 
Constitution. As a result, and possibly for the first time since independence, the 
Georgian armed forces are unified and well controlled.
■ Although official data on the subject is classified, it is estimated that Georgia presently
maintains between 76,000 and 91,000 state-held SALW, excluding those under the
control of the Russian forces in Georgia.
■ The Georgian military is in the process of adopting more advanced needs
identification, stockpile security and inventory practices. While this is the case, an
accurate assessment of Georgia’s stockpile security needs is difficult, due to limited
information.
■ The Georgian military is engaged in a significant procurement process, which should
increase the number and type of SALW at its disposal. Further, Georgian military
expenditure is increasing at a faster rate than in any other country in the world.
■ There is evidence that the use of firearms by state security agencies, and the Ministry 
of Internal Affairs and the Ministry of Justice in particular, poses a threat to human
rights and public safety and is not in accordance with international best practice as
outlined in the United Nations Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law
Enforcement Officials.
Collection and destruction of small arms
■ While several collection campaigns have taken place in Georgia, poor record keeping
and transparency mean that it is not clear how many weapons have been collected in
total. However, according to available information, between 13,750 and 23,350 weapons
have been collected on Georgian government-controlled territory as of March 2006.
■ An ongoing amnesty for illegal weapons, provided that they have not been used in the
execution of a crime, is presently in place, but has not yet proven successful.
■ Plans are presently underway to develop a destruction programme for military SALW
during the period 2006–2009, and to this end the Ministry of Defence has already
undertaken a comprehensive inventory of stockpiled SALW in order to identify non-
functional and surplus units. However, it is not yet national policy to destroy all
weapons seized from the public.
International arms transfer controls and border management
■ Georgia has made good progress over the last decade in developing a legal framework
to govern the transfer of arms and dual-use goods. National legislation in this area
now regulates the majority of trade including direct import and export, re-transfer
and transit. Legislation also includes a number of progressive stipulations, such as
end-user certificates, and post-delivery verification for transfers of selected goods.
While this is the case, legal provisions are still inadequate in a number of areas:
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■ End-user certificates are not required for transfers to recognised state agencies in
other countries and most contracts do not permit state agencies to perform checks
on end-use 
■ Re-export from Georgia can occur without a permit from the authorised agency of
the original exporting country
■ Legislation does not regulate brokering.
■ Oversight of transfers by state agencies is poor:
■ The Ministry of Defence is both chief regulatory agency for military purpose arms
and dual-use goods transfers, and the main state agency engaged in the transfer of
such goods
■ Transfers by state agencies and their subordinate bodies are no longer licensed by 
the Ministries of Justice and Economy but by the Military Technical Commission
directly.
■ The central role of the President in Georgia’s transfer licensing system does not accord
with European or international norms in this area and may lead to politicised 
decision-making on arms transfers that does not favour dispassionate and objective
criteria-based judgements.
■ The decision-making criteria and procedures by which arms transfer licence 
applications are considered are not clearly developed or publicised.
■ The total amount of SALW imported into Georgia has increased dramatically in the
period 2003–2006 in line with Georgia’s increased military expenditure, from 
approximately US$2.8 million in 2003 to US$22.9 million in 2004, although this figure
will also capture some non-SALW items.
■ SALW exports from Georgia have been minimal since 2000, approximately
US$250,000 per annum, and are mostly comprised of parts of sports and hunting rifles
and shotguns.
■ Government officials believe that trafficking in small arms does not represent a major
concern for Georgia. However, the lack of comprehensive information on seized 
contraband, combined with past incidents of small arms trafficking and cross-border
incursions by armed groups indicates that such trafficking could resume if demand for
firearms increased.
■ While the Border Police is undergoing a process of demilitarisation and reform, no
threat analysis or strategic plan guides this work. The organisation also lacks clear
standard operational procedures and job descriptions for staff.
Transparency and oversight
■ Transparency within government ministries on topics relating to small arms is
improving. Transparency and co-operation on these issues was especially good during
the research for this report from the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Border Police and
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. While this is the case, transparency remains low in a
number of areas:
■ Reporting on arms transfers is fragmented and could be improved. While official
information is available on the amount of SALW imported into Georgia by 
Georgian gun shops, information is not publicly available on civilian purpose
exports or imports and exports for use by security services. In addition Georgia 
does not presently report on international arms transfers on a regular basis
■ Little information is available on state SALW holdings or stockpile maintenance
standards 
■ Information concerning small arms issues is not made routinely accessible to parlia-
mentarians or private citizens. Public and parliamentary oversight of security issues
in general and small arms control issues in particular is therefore not systematic. For
example, there is no requirement for reporting to Parliament on licensing decisions.
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■ Though there have been some positive examples of co-operation between the 
Government and civil society on security affairs, a culture of secrecy remains across
parts of the security sector that will take time to eradicate.
Co-ordination and policy formulation
■ There is a high degree of willingness amongst staff in most law enforcement 
departments to improve their co-ordination and information-exchange with other
departments, and an awareness that despite resource shortages, this is necessary.
■ Co-ordination between the various government ministries and agencies that should
collectively work to solve Georgia’s small arms control problems has been historically
poor, both at the level of policy and operations. At present, no over-arching structure
or strategy exists across government to guide policy development, oversee its 
implementation and co-ordinate the work of different ministries and departments.
■ Information exchange and co-operation within the domestic civilian licensing system
is poor and has undermined its operations, most notably by the failure to establish a
State Weapons Register.
■ The subordination of the Military Technical Commission to the Ministry of Defence
and its present composition of Defence staff can be considered a backward step
regarding interagency co-operation on arms transfer licensing decisions.
■ Communication and co-operation within the Border Police, with the rest of the 
Ministry of Internal Affairs and other government departments remains poor.
Communication is especially poor between the Border Police and the Customs
Department, which have traditionally had unco-operative relations.
■ There are currently no regional mechanisms or initiatives for combating illicit arms
trafficking and preventing the proliferation and misuse of small arms within the 
Caucasus region as a whole. The lack of a framework for co-operation on this issue
undermines national attempts by the Georgian Government to bring domestic small
arms proliferation and misuse under control.
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1
Survey background 
and methodology
AS THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY HAS INCREASINGLY RECOGNISED
over the last 15 years, the uncontrolled proliferation of small arms and light weapons
(SALW) can have devastating impacts on peace and security. Small arms are the
weapons of choice in the vast majority of the world’s conflicts, due to their availability
and ease of use. In many post-conflict areas, small arms are still readily accessible,
armed violent crime remains alarmingly commonplace and the very presence of small
arms can be a major cause of insecurity. In the early 1990s, large amounts of small
arms entered into circulation in Georgia, with several conflicts breaking out in the
South Caucasus as the Soviet Union collapsed. By the middle of the decade, ceasefires
were signed, the situation began to stabilise and small arms proliferation gradually
became less of a high-profile issue. Yet despite the work undertaken by the authorities
to collect weapons and strengthen arms control, there is still a widely-held perception
that Georgia remains ‘awash with guns’.
In order to respond effectively to this threat, co-ordinated action is needed at every
level, from local communities to national governments and the international 
community. At the international level, all states have committed themselves to the 
UN Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small
Arms and Light Weapons in All its Aspects (the UN PoA), agreed in July 2001, which
contains a wide array of measures to combat the illicit proliferation of small arms.
Further commitments have been made within the Organisation for Security and 
Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) Document on SALW, signed in November 2000. The
importance of small arms control is also increasingly recognised by the North Atlantic
Treaty Organisation (NATO) and the European Union (EU), the latter of which 
published its own strategy for SALW control measures in February 2006.
Comprehensive arms control initiatives at the national level should address a wide
range of issues, including:
■ Strengthening legislation and procedures for arms imports, exports and brokering, to
prevent arms dealers and criminals from exploiting loopholes
■ Improving security of state stockpiles (eg army and police weapons) to prevent leakage
■ Collection or registration of illegally held civilian weapons to ensure they are under
state control
■ Awareness campaigns, to ensure that the public is aware of the risks of incorrect 
storage and use of weapons
1 ‘Establishing an Inter-Agency Monitoring Group on Small Arms in Georgia’, a roundtable organised by the Military-Technical
Commission of the National Security Council of Georgia, the Caucasus Institute for Peace, Democracy and Development,
and Saferworld, Tbilisi, 11 March 2005
2 Saferworld has already conducted comprehensive SALW surveys in Albania, Bulgaria, Moldova, Kenya, Kosovo, Namibia,
Serbia, Sri Lanka and Uganda.
3 ‘The Georgia SALW Survey – An introductory meeting’, hosted by the British Embassy in Tbilisi, the Caucasus Institute for
Peace, Democracy and Development, and Saferworld, Tbilisi on 13 December 2005.
■ Licensing and monitoring of gun shops and traders, to ensure that weapons do not
end up in the wrong hands.
However, the success of all of these measures depends on the local history, the contem-
porary environment and correct identification of suitable small arms control meas-
ures. This in turn depends on access to comprehensive information on the small arms
challenges being faced. For this reason, it is widely recognised as best practice for states
to undertake a comprehensive SALW survey at the national level to provide baseline
information before embarking on large-scale small arms control initiatives. This prob-
lem has been recognised by the Georgian Government, which has long accepted that
Georgia continues to face a number of challenges in the field of small arms control.
At an international seminar in March 2005, the Georgian Government stated its 
intention to develop new measures to improve arms control within the country and 
recognised the benefits that a national SALW survey would offer in providing baseline
data to inform initiatives in this area.1 The present report is designed to fill this infor-
mation gap. It presents the findings of research carried out in Georgia by Saferworld
and the Caucasus Institute for Peace, Democracy and Development (CIPDD) from
December 2005 to June 2006, and is the first such survey to be undertaken within the
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) region. It was funded by the UK Govern-
ment’s Global Conflict Prevention Pool. The survey had the following objectives:
■ Assess the geographic and demographic extent of small arms possession and use
■ Assess and highlight the nature of small arms trafficking and circulation
■ Investigate the human and social impact of small arms use
■ Assess the scale of the small arms problem vis-à-vis other socio-economic and 
political issues
■ Outline measures established and needed to control small arms use.
The Georgia SALW Survey was undertaken using a method that was originally
designed by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and has been 
further developed by Saferworld based on the experience of conducting similar 
surveys in various countries around the world.2 In addition, Saferworld and CIPDD
also adjusted the method in order to account for local conditions. The full 
methodology is outlined is box 1.
The survey method and objectives were discussed in detail with the Government at a
round table meeting in December 20053, and the drafting phase was accompanied by
in-depth discussion with relevant officials of the findings generated by the research
and possible policy responses to them. A separate document presenting preliminary
findings and recommendations was submitted to all relevant ministries. Once initial
feedback had been received and appropriate amendments had been made, this 
document was presented to the Government at a closed-door round table meeting in
Tbilisi 11 May 2006.
While this research is aimed primarily at Georgian Government officials, international
donors and small arms practitioners who require an overview of the current situation
with regard to small arms proliferation in the country, it is also hoped that the report
will be of interest to a wider audience of civil society organisations, journalists,
academics and concerned members of the public. Indeed, it is envisaged that the 
survey will form the first part of a wider consultation process between the Georgian
Government, the international community, and civil society, leading to the develop-
ment of a co-ordinated government response to small arms challenges.
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Although this survey will look in some detail at the impact of the two areas of
Georgia’s internationally recognised territory that remain outside the control of the
central Government – Abkhazia and South Ossetia – on arms proliferation and 
insecurity, it is focussed primarily on those areas which are currently under Tbilisi’s
control. This is because of logistical and methodological difficulties relating to under-
taking such research in these areas in 2005–2006. Saferworld and CIPDD recognise
that ultimately, improving small arms control in Georgia and the South Caucasus
requires both comprehensive research across the region and suitable regional 
co-operation on this issue.4 It should be noted that the Georgian Government uses 
the terms ‘former Autonomous Area of South Ossetia’ and the ‘Tskhinvali region’ to
denote the area which is referred to as ‘South Ossetia’ in this report.
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Box 1: Survey methodology
■ A nation-wide household survey, conducted in Georgian and Russian by Georgian 
Opinion Research Business International (GORBI), a Tbilisi-based sociological research 
company. The survey was carried out in the areas under the control of the Tbilisi 
Government between 5 and 20 December 2005 and was answered by 1,300 respondents
(47 percent male, 53 percent female). The survey was conducted according to a five-stage
random cluster sampling with 95 percent confidence that the maximum error attributable
to sampling and other random effects is ±2.7. 
■ More than 50 key informant interviews to access information on, and assess, state
capacities and resources, official data, policy, practice, identified problems, past measures
and initiatives relevant to SALW control. Key informants included government, police, 
customs officials, military experts, journalists, parliamentarians, civil society leaders, and
representatives of international organisations and embassies (see Annex 1). 
■ 14 focus groups in Tbilisi, Kutaisi, Akhaltsikhe, Zugdidi, and Marneuli, to explore small
arms perceptions, issues and dynamics in social and geographical groups of particular 
interest (those living near conflict zones, national minorities, former employees of law
enforcement agencies, and women). The focus groups were led by representatives of
GORBI according to guidelines developed in co-operation with Saferworld and CIPDD 
(see Annex 1). 
■ A desk review of relevant research (both international and national) published on SALW
or associated issues, including for example, previous small-scale surveys on SALW, research
on military reform and security, human rights reports, etc.
■ Official data sources on small arms controls, crime and medical statistics provided
by government officials during interviews, in response to letters requesting information,
and open sources.
4 This was the approach that was taken in Matveeva A and Hiscock D (eds) The Caucasus: Armed and Divided – Small arms
proliferation and humanitarian consequences in the Caucasus (Saferworld, 2003), which contains sections on all areas of the
South Caucasus.
2
Introduction
THE SMALL ARMS DYNAMICS IN GEORGIA cannot be fully understood without
placing them in the appropriate political and social context. This is not always an easy
affair, given Georgia’s painful history over the last 20 years, its complicated political
development and the multitude of challenges that the Georgian Government still
faces. This introduction aims to outline the major dynamics that have had an impact
on small arms proliferation and the states ability to control small arms since 
independence from the Soviet Union. Many of these factors are interlocking and it
makes little sense to deal with each one in isolation. Instead, this section is broken up
into three sub-sections.
The first section provides a brief chronological history of Georgia over the last 15–20
years, with reference to the major events that have influenced small arms proliferation
and control. This includes a short description of the major conflicts Georgia suffered
in the early 1990s, its history of tension with Russia, the development of Government
capacity and the course of these dynamics up to the present day. The second section
considers the impacts these unresolved conflicts have on small arms issues, both in
terms of practical day-to-day control measures and the wider impact on public 
perceptions and political debate. The third section looks at the direction of reforms in
the Georgian security sector, the capacity of the state to implement these reforms and
provide security, and the continued legacy of secrecy in security affairs.
The early 1990s: Separatist conflicts and civil war
More than many parts of the Soviet Union, Georgia had always maintained a separate
identity and culture, and when reforms initiated by Mikhail Gorbachev in the mid-
1980s allowed greater freedoms into the political sphere, calls for independence soon
began to grow and on 9 April 1991 Georgia unilaterally declared independence from
the Soviet Union. Zviad Gamsakhurdia, a famous dissident and writer, was confirmed
as Georgia’s first president a month later. However, Gamsakhurdia’s autocratic and
erratic style of rule soon generated powerful enemies and within a few months various
armed factions had sprung up. By December 1991, Gamsakhurdia had been disposed
in a violent coup led by an armed militia known as the Mkhedrioni (Horsemen), who
established a Military Council, soon renamed as the State Council, to run the country.
The leader of the State Council, effectively the President, was Eduard Shevardnadze,
who had returned to Georgia after the formal dissolution of the Soviet Union. The
Presidency was officially restored in 1995, and Shevardnadze was duly elected.
2.1 A brief
history of
Georgia since
independence
Gamsakhurdia and his supporters made several attempts to regain control of the
country. The most serious of these was in September 1993, when Gamsakhurdia, him-
self capitalising on the chaos in Abkhazia (see below), returned to Georgia to foment a
civil war. He soon captured much of Western Georgia, establishing a ‘government in
exile’ in the town of Zugdidi. Eventually this rebellion was suppressed with support
from Russia, and Gamsakhurdia died in unexplained circumstances soon after.
At the same time as Georgia was moving towards independence, violence broke out
over the status of the Autonomous District of South Ossetia. The district was one of
two autonomous Ossetian districts in the former Soviet Union, the other being North 
Ossetia in the North Caucasus, part of the Russian Federation. South Ossetia felt
threatened by Gamsakhurdia’s nationalistic rhetoric during his rise to power in the 
late 1980s, and disputes sprang up over language issues and elections for the South
Ossetian Supreme Soviet (parliament). By early 1991 this had escalated into violence,
which continued to grow until a ceasefire (the Dagomys Agreement) was signed by
Shevardnadze in Sochi in Russia in July 1992, by which time as many as 2,000 had died
and over 50,000 internally displaced persons had been created by the conflict.
Soon after independence, Tbilisi faced a similar challenge in Abkhazia, in the North
West of the country. In the early years of the Soviet Union, Abkhazia had been on 
a more equal footing with Georgia, before being integrated into Georgia as an
Autonomous Republic during a territorial reshuffle in the 1930s. When Abkhazia
began to demand greater autonomy in 1992, Tbilisi, fearing that this would lead to
eventual independence, sent troops into the region. Supported by volunteers from 
the North Caucasus, the Abkhaz forces launched a successful counter-attack against 
government troops, which were routed from Abkhazia by September 1993. It is 
estimated that by the time of the ceasefire, several thousand people had died and 
about 300,000 people, constituting almost the entire Georgian population of
Abkhazia, had became internally displaced.
Meanwhile, Aslan Abashidze, the ruler of the other autonomous region in Georgia,
the Ajaran Autonomous Republic, exploited the chaos to establish a high level of
independence from the central Government. Local branches of the Georgian state
ministries stopped taking orders from Tbilisi and became entirely subordinate to
Abashidze’s regional administration. As a result, by the mid-1990s Tbilisi had no real
control over Ajara and, at times, Ajara’s borders were even closed to visitors from the
rest of Georgia.
It was against this unpromising backdrop that Georgia began to develop independent
institutions of state. Creating armed and police forces posed a number of challenges.
Firstly, there was a scramble to divide up the large Soviet stockpiles of both heavy and
light weaponry that remained in Georgia and the South Caucasus. Some weapons were
removed to Russia, or were kept at the four Russian bases that remained on Georgian
territory after independence. Others were divided up in a series of legal agreements
between the successor states of the Soviet Union. Others still disappeared from state
stockpiles – often under the cover of ‘staged robberies’ – and found their way into the
hands of the numerous paramilitary groups active in the region. Secondly, the author-
ities had to decide how best to deal with the paramilitary groups that were operating 
in Georgia: should they be integrated into the Georgian Armed Forces (and Police),
or should they be disarmed? Thirdly, Georgia was required to create new ministries 
on the basis of the local branches of the old Soviet ministries. Generally these local
branches lacked both the expertise and resources to operate independently, as they had
primarily functioned as executing agencies for policy devised by the Soviet Union in
Moscow. The end result was that many of the government branches that remained in
Georgia after the collapse of the Soviet Union were only nominally, or not at all, under
state control.
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1995 to 2003: Stability and stagnation
By 1995, a fragile sense of stability began to return to Georgia. Despite the lack of any
permanent resolution to the conflicts, ceasefires were holding in both South Ossetia
and Abkhazia. Shevardnadze’s Government began to crack down on paramilitary
groups (including, in 1995, the Mkhedrioni) and managed re-established some sense 
of security in many parts of the country. A semblance of democracy was established 
by presidential elections and a reformist, Westward-looking course was set.
Despite this, a large number of factors ensured continued instability for much of the
population. The Georgian economy had contracted significantly since 1991, at least
350,000 internally displaced persons were dispersed around the country, and several
areas of Georgia’s internationally recognised territory continued to operate beyond
the control of the central Government. In addition, Georgia’s security and justice
apparatus continued to be under-resourced, unreformed, permeated with corruption
and unable to provide for the basic security needs of the Georgian population.
As a result, the Georgian Government was not able to project much power over the 
entirety of the territory that it did control. This was most notably the case amongst
communities living along Georgia’s international borders and in the country’s 
mountainous regions, particularly in the north.
As a result of the continued economic and physical insecurity, Georgia’s population
began to sink, with many young and bright people moving abroad to look for jobs,
either elsewhere in the former Soviet Union or in the West.
For its part, the West (especially the United States – US) ploughed relatively large
amounts of aid into Georgia, encouraged by its pro-Western orientation and historic
good will towards Shevardnadze from his time as Foreign Minister for the Soviet
Union under Gorbachev. Emphasis was placed on developing democratic institutions,
including a vibrant civil society. A deal signed in 1994 to run an oil pipeline from Baku
(Azerbaijan) on the Caspian Sea, through Georgia to Ceyhan on Turkey’s Black Sea
coast also enhanced Georgia’s strategic importance.
By the start of the next millennium, however, the reform process in Georgia had 
stagnated. Corruption, which had been a problem in Georgia even in Soviet times, had
permeated every corner of life, with Shevardnadze and his entourage perceived as the
biggest culprits of all. This endemic corruption had meant that little real effort had
been made to strengthen the state, with reforms often blocked entirely or perverted to
suit the ends of key officials.
Relations with Russia, which had never been warm, deteriorated when Georgia was
accused of harbouring Chechen separatists and terrorists in the Pankisi Gorge, a
remote northern region near the Chechen border populated largely by Kists, close 
ethnic relatives of the Chechens, and refugees from the conflict. The Georgian author-
ities seemed unable or unwilling to respond to these accusations, only tightening 
security in the area after Russia launched air strikes and threatened unilateral military
action in the gorge in late 2002. Things were further complicated by the ongoing dis-
pute over the remaining Russian bases on Georgian territory. At an OSCE Summit in
Istanbul in 1999, Russia committed itself to closing two bases (in Vaziani and Gudauta)
and reaching agreement on the closure of the other two (in Batumi and Akhalkalaki)
by late 2001. Though Vaziani and Gudauta were closed more or less in accordance with
this agreement, the fate of Batumi and Akhalkalaki remained undecided, with Georgia
accusing Russia of stalling tactics. Georgia also regularly made allegations that these
bases were not secure and were a source of small arms proliferation in the region.
Even the EU and the US had become disappointed with the progress of reform in
Georgia. The EU, responding to a series of kidnappings of Westerners, announced its
intention to downgrade its relations with the Georgian Government and restructure
its assistance to the country. This resulted in a re-write of the Country Strategy Paper
2002–2006, the strategic framework for providing assistance to Georgia. Likewise, the
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US seemed increasingly disillusioned with the results of its co-operation with the 
Government, and began allocating a larger proportion of its assistance to Georgia for
the development of civil society.
2003 to present: The Rose Revolution and the Saakashvili Government
It was in large part this sense of stagnation and despondency that catalysed the events
that are now well known around the world as the ‘Rose Revolution’. Claiming that the
parliamentary elections of 2 November 2003 had been rigged to give Shevardnadze’s
Citizens Union of Georgia (CUG) a majority, opposition groups went out on the
streets of Tbilisi to protest. Despite fears that Shevardnadze would use violence in
order to disperse the protests, they continued to gather momentum. When 
Shevardnadze tried to convene the new parliament on 22 November, a mass of people
broke into the new parliament building, led by Mikheil Saakashvili clutching a red rose
above his head. By the next day, the Shevardnadze regime was over without a shot
being fired. Saakashvili was elected as president with an overwhelming 96 percent of
the votes in January 2004, and on 28 March 2004 his National Movement – Democrats
party took the large majority of seats in the repeat parliamentary elections.
The Saakashvili Government declared that Euro-Atlantic integration was essential for
the country, with membership of NATO and the EU its overriding goals. To achieve
this, wide-reaching reforms were rapidly launched in almost every sphere of public
life, from economics to education to the military. The relevant reforms are dealt with
in more detail below.
The other key priority identified by the new government was the ‘re-unification’ of
the country. The first target was Ajara, where Aslan Abashidze continued to rule un-
contested. Using tactics akin to those they had employed during the Rose Revolution,
Saakashvili’s Government set about stirring up public protests in the Ajaran capital,
Batumi. Abashidze responded by closing the borders and distributing weapons to his
supporters, leading once again to fears of violence, which escalated after the Ajaran
regime blew up the main bridge into the region from the rest of the Georgia. This act
served only to fuel local discontent, however, and by the middle of May Abashidze had
fled the country and Ajara was back under central control.
In summer 2004 Tbilisi attempted to try a similar strategy in South Ossetia, expecting
that a combination of high-profile ‘humanitarian aid’ and strong political pressure
would yet again show the local leader to be unpopular and trigger protests against
them. This failed to take account of the continued distrust engendered by the still
unresolved conflict, and soon backfired. Instead, the build-up of Georgian Interior
Troops (under the Ministry of Internal Affairs – MIA) in the region massively
inflamed tensions, and gunfire was exchanged on a nightly basis between Georgian
and Ossetian villages in the zone of conflict. These tensions were eventually calmed 
by late August 2004, but not before several people on both sides had died.
Since then, the Georgian Government and Parliament have attempted to achieve their
aims through aggressive diplomacy. This brought results in May 2005, when the 
Georgian Parliament adopted a series of tough measures to put pressure on Russia to
finally close its remaining bases; Russia eventually agreed to close these bases by 2008.
In February 2006, the Parliament employed a similar tactic with regard to peacekeep-
ing in South Ossetia, passing a resolution to block the routine extension of the peace-
keeping operation. The Georgian Government has made it clear that it considers the
current situation – in which the zone of conflict is regulated by a quadripartite Joint
Peacekeeping Force (JPKF) made up of South Ossetian, North Ossetian, Russian and
Georgian soldiers – to be ineffective; likewise, it denounces the format of peace negoti-
ations as biased against it, and has pushed heavily for the EU and the US to join the
peace process, as they did in the Moldova-Transdniestria conflict resolution process in
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2005. South Ossetian and Russian officials have both rejected these demands, and
warned that any changes to the peacekeeping format could be very destabilising.
The new momentum generated by the Saakashvili Government has forced the EU to
re-assess its engagement in the South Caucasus region. It reversed its decision to leave
Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan out of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP),
inviting them to join on 14 June 2004. The EU and Georgia are now in the process of
developing a comprehensive ENP Action Plan. The ENP does not in itself constitute a
step towards EU membership, but significantly enhances co-operation with the EU in
several key areas, including security. In the meantime, EU co-operation with Georgia
is still based on assistance under the revised Country Strategy Paper,5 and through the
EU Special Representative (EUSR) to the South Caucasus, Peter Semneby.6 The US 
has also further upgraded its co-operation with Georgia, most notably through the 
Millennium Challenge Fund. This is a new mechanism that aims to encourage 
development through major infrastructure projects and supporting the private sector;
a US$295m five-year programme was agreed for Georgia in summer 2005.
Impact on practical small arms control measures
The unresolved conflicts impact practically on small arms control measures in Georgia
in a number of ways. Firstly, and most obviously, the Georgian Government does not
have control over areas that are internationally recognised as part of its territory. Since
the administrations of South Ossetia and Abkhazia are not recognised by any country
as independent, they are thus not subject to any regional or international legal or polit-
ical commitments, as Georgia is. Rather, Georgia is technically responsible for arms
control in these areas, despite the practical impossibility of fulfilling its obligations.
Similarly, the Georgian Government does not control significant sections of its 
northern border (with Russia): the whole of the South Ossetian section, and most of
the Abkhazian section of this border are controlled by local forces. Since the borders
between both Abkhazia and South Ossetia and the rest of Georgia are not considered
by the Georgian authorities to be state borders, there is effectively a porous border
which the government cannot fully control. This is mitigated against by the presence
of Georgian customs officials on the road into South Ossetia.
Thirdly, Tbilisi’s control over the areas which border Abkhazia and South Ossetia is
limited. This is especially the case regarding the ‘demilitarised zone’ which runs along
the internal border with Abkhazia and encompasses the Zugdidi region on the 
government-controlled side and Gali on the Abkhazian side. The demilitarised zone
was established by the ‘Moscow Accords’ in May 1994.7 Adherence to the ‘Moscow
Accords’ in the demilitarised zone, including the ceasefire, is monitored by a CIS
Peacekeeping Force (PKF), while the United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia
(UNOMIG) is tasked with monitoring implementation of the ‘Moscow Accords’ and
the activities of the CIS PKF.
Lastly, there are a multitude of actors directly involved in small arms control on 
Georgia’s internationally recognised territory. These include:
■ the Georgian Government
■ the (unrecognised) Government of South Ossetia and Abkhazia
■ the Joint Control Commission in South Ossetia
8 TAKING STOCK: SMALL ARMS AND HUMAN SECURITY IN GEORGIA
5 <http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/georgia/csp/georgia_csp_6.pdf>, accessed 30 March 2006.
6 Semneby replaced Heikki Talvitie in February 2006. Talvitie had been appointed as the first EUSR to the region in July 2003,
with the tasks of assisting the Council in developing a comprehensive policy to the South Caucasus, contributing to conflict
prevention, and assisting the conflict resolution processes in the region.
7 Declaration on measures for a political settlement of the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict (4 April 1994); Quadripartite agreement
on voluntary return of refugees and displaced persons (4 April 1994); Agreement on a ceasefire and separation of forces
(14 April 1994). 
2.2 The impact
of the
unresolved
conflicts
■ the Joint Peacekeeping Force in South Ossetia
■ the OSCE Mission in Georgia
■ the CIS PKF in Abkhazia
■ UNOMIG 
■ the remaining Russian bases in Georgia (in Akhalkalaki and Batumi).
This broad range of actors, many of which have competing political and security 
priorities, presents serious challenges in terms of co-operation and co-ordination,
even in policing matters of little political significance.
Impact of unresolved conflicts on politics and perceptions 
The unresolved conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia loom heavily over all 
Georgian politics. Understandably, they are an emotional sore point for a proud
nation, and the inability to find a lasting solution is a major cause of frustration and
misery. They are perceived by a majority of Georgians as one of the prime causes of
Georgia’s poverty and weakness over the last 15 years, and one of the main obstacles to
becoming richer and more stable in the near future. They have left hundreds of
thousands of internally displaced persons dotted across the country, hoping some day
to return to the homes they have left. They are a constant source of instability, as every-
one is aware that these conflicts are anything but ‘frozen’, and could easily re-ignite;
equally, everyone knows that further fighting could derail the reform process. They
undermine relations with Russia, especially since many Georgians believe that South
Ossetia and Abkhazia could not survive without Russia’s economic, and even military
support. To outsiders, they perpetuate an impression that Georgia is conflict-ridden
and insecure, and thus an unsuitable place for investment or tourism. They are also a
major stumbling point on the road towards NATO and/or the EU. And arguably, the
constant need to engage on this issue takes up scarce government time and resources,
which could otherwise be spent on economic and political reform.
With all this in mind, it is obvious that anything related to the conflicts can be a highly
politicised and emotive issue, and small arms proliferation is no exception. This is
hardly surprising, particularly since the fighting in these conflicts predominantly
involved small arms. However, there will always be a temptation to consider the issue
of small arms proliferation in Georgia merely as a subset of the wider problem of
unresolved conflicts, and thus come to the conclusion that little can be done to
improve small arms control until there is peace. This attitude fails to take account of
the breadth and depth of measures that seek to improve small arms control, either 
collaboratively between the Georgian Government and the separatist authorities, or
unilaterally. Collaborative action may take the form of confidence-building measures,
such as efforts to prevent weapons entering into or remaining in the zone of conflict.
Unilateral measures may have little direct relation to conflict dynamics, such as
improving stockpile security or tightening legislation on civilian possession.
Conversely, however, a danger also exists that measures are proposed which are 
presented as ‘technical’ or ‘apolitical’, but in fact carry potential dangers to the conflict
dynamics in the region. It is therefore hoped that this survey will provoke greater
thought about which small arms control measures are most appropriate in Georgia 
at the current time, and about the need for conflict analysis to be carried out before
implementing any concrete small arms initiatives.
Institutional capacity
The capacity of Georgian state ministries and agencies to fulfil their core functions and
to formulate and implement policy remains very low by Western standards, though
the Saakashvili Government appears to be making some progress in overhauling and
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2.3 Capacity
and reforms
revamping the system. Many of the reasons for this institutional weakness have already
been referred to above, but deserve to be briefly recalled here:
■ On gaining independence, Georgia had to develop a complete set of institutions of
state, either completely from scratch, or on the basis of local branches of Union-wide
ministries, which were used to taking guidance from Moscow. This had to be done
with few human, financial or technical resources.
■ This process was greatly complicated by the fact that in close succession, Georgia faced
two separatist conflicts, a civil war, de facto loss of control over Ajara, and a general
process of political disintegration across the country.
■ A corollary of this was economic collapse. Georgia’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP)
fell from US$5.1 billion in 1990 to US$2.1 billion in 1995; only in 2005 did GDP 
overtake 1990 levels. Despite strong growth over the last few years, over 50 percent of
people were still living in poverty in 2004, according to International Monetary Fund
(IMF) figures.8
■ Poor economic conditions have meant low wages, inadequate facilities, and little 
training for government officials. This in turn bred endemic corruption in all areas of
public life.
■ During the Shevardnadze era, corruption and inertia took hold, meaning that reforms
to improve institutional capacity were either not began in the first place, or were 
perverted to suit the needs of corrupt officials or to achieve short-term political goals.
This was the unpromising inheritance which the Saakashvili Government received on
taking office. The new Government has acted boldly across the board. The first step
has been to drastically cut staffing levels, in order that it can afford to pay those
remaining an acceptable wage and thus remove pre-conditions for corruption. The
second has been to design and then implement reforms in each sector which aim to
bring these institutions closer to Western standards and best practice. The one possible
downside of this reformist zeal has been an extremely rapid rotation of staff in key
positions. While it has been successful in sweeping out ineffective officials and intro-
ducing a notion of merit to appointments, the pace of rotation has at times actually
undermined reforms, because people are not in place for long enough to be familiar
with the job and to manage the reform process. Overall, however, while it is still too
early to say whether these reforms will be effective over the long term, there have been
some encouraging early signs of improvement.
The problems listed above affect more or less all areas of the state apparatus.
Unsurprisingly, therefore, they also have a major impact on small arms control issues,
since the agencies that are primarily responsible for small arms control policy and
implementation face the same institutional challenges as agencies in other fields. This
should be borne in mind when considering the state’s capacity to control small arms.
Security sector reform
Even during the Shevardnadze period, Georgia had a strong pro-Western military 
orientation, and was also attempting to reform its military along Western lines
(though this cannot really be said about other parts of the security sector, such as the
MIA). This process has significantly accelerated since the Rose Revolution. The
Saakashvili Government has made NATO and eventually EU membership Georgia’s
main long term policy goals, and this has translated into an extremely fast reform
process – though given the low base from which the new government began, achieving
Euro-Atlantic standards in the security sector remains a daunting task.
Reforms to the structure and management of the Armed Forces and the Ministry of
Defence (MoD) were already taking place prior to 2003. Various Western military
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advisers provided advice and support to the Georgian Government, including ISAB
(the International Security Advisory Board), a group of former senior military person-
nel with great experience of military reform, particularly in the Baltic States. On the
training ground, the US provided the Georgia Train and Equip (GTEP) programme.
Though this was primarily aimed at training Georgian troops in counter-insurgency
and peace support operations, in order that they could take part in anti-terrorist and
peacekeeping missions internationally, in effect this also prepared the first Georgian
battalions who had been trained to Western standards.9
Under the new Government, the pace of reforms has accelerated. There has been a
rapid increase in military spending, including imports of heavy weaponry. These steps
have been criticised in some quarters, but the MoD argues that a large rise in spending
is necessary to reform a largely ineffectual army and prepare the country for NATO
membership. Georgia was the first country to agree an Individual Partnership Action
Plan (IPAP) with NATO, a new mechanism for countries that wished to deepen 
co-operation with the Alliance, but were not yet deemed ready (or did not wish) for a
Membership Action Plan (MAP). The IPAP, which was drafted jointly by NATO and
the Georgian Government and was adopted on 29 October 2004, sets out an ambitious
range of tasks for military and political reform. This includes arms control, under 
section 2.5.1, where Action 2 is to ‘develop and implement a plan to safely store usable
ammunition, and to dispose of excess and unsafe munitions, as well as small arms and
light weapons’. The Georgian Government aims to complete the IPAP as quickly as 
possible, in order to be ready for a MAP; it is hoped that a MAP could be completed in
time for Georgia to join the Alliance at the next major NATO summit in 2008, though
this time scale may be unrealistic.
Perhaps the most dramatic changes of all, however, have happened in policing.
Previously, the MIA was notoriously corrupt, and public perceptions of the police
were extremely negative, with many people seeing them as more of a threat than as a
security provider. Immediately after taking office, Saakashvili announced that police
reform would be a major priority for his government, with the aim of restoring
confidence between the police and the community. A few months later, the entire
Traffic Police – which did little to ensure security on the roads, and was largely engaged
in stopping motorists for bribes – was disbanded overnight, and replaced with a new
Patrol Police. This new police service, made up mostly of well-educated recruits who
initially received only three weeks of training, was an instant hit with the public. Patrol
policemen are relatively well paid and well resourced, driving around in distinctive,
modern cars that are fitted with proper radio equipment; in return, corruption is off
limits and they are expected to treat citizens with greater civility. The introduction of
the Patrol Police is only one part of a much greater long-term plan to reform the entire
police structure, including:
■ The development and implementation of community based policing methods
■ An overhaul of the police academy and training methods
■ The instigation of a new criminal police
■ The civilianisation of the Ministry
■ The restructure of personnel management within the service.
This transformation is being supported by a major OSCE Police Assistance Programme
and also by other donors, particularly the US. Further, a new Criminal Code adopted
in May 2005 has led to a change in the way that statistics are recorded.
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3 
Possession of firearms
THIS SECTION MAPS OUT FIREARM OWNERSHIP IN GEORGIA and the 
mechanisms that have been put in place by the Government to control it. Georgia has
introduced strong legislation to regulate civilian firearm ownership, a fact which is
welcome given the research team’s estimate that as of March 2006 there were at least
409,000 weapons in civilian hands in Government-controlled Georgia.10 This equates
to 9.4 guns for every 100 people in Georgia.11 While around 159,000 of these weapons
are registered either to individual citizens or legal entities, there appear to be upwards
of 250,000 illicit weapons in civilian hands.
Although the legislation governing civilian ownership is reasonably strong, it could be
further strengthened in a number of areas: applicants do not have to undergo a
firearms training course or to provide ‘proof of threat’ in order to receive a permit;
there is still no clear definition as to what constitutes a ‘civilian’ weapon and can 
consequently be legally owned; and there are no legal provisions for the inspection of
weapon licences or storage facilities. The law also provides no basis for regulating the
work of private security companies and internal security divisions, making controls 
on the industry and its use of force extremely weak.
Fortunately, implementation of the law in this area, though traditionally weak, has
improved significantly in the period 2004–2006 as a result of better recording 
procedures for firearm licences and reduced corruption within the licensing system.
Nevertheless, limited administrative capacity, poor inter-agency co-operation and
poor outreach programmes (especially for non-ethnic Georgians) continue to hamper
adequate controls over the possession of firearms. For example, the poor recording
practices of the past mean that it is impossible to establish precisely how many 
registered firearms there are in the country at the present time. Poor past recording of
registered firearms also poses obvious control problems for legally held weapons:
without reliable records of registered weapons, it is difficult to verify their ownership,
inspect storage conditions or ensure they are re-registered when licences expire.
Further, the phenomenon of illicit civilian firearms possession has also not been
explored or dealt with systematically to date and no plan of action has been developed
to counter this threat. There is little structured inter-agency co-operation on this issue,
and it is questionable how effective ad hoc measures have been.
10 The methodology for these estimates, their margin of error, and more detailed breakdown of the distribution of weapons is
provided in the following sections.
11 This is based on a population of 4,345,686 excluding South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Source: Ministry of Economic
Development of Georgia Department for Statistics, 2004. It should be noted that this population estimate is also open to
question. Georgia’s current population may be lower than four million as a result of emigration. 
The principal laws governing civilian arms possession in Georgia are:
■ The ‘Law on Arms’ (8 May 2003), which governs civilian possession by both 
individuals and legal entities
■ The ‘Law on Enterprise Activity Licensing & Basis of Permission Issues’ (14 February
2002), under which the private security industry currently operates
■ The Criminal Code, which specifies penalties for violating domestic small arms 
legislation.12
Licensing of weapons
The ‘Law on Arms’ provides for a two-tier licensing system, whereby every person
wishing to legally own a weapon must first apply for and receive an authorisation to
acquire a weapon and then, upon purchasing a weapon, apply for a three-year permit
to own it. The Law also provides for a centralised State Weapons Register, which details
the types of all military weapons (classified) and civilian weapons (unclassified) that
are in circulation in Georgia.
Responsibility for issuing permits to individual citizens and legal entities is divided
between the MIA’s Permissions Department, which is located in Tbilisi and deals with
rifled and ‘self-defence’ weapons such as pistols, shotguns and gas weapons, and the
Patrol Police (located across the country), which handles smooth-bored hunting
weapons (excluding shotguns).
According to the ‘Law on Arms’, authorisations to purchase firearms cannot be issued
to individuals who: are under the age of 18; are mentally disabled or have a physical
disability that makes them unfit to own a firearm; systematically break public order;
have been convicted under articles 114 and 116 of the Georgian Criminal Code;13
or, those subject to legal proceedings or under MIA surveillance. Applicants for an
authorisation permit are required to undergo a medical examination and obtain a
health certificate from the Ministry of Health (MoH) establishing that they are 
‘psychologically healthy’. The Permissions Department and the Patrol Police are then
responsible for checking that the applicant has received a medical certificate and does
not have a criminal record.
Once the applicant is issued an authorisation permit, he/she has three months from
the date of receipt to purchase a firearm. The shop from which the firearm is 
purchased should provide a document on headed paper containing the weapon’s serial
number. Using this document, the firearm must then be registered with the relevant
government agency within ten days of purchase. The application must also be 
accompanied by a customs declaration with details of when the firearm was
imported.14 Smooth-bored firearms can be registered locally, while rifled weapons
must be registered with the central Permissions Department in Tbilisi. The fee for 
registration and issuance of permits is GEL 16 (approximately US$8.7).
Despite the restrictions listed above, the application criteria for ‘self-defence’ weapons
such as pistols and revolvers are relatively liberal in comparison to many European
countries. Firstly, applicants do not need to provide evidence of a threat to their person
or property in order to receive a licence. Secondly, applicants are not obliged to under-
go firearms training, meaning there is no way of ensuring that the applicant knows
how to use a weapon responsibly.
In addition, former employees of state security agencies (such as the MIA) that attain
the rank of major can own and carry weapons after retirement. While this is the case,
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12 2005 report to the UN Department for Disarmament Affairs (DDA) regarding implementation of the UN Programme of
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13 Article 114 refers to public officials who kill a suspect; article 116 refers to manslaughter. 
14 Each firearm that is notified on a customs declaration has to undergo ballistic testing by the MIA’s Forensic Department
before it can be sold to individual citizens. The whole process takes up to 20 days.
3.1 Legislation
and regulation
many do not know how to properly maintain or use firearms.15 It is also unclear how
many such persons presently possess and carry firearms as a result of this law.
Recording and monitoring
According to the present Head of the MIA’s Permissions Department, before 2004 little
attempt was made to properly record civilian firearms licences. It is alleged that under
the previous administration, the Permissions Department existed more to collect 
revenue from the licensing system than to exercise any control.16 As a result, no com-
prehensive statistics are currently available on the number of legally owned firearms 
in Georgia. The Department is now in the process of establishing an inventory of
licences, but estimates that it will take at least three to five years to implement an 
effective recording and monitoring system. This is compounded by poor information
exchange between the central Permissions Department and the regional Patrol Police
on the number of hunting weapons that have been licensed regionally.
Re-registration
Firearms owners are required to re-register their weapons every three years, but there
is no effective system for ensuring that they do, or for punishing those that do not. As
neither the Permission Department nor the Patrol Police maintain full registers of
legally owned weapons, it is unclear how they can identify all cases in which licences
have expired. The only viable way to enforce re-licensing is for the Patrol Police to 
conduct spot checks of individual firearm owner’s licences.
The situation is made even harder by the lack of an effective deterrent for non-
registration. At the beginning of 2006, the fine for late re-registration stood at just 
GEL 1.5 (US$0.8). Recognising that this figure is insufficient, the Permissions Depart-
ment plans to introduce changes to the Administrative Code which would allow it to
issue fines of GEL 50 (US$27.4) to those that do not re-register their firearms promptly
when the three-year time limit expires. The fine would then rise further with 
continued non-registration, until eventually the firearm owner would be liable for 
prosecution and the loss of his/her weapon. Reminder letters would be sent to firearm
owners whose licences are due to expire to re-register their weapons.
Despite all these problems, the Permissions Department still estimates that 
approximately 80–90 percent of firearm owners renew their firearm licences on time.
Carriage of weapons
The majority of firearm licences issued for short and long-barrelled rifled weapons are
for household protection only and do not permit the owner to carry their firearm out-
side of the home. Weapons should, therefore, be stored at home in a ‘safe place’ along
with their registration documents. Certain categories of people deemed to be at high
risk are exempt from this rule and can carry such weapons providing they have the
appropriate licence. Government officials, judges, prosecutors, active servicemen,
policemen and members of parliament all fall into this category.17
Restrictions on carriage do not extend to gas, sport and smooth-bored hunting
firearms (except shotguns).18 Carriage of shotguns was banned in early 2005, though
ownership and home storage is still allowed.19
Many countries are now reviewing legislation allowing the carriage of gas weapons
because they are practically indistinguishable from ‘real’ weapons, and are of equal use
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17 Interview, Shota Utiashvili.
18 Ibid.
19 Ibid.
for threatening criminal intent. Also, they are often easy to convert into weapons that
can fire live ammunition. In Georgia, the majority of legally owned gas weapons are
relatively cheap Turkish-made models.20 The protection mechanism intended to
inhibit the discharge of conventional ammunitions can easily be broken off, and they
can then fire several rounds before breaking. Gas pistols were consequently raised as a
concern by the Regional Police Chief in Kutaisi, who indicated that they were easily
available and represent a significant threat to the public.21
Categorisation of weapons
The Law on Arms provides for a State Weapons Register that would classify the types
of firearm authorised for ownership by individuals and legal entities (‘civil’ weapons,
as opposed to ‘military’ and ‘service weapons’). This list has not yet been established,
however, meaning there is no clear basis for stating which types of firearms can or 
cannot be owned legally. It has also been indicated that the State Weapons Register
cannot be created without interagency consensus on how weapons should be 
categorised.22 This in itself would require the creation of an inter-agency body.
In the absence of a more detailed register, the MIA has made individual decisions on
certain types of weapons it does not regard suitable for civilian possession. For 
example, the characteristics of a Stechkin assault pistol are such that it could plausibly
be classified either as a civilian or a service weapon. Considering the potential threat
they represent, in 2005 the MIA decided to stop issuing licences for 9mm Stechkin
automatic pistols. It is not clear, however, how many civilian licences for such weapons
had been issued in the preceding years, or whether these weapons have since been 
collected. Another problem caused by the lack of a Register is that it is sometimes
unclear whether a specific type of ‘civil’ weapon should be registered with the central
Permissions department in Tbilisi or by the Patrol Police anywhere in the country.
Verification and inspection
According to the ‘Law on Arms’, weapons should be kept at home in a ‘safe place’ with
their registration documents. However, the Police do not have the right to enter
firearm owners’ houses in order to check storage conditions or the owner’s licence.
They can do so only if there are strong grounds for suspicion that storage conditions
are inadequate. Even in such cases, permission to check storage conditions is first
required from a prosecutor or judge. The Permissions Department also lacks the
authority to inspect the inventories of gun shops and is consequently unaware how
many weapons each shop holds and cannot easily monitor whether the amount of
weapons sold by a shop tallies accurately with the amount it is acquiring.
Outreach to civilians 
It appears that knowledge amongst the general population of the licensing and regis-
tration process is low. For example, 43 percent of household survey respondents were
not familiar with the procedure for registering and licensing firearms, and focus group
participants thought that the ‘vast majority’ of the population was unaware of it.
Knowledge of the licensing system was considerably lower amongst non-ethnic 
Georgian communities; 61 percent of non-ethnic Georgians were unfamiliar with the
licensing system, compared to 41 percent of ethnic Georgians. Focus group discussions
showed that ethnic Azeris are unfamiliar with domestic arms control legislation.
Ethnic Azeri participants in these discussions attributed this to the fact that the 
relevant legislation has not been translated into Azeri.
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Controls over the private security industry
There are no specific laws governing the operations of private security companies or
private detective agencies in Georgia, nor do private security companies require a 
special licence or permit in order to provide private security services. Rather, private
security companies are regulated like all other economic enterprises by the ‘Law on
Enterprise Activity Licensing & Basis of Permission Issues’. It is consequently often
difficult to know whether an organisation provides private security services or not.
In addition, no information was available on the number of companies, such as banks,
that maintain armed in house security in the form of ‘internal security divisions’.
The use of firearms by private security guards is regulated by the ‘Law on Arms’ in the
same way as for all other citizens. This means that private security companies cannot
possess weapons directly. Instead, such companies obtain permissions for named
employees to apply for a licence to own firearms. It is not clear, however, to whom the
private security companies apply for this permission, due to a lack of access to infor-
mation on the MIA’s internal regulations regarding the private security industry.
Named employees then apply for an individual licence to own a firearm.23 The require-
ments necessary for private security guards to obtain firearms are identical to those for
other citizens. While ordinary citizens can carry gas, sports and smooth-bored hunt-
ing firearms, private security guards are only permitted to carry gas weapons. The only
exceptions are the internal security divisions of banks (including vehicles transporting
cash) and airports. These groups can issue ‘service’ firearms to their employees (with
the exception of automatic machine-guns). Each bank/airport must register all
firearms used by its staff and provide a list to the MIA of all employees permitted to
carry weapons. These weapons must be kept on the bank/airport’s premises at all
times.
The absence of specific legislation regulating the provision of private security services
and establishing a specific licensing system has severely undermined control of this
sector in a number of ways. Firstly, it is not possible to know exactly how many private
security companies are presently operating in Georgia. Secondly, no standard system
presently exists to vet those who apply to work as guards. While some private security
companies claim to check whether potential employees have criminal records, it is not
clear whether this is always the case. One informed interviewee thought that a large
proportion of private security guards might have criminal records.24 Nor are private
security guards required to undergo any specific training, including in the use of
firearms. One interviewee admitted that while there is not a shortage of potential
employees the professionalism of many applicants is not very high.
Thirdly, there is no formalised relationship between private security companies and
government security agencies such as the Patrol Police. This means that the level of
co-operation and interaction between the private security industry and state security
agencies varies enormously from company to company. Co-operation may just entail
calling the Patrol Police in the event of an incident (eg a burglary), with private 
security guards and the Patrol Police then entering the building jointly. However, some
private security companies seem to have a closer relationship with the authorities.
For example, some managers are regularly invited to information-sharing meetings
with the MIA.25 One private security company stated that it provides information to
the Antiterrorist Centre on a monthly basis.26 This does not appear to be the norm,
however.
Lastly, without adequate safeguards in place, the potential exists for inappropriate
links to develop between private security companies, government officials and 
parliamentarians. Most private security guards were formerly employed in the state
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24 Anonymous interviewee A, public security official.
25 Interview, Private Security Company ‘Guarantor of Security of People and Property’.
26 Interview, Private Security Company ‘Daraka’. 
security sector, including high-ranking servicemen, policemen, special troops,
members of Shevardnadze’s private guard service, and those who fought in the Abkhaz
war. Only one of the managers interviewed for this study had not previously worked in
the state security sector. While a close affiliation between public and private security
sectors is not in itself negative, it might be the case that these associations have 
prevented the introduction of legislation on the protection of private property.27
In addition, according to one study in 2003, some private security companies would
pay the MIA’s Property Protection Department to obtain police officer status for their
employees, thereby gaining the right to carry firearms. It was claimed that the MIA
would ‘then show little interest in what its newly registered officers get up to’.28
Various attempts have been made since 2001 to introduce a law governing the private
security industry, but so far they have proved unsuccessful. A number of interviewees
have suggested in private that this legislation has been blocked due to close associa-
tions between private security companies, the justice and security ministries, and 
parliamentarians who fear it could damage their interests.29 No substantial evidence
has been provided to support any of these claims. Elements of the private security
industry are, however, interested in regulation and one company has developed a draft
law, which provides for licensing and background checks of personnel.30
Despite the lack of legislation, an MIA representative claimed that governance of the
private security industry has improved since the Rose Revolution in 2003 because of
the introduction of strict internal MIA instructions.31 However, the research team was
not given access to these internal instructions, and it is thus difficult to judge what
impact they have had on improving regulation of the private security industry.
It is impossible to give a precise figure for the amount of weapons held legally by 
civilians. This is primarily because – as Georgian officials themselves acknowledge –
previous inadequacies in the record-keeping system mean that government statistics
are not yet fully reliable. In such circumstances, the only option is to draw on all 
available sources and make an approximate calculation. On this basis, the research
team estimates that there are over 159,000 legally registered firearms in Georgia.
This is based on the following logic:
Table 1: Estimate of legally registered weapons
Types of weapon Registration body Estimate
Pistols, shotguns, gas weapons MIA Permissions Department 60,000a
Smooth-bored hunting weapons Patrol Police 99,000b
Total 159,000
aMIA Permissions Department Estimate. 
bExtrapolation of data from Ajara (9,000) across all nine regions
The figures presented draw together information from two different sources, reflecting
the two different agencies responsible for licensing weapons in Georgia. The MIA’s
Information and Analysis Department told the research team that although it does not
have accurate figures, it is believed that approximately 60,000 pistols, shotguns and gas
weapons have been licensed by the Permission Departments, with 600–900 new
firearm licences being issued every month.32
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29 Anonymous interviewee A, public security official. 
30 Interview, Private Security Company ‘Aligator’.
31 Interview, Shota Utiashvili.
32 Ibid.
3.2 Legal
civilian
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Getting information on the number of hunting weapons registered by the Patrol Police
proved more of a challenge, as statistics on the number of weapons licensed in each
region are not centrally collated and the research team was not able to source informa-
tion from the regional offices. As a result, it has been possible only to make a very
broad estimate of the number of registered smooth-bored hunting weapons by 
extrapolating from information from one region. According to the Patrol Police in
Batumi, there are about 9,000 registered smooth-bored hunting rifles in Ajara.33
Multiplying this figure by the 11 regions of Georgia under central control produces 
a figure of 99,000 weapons. It is recognised, however, that such calculations fail to take
account of the significant cultural and demographic variations between Georgia’s
regions, and as such, this figure is meant only as a broad estimate rather than as a
definitive figure. Indeed the overall figure for firearms registered in the regions could
be much higher. For example, the majority of household survey respondents who 
stated that they owned a weapon said that they owned a hunting rifle (78 percent),
while only 20 percent stated that they owned a pistol or revolver. If this is correct, and
the weapons referred to are legally owned, then as many as 267,000 hunting style
weapons could be registered in the regions.
If these two estimates are correct, this would indicate that upwards of 159,000 legally
held firearms are in Georgia34 and thus that there are approximately 3.7 registered
weapons per 100 people. This means that per capita legal weapon ownership in 
Georgia is well below the EU15 average of 11 per 100 people.35
Types of registered firearms
Due to the aforementioned weaknesses in the recording system prior to 2004, the MIA
is not able to provide a breakdown of firearms ownership by type. Nonetheless, it is
possible to develop a general picture of the types of firearms legally owned by compar-
ing the number of firearms registered by the Permission Department (rifled long-bore
weapons, pistols, gas weapons and shotguns) and those registered by the Patrol Police
(hunting weapons excluding shotguns), through interviews with gun shop owners and
the results from the household survey.
If the above estimates are accurate, then approximately 62 percent of legally owned
weapons are hunting style weapons, since they are registered by the Patrol Police. The
ratio of hunting weapons to non-hunting weapons could, however, be much higher.
For example, as noted above, 78 percent of household survey respondents who claimed
to have a gun stated that they had a hunting weapon. In addition, gun shop owners
confirm that although they sell a broad range of weapons, the majority of their trade 
is comprised of hunting weapons, and some shops only sell such weapons.36 Further,
when asked what three types of firearm ordinary citizens most commonly have,
respondents thought that the most widely owned weapons were hunting rifles,
followed by pistols and revolvers:37
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33 Interview, Johnny Bakuradze. 
34 The estimate of 159,000 plus firearms in legal possession is broadly supported by the findings of the household survey.
Responses to the questions ‘Do you have a weapon at home now’ and ‘If yes how many’ indicate a total of 104,000
weapons in civilian ownership in government controlled Georgia. As experience from previous research in other countries
demonstrates that the public tend to underreport on questions of firearm ownership, an estimate of 159,000 firearms in
legal possession does not seem unreasonable. It should be noted that it is unknown what proportion of these weapons are
held illegally, although it is unlikely that respondents would openly declare illegally held firearms.
35 Source: Small Arms Survey 2003. Since this average figure hides major differences in levels of weapon ownership between
EU states, this figure is meant only to indicate the relative prevalence of weapons in Georgian society in comparison to other
European nations. 
36 Gun shop interviews (see Annex 1).
37 It should be noted that no distinction was made in this question between legal and illegal firearms.
Figure 1: If any, what type of arms do ordinary citizens most commonly have?
(Up to three answers; Base No. = 1,300)
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The one exception to this trend is Tbilisi, where there are probably more self-defence
weapons, such as pistols and revolvers, than hunting weapons. Indeed, when asked
what types of weapons ordinary citizens most commonly own, more household 
survey respondents in Tbilisi answered pistols and revolvers (58 percent) than hunting
rifles (48 percent). The most popular self-defence firearm in Georgia appears to be 
the Makarov pistol, which can be bought legally for around GEL 550 (approximately
US$300).38 Previously, when shotguns could be legally carried, they were popular
weapons and accounted for a large proportion of weapons sold in gun shops.
Following a ban on their carriage, however, shotgun sales have fallen.39
Demographic distribution of legal weapons
The MIA is not currently able to provide a demographic breakdown of firearm owner-
ship in Georgia. However, an impression of demographic distribution can be gained
from interviews and the household survey. Gun shop owners state that their clients are
mainly male, with female clients buying only self-defence pistols.40 Although they
serve clients of all ages and social groups, the majority of customers are thought to be
middle class and in the 30–60 year old age bracket. This age range contrasts with 
information provided by survey respondents, according to which 26–35 year olds are
the group most likely to have firearms, followed by 19–25 year olds:
Figure 2: People from which age group are most likely to have firearms? 
(Base No. = 1,300)
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This discrepancy may be attributable to the different ways in which these questions
were posed. While gun shop owners were asked exclusively about weapons they had
legally sold, household survey respondents were not asked to discern between legal
and illegal firearm ownership. This might indicate that while 30–60 year olds are more
likely to purchase firearms legally, 19–30 year olds are more likely to acquire firearms
from other sources, either through inheritance or by illegal means. Significantly, in
Tbilisi, Shida Kartli and Samtskhe-Javakheti, the 19–25 age group was considered most
likely to own firearms by household survey respondents (Tbilisi and Shida Kartli suffer
from high levels of illegal firearm possession and gun crime) while focus group par-
ticipants in Samtskhe-Javakheti commented that gun crime is becoming increasingly
prevalent among young people due to a lack of employment opportunities (see section
4.3 for more information on gun crime).
Discounting criminals, the Army and the Police (for whom weapons possession is
taken for granted), survey respondents thought that the largest amounts of firearms 
in Georgia are held by private security companies, politicians and businessmen, in that
order. Although respondents overwhelmingly thought that the most common types of
firearm in Georgia are hunting weapons, only one percent of respondents thought that
hunters were the group with the most number of firearms. This discrepancy may be
due to the fact that groups other than hunters (eg criminals) also own hunting style
weapons. Equally it could be because hunters are not seen as a coherent group in the
same way that private security guards, politicians or businessmen might be.
Firearms and the private security industry
Since no specific licences are given to private security companies and private detective
agencies identifying them as such, no statistics are available for the number of such
companies operating in Georgia or the number of firearms they hold. As a result, the
research team was unable to make an estimate of the number of firearms that are used
by private security companies and their employees. In addition, although current 
regulations only allow private security guards to carry gas weapons, it is unclear
whether individual employees use weapons licensed to them personally in the 
provision of static security.
A limited idea of the extent of the private security industry and its use of firearms was
gained from interviews with representatives from the private security industry (see
Annex 1). The majority of private security companies interviewed stated that their
employees do not have firearms, and none were aware of the number of companies
that do use them. However, some interviewees suggested that companies with close
affiliations with the justice and security ministries or political parties might keep and
use firearms.41 In place of firearms, employees are generally armed with electric-shock
equipment, handcuffs and rubber clubs. One private security company mentioned
that it also keeps smooth-bored guns, gas pistols and shotguns on the sites it is 
guarding, but these weapons are not carried, simply kept on site and handed from shift
to shift.42
20 TAKING STOCK: SMALL ARMS AND HUMAN SECURITY IN GEORGIA
41 Anonymous interviewee A, public security official.
42 Interview, Private Security Company ‘Guarantor of Security of People and Property’.
The Georgian Government does not have an official estimate of illicit firearms hold-
ings, and it is hoped that this study will provide valuable indicators to the Government
on levels of illegal possession. There is little doubt, however, that illegal firearms 
possession is an issue in Georgia. Several factors point in this direction. Firstly, both
government officials and the general public expressed a perception that illegal
weapons are widespread. The Head of the MIA’s Information and Analysis Depart-
ment made a personal estimate that approximately ten percent of households might
have illegal firearms, many of which may own more than one weapon.43 In addition,
33 percent of household survey respondents thought that most firearms in Georgia 
are unlicensed.44 Secondly, the high incidence of arrests for the illegal possession or 
carrying of firearms also suggests that unregistered weapons are widely distributed 
in Georgian society. For example, there are approximately three to five arrests for the 
illegal possession or carriage of firearms a week, the majority of which occur in
Tbilisi.45 Thirdly, it is often pointed out that a large number of illicit firearms entered
civilian possession as a result of the two separatist conflicts and civil war in the early
1990s, but have not since been accounted for. No substantial collection campaigns have
since been conducted – those that were undertaken in the mid-1990s were targeted 
at undermining politically powerful paramilitary groups rather than disarming the
general population.46 The expectation is that many of these weapons remain in illegal
possession, in a ‘dormant’ state.
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that a proportion of these cases involve firearms that are registered but illegally carried. Such firearm cannot be considered
‘illegal’. See section 3.5 for more analysis. .
46 Demetriou S, Politics from the Barrel of a Gun: Small Arms Proliferation and Conflict in the Republic of Georgia, 1989–2001
(Small Arms Survey, 2002). 
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Box 2: The private security industry in Georgia
Private security companies are thought to have first started operating in Georgia in 1985. 
The number of companies operating in Georgia increased in the mid-1990s, following the
disbandment of the Mkhedrioni and the subordination of the National Guard to the MoD.
The size of the private security market has grown rapidly since 2002–2003, with a great 
number of new companies being established. One observer estimated that tens of thousands
of Georgians are presently employed in the private security industry. However, a more likely
figure is around 10,000 employees. Interviewees from within the industry estimate that there
are between 250 and 300 security providers in Georgia. Of these, three to six companies are
thought to dominate the market, some of which employ between 500 and 1,000 staff. The
remaining companies are considered to be uncompetitive and can have as few as seven to ten
members of staff. For example, the smallest company interviewed had 25 employees, while
the largest had 750.
Representatives from the industry believe that the market is now extremely ‘chaotic’ and has
been affected by the rise in competition, since in the absence of specific licensing require-
ments ‘anyone can set up a private security company’ (Interview, ‘Guarantor of Security of
People and Property’; ‘Voltra’). Another interviewee suggested that ‘almost all’ former 
security employees who find themselves unemployed establish private security companies
(Interview, 'Aligator'). Most newly formed companies do not operate for long, however, as
they lack both technical and material resources and an established client base. There are some
indications that the number of companies operating might be reducing due to pressure from
the Government and market realities. In general, those interviewed thought that Georgia’s
private security industry is in need of consolidation and that between ten and fifteen 
companies would be sufficient to meet current demand.
The research team used different questions from the household survey in order to 
calculate the amount of illegal weapons in circulation. These calculations were com-
pared with estimates given by informed interviewees. This method has its weaknesses,
and the estimates produced as a result should be used with caution. Nonetheless, the
research team believes upwards of 250,000 illegal weapons are in circulation in con-
temporary Georgia, excluding Abkhazia and South Ossetia, since the information that
this estimate is based on – household survey respondents claiming to know of at least
one friend or family’s household owning at least one working firearm – is generally
credible. Alternatively, a second minimum estimate of 89,000 illegal weapons, which is
based upon the number of firearms previously in civilian possession that have not
been collected or seized (this information is again taken from the household survey),
is also presented. The different methods for estimating illegal firearm ownership, their
relative strengths and weaknesses and the resultant estimates are outlined in Table 2
and are explored in detail below.
Table 2: Estimates for illicit weapons holdings
Method Key problems Estimate
1. Key informant estimate Not based on statistical data 147,000
2. Estimates from survey
1a. ‘Have you ever had a weapon at home?’ Direct questioning – likely under- 89,000
reporting by respondents
1b. ‘In your opinion, what percentages of Calculation based on each positive 250,000
your friends and family’s households have respondent having only one firearm-
at least one working firearm?’ owning family/friend – likely 
underestimate
Method 1: Key informant estimate
As noted above, the Head of the MIA’s Information and Analysis Department made 
a personal estimate (ie not based on statistical or operational information) that
approximately ten percent of households could have illegal firearms, many of which
may have more than one weapon. If this figure of ten percent were to be accurate, this
would correspond to a figure of at least 147,000 illegal firearms in civilian possession.47
It is recognised, however, that this was meant only as estimation, and although it is
from a well-informed individual, it has no pretensions to be an accurate figure.
A range of other government officials (eg police officers, border officials and MoD
officials) and experts from civil society were also asked to provide an estimate of illicit
weapon holdings. Most interviewees did not feel themselves informed enough to 
provide an estimate, while those that did provided a very broad range of estimates.
Method 1: Household survey estimates
Responses to the household survey conducted by the Georgian market research 
company ‘GORBI’ in late 2005 provide two estimates for the number of illegal civilian
weapons in Georgian households. The household survey was conducted on territory
controlled by the Georgian Government and does not take into account Abkhazia and
South Ossetia. Since a random sampling technique was used, the survey’s findings can
be generalised to households across Georgia (excluding Abkhazia and South Ossetia).
It should also be noted that this method provides initial estimates of the total number
of civilian-held weapons in Georgia, requiring a further calculation, in which the
research team’s estimate of the total number of registered weapons (itself an uncertain
figure) is subtracted from the overall total to provide an estimate of illegal weapon
holdings.
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47 In 2004, there were 1,243,158 households in Georgia, excluding the separatist areas of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Source:
Ministry of Economic Development of Georgia Department for Statistics, 2004. Ten percent of all households equals is
124,316. Using a multiplier of 1.182, to take account for the fact that some households will own more than one firearm, this
provides a total of 147,000 weapons (146,941 exactly). See below for method for calculating multiplier. 
An estimate of levels of household firearm possession can be calculated from positive
responses to the question ‘Have you ever had a weapon at home’, which indicate that a
total of 210,094 households (16.9 percent of all households) in government-controlled
Georgia have had at least one weapon previously and that this weapon has not been
removed from circulation.48 A multiplier of 1.182 can also be calculated from the 
question ‘In your opinion, how many guns are there in a typical Georgian household’,49
indicates that there are presently some 89,000 illegal firearms in the country. However,
the accuracy of responses to this question is limited by the tendency of respondents to
under-report when asked directly about firearm ownership in their households:
Table 3: Household survey estimate 1 – ‘Have you ever had a weapon at home’
Number households with weapons 210,094
Multiplier x1.182
Total number of weapons 248,331
Legally owned weapons –159,000
= Total illegal weapons 89,000 (89,331)
A second estimate for illegal firearm possession can be calculated from responses to
the question ‘In your opinion, what percentages of your friends and family’s house-
holds have at least one working firearm? A total of 28 percent of respondents to this
question stated that at least one of their friends and family’s households have a
firearm.50 Responses to this question indicate that there are at least 250,000 firearms in
illegal possession in government controlled Georgia. While this estimate is more likely
to be accurate than the previous one, it may underestimate total civilian weapon hold-
ings as respondents who answered the question positively indicated that more than
one of their friends and family’s households have a weapon. However, it is not feasible
to attempt a calculation of the total number of such firearm-owning households, as a)
the respondents answered with a range (eg 1–5 percent), and b) it is not known how
many friends and family households each respondent has.
Table 4: Household survey estimate 2 – ‘In your opinion, what percentages of your friends’
and family’s households have at least one working firearm?’
Number households with weapons 348,084
Multiplier x1.182
Total number of weapons 411,435
Legally owned weapons –159,000
= Total illegal weapons 252,000 (252,435)
Interviewees and the focus group discussions identified a range of different sources
from which firearms have been obtained illegally in the past, and which could 
represent contemporary sources of illegal firearms. It was alleged that the principal
sources have been: Russian military bases located both in Georgia and elsewhere in the
Caucasus; the various conflicts in the 1990s; thefts from national stocks and individual
civilian owners; and trafficking into Georgia from other countries. While all these 
factors have played significant role in past small arms proliferation, they do not seem
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48 Respondents who replied positively to this question were then asked ‘What happened to that weapon?’ – It was given to a
friend or family member, 27,349 (2.2% of all households); It was stolen, 24,863 (2%); It was sold, 44,754 (3.6%); Still have
it, 87,021 (7%); Other/NA/DK, 26,106 (2.1%); Total = 210,094 (16.9%).
49 While the majority of survey respondents stated that they did not know, a mean figure of 1.182 for weapons possession per
household can be generated from the responses of those that gave an answer. This calculation is used as the minimum
multiplier to apply to estimated numbers of weapons-owning households to project the total of weapons possessed by
them. From a base of 1,300 the responses were: ‘don’t know’ – 578 (44.5% of respondents); no answer – 30 (2.3%); ‘1’ –
543 (41.8%); ‘2’ – 64 (4.9%); ‘3’ – 16 (1.2%); ‘4’ – 3 (0.2%); ‘5’ – 1 (0.1%); ‘0’ – 66 (5.1%). The sum of positive responses
was divided by the number of positive respondents to provide the multiplier of 1.182. 
50 21% of respondents stated that 1–5% of their friends/family had one working firearm; 3% stated that 6–10% had one
working firearm; 2% stated 11–20%; 1% stated 21–40%, and; 1% stated 61–80%. 
3.4 Sources for
illegal firearms
to be the source of large quantities of illegal firearms at present. Indeed, results from
the household survey demonstrate that gun shops are the most frequent way of
acquiring a firearm. For example, 69 percent of respondents to the household survey
stated that they would turn to a gun shop if they ever wanted a firearm.51 It is probably
the case that few new illegal weapons are entering society, due in part to reduced
demand, and that the present market for illegal weapons is based upon the circulation
of old weapons.
Russian bases
Russian bases and peacekeeping battalions – particularly those in Anaklia and 
Akhaltsikhe in Georgia but also those in other parts of the North and South Caucasus
– were consistently identified by both Georgian officials and focus group participants
as a major source of illicit firearms. This related primarily to the early 1990s, when
weapons seemed to be easy to acquire from the bases of the Transcaucasian Military
District as a result of individual or orchestrated corruption amongst the Russian 
military. One interviewee claimed that in 1992–93 it was possible to obtain a Russian
firearm for two bottles of vodka.52 A number of participants also thought that Russian
forces had intentionally distributed weapons from these bases:
I knew people who received weapons in the 1990s. There was one man who lived in 
Zugdidi, he bought and transported weapons that had been provided by the Russians.
He would go to the Russian battalion, which was located in Anaklia, and take guns.
Focus Group G, Zugdidi, civil servant, female
Some interviewees and focus group participants believed that it is still relatively simple
to obtain weapons from Russian troops based in Georgia and also expressed the fear
that the withdrawal of the remaining Russian military bases from Georgia provides an
additional opportunity for firearms to be illegally distributed amongst the population.
While previous studies have indicated that Russian bases were a significant source of
illicit firearms in the 1990s,53 the research team is not aware of any national or 
independent investigations that would substantiate accusations of contemporary 
leaks or thefts from Russian bases.
Conflicts during the 1990s
Key informant interviewees and focus group participants agreed that, with the large
availability of small arms during the civil confrontations in Abkhazia, South Ossetia
and Mingrelia at the beginning of the 1990s, a large number of weapons were 
distributed amongst the general public. This included distribution to ‘illegal 
battalions’ comprised mainly of young people and semi-autonomous paramilitary
groups such as the Mkhedrioni (Horsemen) and the Erovnuli Gvardia (National
Guard), which were powerful during this period. It is thought that many of these 
volunteers kept their weapons rather than surrender them to officials during the
weapons collection campaign in 1995–1996. It is also thought that many weapons left
over from the conflict period have been buried ‘just in case’.54 Indeed, several key
informant interviewees thought that perhaps the majority of unregistered firearms in
illicit possession were obtained during these conflicts:55
In the 90s, people could just walk around carrying weapons. It was a time when many 
people were able to buy weapons with no questions asked. Of course, this wasn’t the official
situation, but who was going to question it or ask why they needed weapons? 
Focus Group M, Marneuli, unemployed, male, 25 
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51 Only one percent stated that they would acquire a firearm from a friend, while three percent stated that they would turn to
an arms dealer
52 Interview, Kakha Katsitadze.
53 Op. Cit. Demetriou S.
54 Interview, Koba Liklikadze.
55 Interview, Kakha Katsitadze.
Looting and thefts
The MIA maintains a list of firearms that have been stolen from civilians and from the
state. This list was not provided to the research team. Nevertheless, available informa-
tion demonstrates that a significant number of firearms have been looted or stolen
from both state stockpiles and civilian owners. A previous estimate in 2003, based
upon official figures for stolen weapons and weapons missing from government
stocks, found that there were at least 40,000 such weapons in circulation in Georgia.56
All interviewees agreed that the majority of thefts from stockpiles probably occurred
in the early 1990s during the transition from Soviet security structures to the creation
of a new domestic security architecture. While MoD representatives interviewed for
this study were not able to provide details of weapons stolen during this period,
according to the Head of the MoD’s Law Department, in the last ten years there have
been approximately seven thefts from military barracks (a few dozen guns and less
than ten grenade launchers).57 While stockpile security is improving, it is hard to judge
whether thefts from stockpiles still represent a concern for the Georgian Government,
since the research team did not have enough information regarding present stockpile
security standards at MoD stores (see section 6.2.1).
Ongoing thefts from civilian owners might present more of a problem than thefts
from state stores. For example, two percent of respondents to the household survey
admitted to having had a firearm stolen in the past, suggesting some 25,000 firearms
have been stolen across the country58 This estimate should be regarded as a minimum
figure due to under-reporting, especially regarding illegally held weapons that have
been stolen.
Trafficking
While the MIA’s Department of State Border Defence (hereafter ‘Border Police’) does
not consider small arms trafficking to be a major concern apart from in the areas 
controlled by the two separatist regions, cases of small arms trafficking across borders
controlled by the Georgian Government have occurred in the past. It appears that
significant amounts of illegal firearms may have entered the country due to trafficking
across both the Northern mountainous border and the Southern border around the
regions of Samtskhe-Javakheti and Kvemo Kartli (see section 8.4). While there is no
evidence of small arms trafficking at the present time, it could become significant in
the future were demand for illegal weapons to become greater.
There is great deal of variance in the distribution of legal and illegal firearms across
Georgia’s regions, even excluding the separatist areas. This is mostly due to the 
differing conditions across the country, including each region’s proximity to zones 
of conflict or certain border areas, a continued cultural affiliation towards firearms
amongst some groups, historic inter-ethnic tensions in some areas and related low 
levels of trust in the police and other security and justice agencies. However, state
agencies were not able to provide detailed assessments of the distribution of either
legal or illegal firearms. The following section aims to go some way to filling this gap,
by using responses to the household survey, official crime statistics, past research and
interviews to develop a picture of both legal and illegal firearms distribution.
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56 Op. Cit. Darchiashvili D. While official figures recorded 20,000 such weapons, it was argued that under-recording of such
incidents meant that the real number was likely to be at least double this figure. 
57 Interview, Mamuka Kikaleishvili. 
58 Two percent of all respondents to the household survey stated that they have had a weapon stolen. On the basis that there
are 1,243,158 households in Georgia, this entails that firearms have been stolen from 24,863 households.
3.5 Geographic
distribution of
firearms 
In general, overall levels of firearm ownership were found by the research team to be
highest in the capital, Tbilisi, and in the regions of Samegrelo-Svaneti, Shida-Kartli
and Imereti. It is almost certainly no coincidence that these regions were found to
exhibit the highest levels of illegal firearm ownership and that two of these regions
(Samegrelo-Svaneti and Shida-Kartli) are close to Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
Outside of these areas illicit firearms were found to be common in Ajara, among the
mountainous areas of Kakheti and Mtskheta-Mtianeti, which border Chechnya and
Dagestan, and among the non-ethnic Georgian communities in the border areas of
Kvemo-Kartli. The basic indicators for high levels of firearms distribution in these
areas are presented below.
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59 It should be noted that this question made no distinction between legal and illegal firearms. It is also recognised by the
research team that the levels of legal and illegal firearm ownership may vary dramatically within a region. Nevertheless, a
regional breakdown of firearm ownership was considered the most accurate method for analysing the geographic
distribution of weapons. 
Box 3: Distribution case study – Tbilisi
Tbilisi was identified as one of main centres of both legal and illegal firearms in Georgia by
both the public and government officials. Indeed, the Head of the MIA’s Information Depart-
ment thought there were more illegal firearms in Tbilisi than anywhere else in the country.
This view was echoed by focus group participants:
There are probably less weapons located in Pankisi Gorge than in the cities, because 
authorities often go to Pankisi [in search of weapons]. However, in Tbilisi nobody goes to
houses in search of weapons. Isn't this true?
Focus group E, Tbilisi, housewife, female, 40
FGD participants also thought that urban gun owners most commonly possessed short-
barrelled weapons such as TT and Makarov pistols, as well as some Kalashnikov assault rifles,
while people living in rural areas mainly had hunting weapons. The supposedly high level of
distribution of short-barrelled weapons in urban areas was thought to be associated with
criminals operating in towns and cities. 
Overall geographic distribution
Respondents to the household survey thought that firearms, apart from those under
the control of the state (eg Police and Army), are much more abundant in Tbilisi, the
regions of Samegrelo-Svaneti and Shida Kartli, and Ajara.59 Significantly, Samegrelo-
Svaneti and Shida Kartli were also the only regions in Georgia where respondents
thought that firearms were more abundant in their own region than in other regions:
Figure 3: In which regions of Georgia are firearms most abundant? 
(Base No. = 1,300)
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Overall, survey respondents also thought firearms were more abundant in cities (65
percent) than in villages and rural areas (19 percent). Citizens from Samegrelo-Svaneti
were an exception to this trend, where a larger proportion of respondents thought that
firearms are more abundant in villages and rural areas (40 percent). This discrepancy
probably reflects significant levels of illegal firearms ownership in this region and the
operations of organised armed groups, especially during the hazelnut harvest 
(see below).
Box 4: Distribution case study – 
Samegrelo-Svaneti, Zugdidi town 
Illicit firearm holdings in Samegrelo-Svaneti are thought to be particularly high for a number
of reasons. Firstly, most of the fighting during the civil war between the central government
and supporters of ousted President Gamsakhurdia took place in Mingrelia and Svaneti, where
he remained popular. As a result, a large number of firearms entered into circulation during
this period. No substantive collection campaigns have been carried out since, meaning it is
likely that a large amount of illegal firearms remain uncollected. Secondly, Samegrelo-Svaneti
marks the internal border between Abkhazia and government-controlled Georgia, and is
presently home to over 100,000 internally displaced persons, the largest concentration in
Georgia. Security in this region remains a challenge, especially in the demiliatarised zone,
much of which is not effectively controlled by either the Georgian or Abkhaz side. Thirdly,
there is a traditional affiliation with weapons among many of the region’s inhabitants, and
correspondingly high levels of ownership. Focus group respondents agreed that Samegrelo-
Svaneti still has a significant problem with illegal firearms possession:
Not even 10 percent of the weapons which were distributed amongst the population [in 
Zugdidi and Svaneti] in the 90s have been collected
Focus group D, Tbilisi, former MoD, male, 56
Our government is unable to control Svaneti because there are so many guns, and because
there are so many guns there’s no control. 
Focus group H, Zugdidi, unemployed, Female, 42 
The chief of the Zugdidi Regional Police thought that levels of illicit ownership are decreasing,
as indicated by the reduction in celebratory shooting during the 2005–2006 New Year and a
considerable decrease in firearm-related crime. He also believed that currently there is no sub-
stantial black market in the region, and thus the principal way to obtain a weapon illegally is
to purchase it from another illegal owner. Nonetheless, a ‘large’ number of firearms are still
thought to be in illegal possession in the Zugdidi region, mostly from the early 1990s. High
levels of illicit SALW distribution is indicated by the number and range of SALW seized by the
regional police in 2005: 83 automatic rifles, 20 pistols, seven rifles, nine grenade launchers,
40 grenades, a number of anti-tank mines and dozens of hand grenades. 
The picture of geographic firearms distribution painted by the household survey is
generally in line with the views expressed in key informant interviewees and focus
group discussions, except that interviewees generally felt that Tbilisi had the highest
level of firearm ownership, rather than Samegrelo-Svaneti. Indeed, according to the
MIA’s Information and Analysis Department, the majority of registered rifled and gas
firearms are probably in Tbilisi, as they are expensive enough to be considered a 
luxury. In contrast to the household survey, focus group participants also thought 
that there are significant levels of firearms ownerships in the mountainous regions of
Northern Georgia (see box 5).
This picture is similar to that provided by the analysis of overall distribution based on
responses to the household survey, except that the Samegrelo-Svaneti and Shida Kartli
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60 As categorised under Paragraph 236 of the Georgian Criminal Code. 
61 It should be noted that a proportion of illegal firearms incidents involve legally registered firearms that are illegally carried
outside of the home. As such, these firearms cannot be considered illegal. The research team was not able to calculate the
number of such incidents due to the lack of access to a more detailed breakdown of these crimes. 
62 Calculations of illegal firearm incidents per 10,000 people in 2005 provide a slightly different map of illegal firearm
possession. While this type of crime is still most frequent in Tbilisi, those areas will smaller populations, such as Racha-
Lechkhumi and Guria, are more prominent: Tbilisi (4.2 firearm incidents per 10,000); Racha-Lechkhumi (4.2); Guria (3.6);
Ajara (3.4); Imereti (2.97); Shida Kartli (2.5); Samegrelo-Zemo Svaneti (2.3); Mtskheta-Mtianeti (2.3); Kakheti (2.2);
Samtskhe-Javakheti (1.9); Kvemo Kartli (1.1). Source: Georgian Department of Statistics.
Box 5: Distribution case study –
Northern mountainous border, Kakheti
While it is possible to establish broad comparisons of firearm ownership between regions on
the basis of responses to the household survey, key informant interviews and the focus group
discussions suggest that there can be a good deal of disparity in firearm ownership within
regions themselves. This is most likely to be true with regards to regions on Georgia’s 
Northern border, especially Kakheti, Mtskheta-Mtianeti and Samegrelo-Svaneti. Focus group
participants thought that more registered and unregistered weapons can be found in the
mountainous regions of Svaneti (in Samegrelo-Svaneti), the Pankisi Gorge (in Kakheti) and
Khevsureti (in Mtskheta-Mtianeti) than elsewhere in the country. The tendency for high levels
of firearm ownership in these regions was attributed to the traditional association with guns
amongst the mountain groups, as well as the proximity of recent conflicts in Abkhazia and
Chechnya:
There are many guns in Zugdidi and Samachablo [South Ossetia], as well as in the Svaneti and
Khevsureti provinces [in Mtskheta-Mtianeti]. There are also many weapons in high mountain
regions, where traditionally they have always kept many guns; I believe they’re still there.
Focus group G, Zugdidi, unemployed, Male, 55
Of the regions with mountainous areas, substantial illicit firearm seizures were only recorded
in 2004–2005 in Kakheti. More research is needed to establish the level of illicit firearm 
ownership in these regions. 
Distribution of illegal firearms
The above analysis can be compared with arrests for the illegal purchasing, possession,
transfer and marketing of firearms (hereafter ‘illegal firearms incidents’)60 during 2004
and 2005 to provide an impression of illegal firearms distribution.61 The greatest 
number of illegal firearms incidents occurred in Tbilisi, followed by Imereti, Ajara,
Samegrelo-Svaneti, Kakheti and Shida Kartli:
Figure 4: Recorded incidents of the illegal firearm incidents, 2004–2005 62 (source: MIA)
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63 Paragraph 179 of the Georgian Criminal Code. 
64 See section 4.3 for more information on gun crime and its impacts. 
regions do not figure as prominently here as they do in responses to the household
survey. However, government statistics for reported crimes involving the use of fire-
arms (categorised as ‘banditry’)63 indicate that, apart from Tbilisi and Imereti, illegal
firearms possession is more widespread in these two regions than in the rest of the
country. For example, in 2005, this type of crime most frequently occurred in Tbilisi
(1,076 reported crimes) followed by Imereti (214) Samegrelo-Svaneti (141) Shida Kartli
(120) and Kvemo Kartli (104).64 While no information was available on whether these
crimes involved legal or illegal weapons, previous research in other Eastern European
countries indicates that the vast majority of gun crime is usually conducted with illegal
weapons.
Box 6: Distribution case study – 
Imereti region, Kutaisi
Imereti was an important crossroad into both Abkhazia during the conflict there and Svaneti/
Mingrelia during the civil war. Firearms ownership in this region was investigated during 
interviews in Kutaisi town, although it is acknowledged that Kutaisi cannot be considered
entirely representative of the whole region. 
According to the Mayor of Kutaisi, as a result of the easy access to weapons presented by 
the town’s strategic position during the civil war, a significant amount of illegal weaponry was
amassed in the town. Although no official figures are available for the number of firearms
collected in Kutaisi during the 1995–1996 collection campaign, the Mayor believed that a
large proportion of the region's illegal weapons were either handed in voluntarily or seized,
and those remaining do not represent a major problem. Nevertheless, significant amounts of
firearms continue to be seized in the city. In the period August 2005–January 2006, the
Kutaisi Police collected 18 units of weapons, including pistols, automatic weapons and 
explosives. Legal firearms possession is also high. The Mayor estimated that as much as 
80 percent of households may have some sort of weapon (mostly hunting weapons). It has
not been possible to check this estimate against Patrol Police records.
Significantly, illegal firearms incidents have increased substantially in both Tbilisi and
Ajara in 2004–2005, compared to a downward trend in the rest of the country. In the
case of Ajara, the increase is probably due to the fact that Ajara only reintegrated with
the rest of Georgia in May 2004, following which the local authorities undertook an
extensive collection campaign that included seizures (see section 7.1). Combined with
the fact that consistent recording procedures have only been in place since 2004, this
probably explains the increase in illegal firearms incidents in the region. It is less clear,
however, why the number of recorded illegal firearms incidents in Tbilisi is increasing.
This may be due to an increase in illegal firearms possession, but it might also be that
increased police capacity in this area is uncovering incidents that would have 
previously gone unnoticed.
Box 7: Distribution case study – Ajara 
For over ten years, Ajara was ruled by Aslan Abashidze in effective isolation from Tbilisi. 
During two periods of his rule, firearms were distributed to the local population, apparently
to shore up his power: the period of general instability in Georgia following independence
(1991–1995); and during the stand-off between the Abashidze regime and the new 
government brought to power by the Rose Revolution in late 2003–early 2004. 
30 TAKING STOCK: SMALL ARMS AND HUMAN SECURITY IN GEORGIA
In 1992–1993, Abashidze’s regime distributed weapons to civilians, arguing that although
Ajara was not yet directly affected by the conflicts elsewhere in Georgia, the general 
instability and in particular the threat caused by Mkhedrioni paramilitaries made such a step
necessary. It is widely believed, however, that weapons were distributed selectively to
Abashidze’s relatives and friends, government officials and supporters of the regime as 
identified by Abashidze’s intelligence service. It is thought that the authorities did keep 
registers of who had received weapons, but it is not known whether they were complete and
in any event some records were destroyed when the Abashidze regime fell.
The second period began in October–November 2003, when the protests that culminated in
the Rose Revolution swept Tbilisi. Abashidze recognised the threat to his regime and began
handing out weapons once again. This gathered pace in February–March 2004 as the stand-
off between Batumi and the new government in Tbilisi developed. People, particularly young
men, were reportedly gathered together and given US$1,000 and a weapon if they could
assemble a group of militia. However, illicit SALW ownership is thought to have reduced 
substantially since a regional collection campaign in May 2004, following restoration of 
central control from Tbilisi (see section 7.1).
It should be noted that this method of using criminal data to establish a picture of
illegal weapon holdings will only provide truly accurate information if all regional
police forces have similar capabilities to detect and seize illegal weapons. However, it is
clear that capabilities are not constant across Georgia, both because of differences in
police capacity and because of the circumstances in which they operate. For example,
the ability of the police in Samegrelo-Svaneti to seize weapons and record firearms
crime is undermined by the proximity of the separatist region of Abkhazia and the
existence of the demilitarised area along the internal border. Similarly, police operat-
ing in the mountainous regions of Kakheti and Mtskheta-Mtianeti may find it harder
to seize weapons and record gun crime due to the strong gun culture in these areas and
the difficult local terrain. Conversely, police operating in Tbilisi have more resources at
their disposal than the regional police forces.
Box 8: Distribution case study – 
Non-ethnic Georgian communities, Kvemo-Kartli
A final area of potentially high illicit firearms distribution, as indicated by incidents of banditry,
is Kvemo Kartli. Previous research in 2004 by the Tbilisi-based NGO CIPDD has demonstrated
that firearms distribution amongst the ethnic-Azeri population in this region is significant.
According to the study, ‘the amount of weapons amassed in the villages near the borders
[in Kvemo Kartli] is such that the police avoid entering the villages or reacting properly to the
crime committed there’. (SALW Proliferation and its Impact on Social and Political Life in
Kvemo-Kartli, CIPDD/GTZ, 2004) This study also estimated that 70–80 percent of the adult
population in Kvemo-Kartli own firearms, with the largest amount concentrated in villages
close to the border. These high levels of illicit firearm ownership are attributed in large part to
low levels of trust in the police, a lack of knowledge regarding weapons licensing procedures
and the alleged easy availability of weapons across the border in Azerbaijan. Another 
challenge is the low level of integration of the ethnic-Azeri community into Georgia’s political
and public life. The Georgian Government has not yet developed or implemented a cohesive
policy for integrating ethnic minorities into society. This generates a perception among ethnic
minorities that their culture, rights and religion are in some way threatened, which may
encourage them to acquire firearms for self-defence rather than relying on state agencies to
provide security. Indeed, representatives from the MIA have recognised that it is relatively easy
to buy SALW in Kvemo Kartli due to the lower levels of co-operation between ethnic Azeris
and the police.
Punishment for violations of domestic small arms legislation
According to the Georgian Criminal Code, the following punishments apply to 
violations of Georgia’s small arms control legislation:65
Table 5: Punishments for violations of domestic small arms legislation
Crime Punishment Article in Criminal Code
Illegal acquisition or keeping of Fine or imprisonment up to Article 236, paragraph 1
firearms and ammunition three years
Illegal acquisition of firearms, Imprisonment of between  Article 237
parts and ammunition (except three and seven years
for hunting rifles), with intent 
of robbery or extortion
Illegal carriage of firearms and Fine or imprisonment up to five Article 236, paragraph 2
ammunition years
Illegal production, transfer, Imprisonment of between five Article 236, paragraph 3
transportation or sale of and ten years
firearms and ammunition
The Georgian judicial system permits plea-bargaining over arms-related convictions,
with fines of approximately GEL 10,000 (US$5,500) being levied for conditional 
sentences.66 An exception exists for cases of illicit possession, whereby if the firearm is
uncovered disassembled and unloaded, a fine of approximately GEL 500 (US$275) is
imposed instead of a prison sentence.67 The use of plea-bargaining for firearm offences
could be problematic if it leads to inconsistent punishments for them. Further 
investigation is needed in order to ascertain whether this is the case. Those who 
voluntarily surrender unregistered firearms and ammunition avoid punishment
under Georgian law providing that these firearms have not been used to commit a
crime. Seized firearms become the property of the MIA, although in some cases they
can be returned to their legal owner following a court decision.
Investigative framework
There is currently no clear investigative framework for combating illegal firearm 
ownership within Georgia. The Patrol Police seizes illegal weapons, but weapons 
control and anti-proliferation initiatives do not fall within their competence. The
Patrol Police are required to inform the Special Operative Department (SOD) of any
seized or recovered illegal firearms. The SOD was formed in 2005 and is the lead
agency combating organised crime. According to the Criminal Code, SOD is tasked
with investigating and combating all gun crime, including seizures of unregistered
weapons. However, it appears that SOD does not currently analyse patterns of illicit
firearm ownership and trafficking, and has not yet developed a strategy or programme
to combat the trade in illicit firearms. As the research team was unable to interview
SOD officers, it is not possible to analyse the Department’s capacities in more detail.
Government policy to reduce illegal weapons possession through collection 
programmes is analysed separately in section 7.1.
Administrative capacity
Overall, the administrative capacity of the agencies involved in the licensing process
has improved significantly since 2004. The key changes have been the restructuring
and streamlining of licensing procedures for self-defence weapons, improved capacity
within the licensing system and reduced corruption.
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65 2005 report to the UNDDA regarding implementation of the UN PoA. 
66 Interview, Shota Utiashvili. 
67 Ibid. 
3.6 Law
enforcement
Until 2004, licensing of ‘self-defence’ weapons was split between three separate 
Permissions Departments, each with a different geographical remit. These were 
theoretically responsible for Ajara, Abkhazia and the rest of Georgia respectively.
However, the latter two were both based in Tbilisi, since the Department with 
responsibility for Abkhazia was also based ‘in exile’ in the capital. Despite this, there
was virtually no co-ordination between any of the three departments, meaning that in
effect there was no effective national control system.68
These three departments were unified in 2004 soon after the end of Aslan Abashidze’s
regime in Ajara, and since then, control over the licensing of self-defence weapons has
improved. In 2005, the Permissions Department increased its capacity from ten to
fifteen employees, five of which work in the central archives on updating the inventory
at a cost of approximately GEL 2,000 (US$1,100) per month. In addition, the Head of
the Permissions Department plans to have a complete inventory of all issued licences
in a computerised registration system by early 2007. This increased capacity is reflected
in responses to the household survey. Those respondents who were aware of the 
registration and licensing system on the whole judged it to be efficient:
Figure 5: ‘Do you find the procedure of registration and licensing for legal firearms 
possession effective?’ 
(Base No. = 1,300)
32 TAKING STOCK: SMALL ARMS AND HUMAN SECURITY IN GEORGIA
68 Interview, Zaza Khachidze.
69 It has been estimated that most of the employees in the Department made approximately GEL 2,000 (US$1,100) a month
through corruption, while the Head could have accrued up to GEL 10,000 (US$5,500) a month. 
70 Interview, Zaza Khachidze.
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All interviewees agreed that the system for issuing licences was previously extremely
corrupt. There were plenty of face-to-face opportunities for corrupt officials to
demand bribes from those who applied directly for a licence, and the process was very
slow for those who did not pay.69 Another option was for the applicant to pay a gun
shop to handle the application, after which the gun shop would process the docu-
ments, possibly without due procedure being followed. This cost considerably more
than it was supposed to (GEL 50 – US$27.4 as opposed to US$8.7, suggesting that both
the gun shops and officials profited from this arrangement), but was popular because
it involved much less effort. The current system now requires that each individual gun
owner has to personally hand in their documents, unless a notary has authorised the
gun shop to act on their behalf. In the period following these changes to the system, up
to 800 weapons were registered per month, a dramatic increase on previous figures.
The Head of the Permissions Department attributes this increase to an understanding
amongst the public that weapons can now be registered without paying bribes.
However, there are still a number of key weaknesses within the system. Firstly,
although the Permissions Department is responsible for checking that applicants do
not have criminal records and have acquired a medical certificate, in practice this is not
always possible, due to both a lack of manpower and the fact that an adequate criminal
record system has not yet been established.70 Secondly, there is not yet a State Weapons
Register classifying all types of weapons. Such a register should have been prepared by
the Department for Standardisation and Metrology, but has not occurred due to a lack
of funds. Thirdly, the Ministry of Justice (MoJ) does not have sufficient employees to
conduct inspections of gun shops, as required by law (see section 5.5).
Corruption also continues to represent a problem for the licensing system. For ex-
ample, the 2003 ‘Law on Arms’ required the MoH to establish a new certificate system
(‘third-degree certificates’) for the licensing process. However, the MoH stopped 
issuing third-degree certificates as it was concerned that corrupt staff may be issuing
them without due procedure. This means that the Permissions Department must
either accept certificates that have been obtained corruptly, or ignore this requirement
altogether. Another potential problem is the current lack of oversight over hunting
licences issued by the Patrol Police. While this in itself does not entail that corruption
is significant, it provides the conditions in which corrupt practices can occur.
It should also be noted that, due to the centralised process for licensing self-defence
weapons, it is difficult for those living outside of Tbilisi to legalise or register such
weapons. This fact was commented on by focus group participants, who thought that
a less centralised licensing process would make it easier to legalise illicit weapons in
remoter parts of Georgia, and the mountainous regions in particular. It was thought
that the licensing process for sports and hunting weapons should also be made easier
for those living in more remote regions:
If we intend to legalise weapons, registration must be made easier for the high-
mountainous regions. This is because it is impossible for people in these regions to collect
the necessary documents, while these are the very regions where the most unregistered
weapons are. There are two or three hunting guns in a family, there are more hunters and
more beginners who want to take up the sport.
Focus group F, civil society activist, male 
While mobile licensing units may present a viable way of licensing such weapons in the
more remote regions of Georgia, the law would need to be adapted to allow this as, at
present, each licence for self-defence weapons has to be signed by the Head or Deputy
Head of the Permissions Department.
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Firearm use and misuse
THIS SECTION MAPS OUT THE DYNAMICS of firearms use and misuse in Georgia,
and the impact that they have had on individuals and society. According to the
research team’s findings, weapons are primarily acquired for protection, traditional
reasons such as hunting, or criminal practices. Firearms misuse is relatively common
in Georgia. The frequency of such incidents is indicated by the significant number of
recorded crimes involving firearms (1,925) or illegal possession (1,238) in 2005, and
cases of firearm-related morbidity (1,250) and mortality (50) during the same year.71
Nevertheless, human security has improved substantially in the period 2003–2005,
with lower crime and gun crime rates and a more widespread perception of personal
security amongst the population. The improved sense of security can be attributed to
government actions, such as:
■ A concerted country-wide crackdown on organised crime
■ A national programme of police reform, including the establishment of the Patrol
Police and resultant improved law enforcement capacity and police-public relations
■ Improved recording procedures within the criminal justice system.
In the case of Ajara, these measures have also been augmented by an effective regional
weapons collection campaign.
While these improvements are significant, improvements in the level of human 
security has not been shared equally across the whole country. Tbilisi and rural 
communities still suffer greatly from crime and firearm-related crime in particular,
while the provision of basic security is often lacking in areas of ‘grey sovereignty’ such
as the demilitarised area encompassing Zugdidi and Gali, minority areas and remote
border communities. Indeed, there is some evidence that firearms crime and armed
robbery in particular, might be more frequent than captured by MIA statistics.
In addition, a larger proportion of respondents to the household survey stated they
thought that the availability or use of firearms represented a major concern where they
lived, than did not. This was especially the case in Samtskhe-Javakheti.
A number of significant weaknesses in the state’s ability to combat the misuse of
firearms are also still evident: the MIA does not record incidents of domestic violence
involving the use of firearms; while the clear-up rate for firearm crime is significant,
a very low proportion of criminal proceedings for such crime end up in court; in spite
of improved police-community relations, a significant proportion of the victims of
firearm crime do not turn to the police for security; and, trust in the police to provide
security is still low amongst non-ethnic Georgian communities. Perhaps most 
71 See following analysis.
importantly, while law enforcement has improved, crime prevention has been under-
mined by the absence of strategic planning to combat firearm misuse. While this may
be the case, the relevant government structures have shown both a willingness and
ability to improve policy and practice in this area.
A third of household survey respondents said that if they could legally own a firearm,
they would choose to do so (compared to 65 percent who would not). These responses
provide an informative map of demand for legal firearms across Georgia. While the
analysis in the previous sections suggests that weapons are most widespread in Tbilisi,
Samegrelo-Svaneti, Shida Kartli and Imereti, responses to this question demonstrate
that the desire to own firearms, or to legalise firearms already owned, was considerably
greater in Kakheti, followed by Mtskheta-Mtianeti, Kvemo Kartli and Shida Kartli:72
Figure 6: If you could own a firearm legally, would you choose to do so? 
(Base No. = 1,300)
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72 It should be noted that as the number of respondents from three of the regions is very low (Samtskhe-Javakheti, 60; Guria,
41; Mttskheta-Mtianeti, 34), these responses cannot be considered statistically relevant. 
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Research conducted for this survey indicated that the two principal drivers for
firearms ownership in Georgia are insecurity and a consequent desire to protect 
oneself and traditions of hunting, linked to an embedded association with firearms.
Insecurity and self-protection
Survey respondents who stated that they would choose to own a firearm were then
asked for the three main reasons why they would choose to do so. The most frequently
cited reason was to protect themselves and their families, while the desire to protect
their property and business was the third most frequently cited reason:
Figure 7: What are the three main reasons why you would choose to own a firearm? 
(Base No. = 434)
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73 Interview, Kakha Katsitadze.
74 Interview, Murman Dumbadze.
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Focus group participants also cited self-defence and defence of property as the most
frequent motivations for people to acquire and own firearms:
I’d say it’s essential to keep a weapon at home since you still fear that somebody will break
into your house at night.
Focus group F, Zugdidi, unemployed, female, 29 
Focus group participants attributed the sense that firearms are needed in order to
ensure security to a number of linked factors including the recent history of resorting
to violence in Georgia, continued instability in the country (especially amongst in-
habitants in areas bordering conflict territories), and the inability of law-enforcement
agencies to ensure security. The recent experience of war means that the idea of
resolving conflicts in a peaceful, consensual way is still not widespread; small arms
were the weapons of choice during the conflicts because heavy weapons were hard to
come by.73 All interviewees and focus group respondents noted the relationship
between economic and social instability, personal insecurity and firearm ownership.
Indeed, it was thought that increased personal security resulting from improved 
instability would manifest itself in reduced levels of firearm ownership:
I think that there will be a continued decrease in the number of weapons if the situation
continues as it has been.
Focus group K, Akhaltsikhe, unemployed, male, 30
While trust in the police has improved substantially in recent times, it is not yet
enough to prevent many people from seeking firearms. For example, 31 percent of
survey respondents identified a more effective police force as the main factor that
would make people in their community more willing to hand in illegal weapons.
When asked to choose the three main factors that would reduce illicit arms prolifera-
tion, the percentage of respondents naming improved police efficiency increased to 53
percent, the most frequent response. This was considered to be much more important
than an improved economic environment (eight percent) or resolution of the remain-
ing conflicts in Georgia (five percent). The importance of poor public provision of
security for levels of weapons ownership was recognised by a number of parliamentar-
ians interviewed by the research team, who voiced the opinion that once the Govern-
ment is strong enough to ensure security for its citizens, the tendency to acquire and
keep weapons would reduce.74
Hunting and affiliation with firearms
The existence of a ‘gun culture’, or tradition of owning firearms, is frequently cited as
the primary cause of legal and illegal arms proliferation in Georgia and throughout
the Caucasus. This culture has been traced back by interviewees to medieval times and
the tradition of dzhigity, who were obliged to carry weapons. This argument was
echoed by focus group participants:
First of all, in Georgia everybody owned weapons – and not only at home – they kept them
on their person at all times. At that time [medieval times] the best weapon was the ‘sabre.’
When firearms came to Georgia, every family had one. There wasn’t a family that did not
own a weapon – that’s tradition.
Focus group A, Tbilisi, civil servant, male, 26
However, although firearms may have previously been kept for self-defence, hunting
weapons and not self-defence weapons are presently the mostly widely distributed
type of firearm in Georgian society. In addition, when asked to identify the principal
reasons other than protection that make people acquire firearms, survey respondents
identified sports shooting and hunting as the main driver (66 percent of respondents),
above tradition (15 percent) and being a valued family possession (12 percent).
However, the focus group discussions demonstrated that hunting firearms are owned
not only directly for hunting purposes, but also for more cultural reasons, such as 
historical and family tradition, as collectors items or simply because they considered
weapons valuable. This suggests that a ‘gun culture’ is an important factor behind
weapon ownership in Georgia:
My father owned one [a hunting weapon] and I have one too.
Focus group A, Tbilisi, civil servant, male, 26
I do not have a weapon, but I own a hunting gun. Do I want to buy another gun now? Of
course I do, because I like guns. I do not need one for self-defence or for any other purpose –
I like them, they are valuable to me, and that is why I want them.
Focus group C, Tbilisi, unemployed, male, 40
The strong demand for both legal and illegal firearms in the remote regions of Kakheti,
Mtskheta-Mtianeti and Kvemo Kartli indicate that an association with firearms may
be stronger amongst some remote communities. This picture was supported by the
focus group discussions:
In Svaneti, weapons are still being found from the civil war period even now. People have
not given up weapons from that period, even though they do not use them. They have had
these weapons for a long time; they did not get them today. For more than half a century
they may have had this weapon at home; it may never have been used, serving only as a
collector’s item.
Focus group B, Tbilisi, unemployed, male, 39
It has been frequently claimed by interviewees that non-ethnic Georgian groups
exhibit a stronger gun culture. However, attitudes towards firearms and firearms 
ownership were consistent amongst all focus group participants, irrespective of their
ethnic origin. When asked directly about levels of gun culture in their ethnic groups,
non-Georgian participants stated that every Caucasian has the same attitude towards
weapons.
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In general, there are three main reasons for Georgians to choose to possess a firearm
illegally: criminal use; low levels of trust in the police and a related reluctance to be
recorded as a firearms owner; and, cost and choice in the illegal market.
Criminal use
A total of 42 percent of survey respondents thought that aside from protection for self,
family and property, the desire to undertake criminal activities is one of the three main
reasons for people to keep firearms. Respondents also thought that apart from the
Army and the Police, criminal groups were the section of society with the highest level
of firearm ownership.
Low levels of trust in the police
A total of 36 percent of survey respondents indicated that a reluctance to be recorded
as firearms owners was the major driver for illegal firearm possession. While there may
be various causes for this reluctance, a lack of trust in the police is probably the main
one. This rationale is supported by focus group respondents, who argued that low 
levels of trust in the police undermine attempts to legalise weapons in Georgia.
Cost and choice in the illegal market 
Focus group participants suggested that an additional reason for people to buy guns
on the black market is that they are cheaper. For example, it is estimated that ‘TT’ and
Makarov pistols cost US$150–250 on the black market, compared to US$300 in a gun
shop (though one key informant stated that black market prices are roughly the same
as in gun shops).75 Some people may also want to own weapons that cannot be 
registered legally, such as assault rifles. In order to acquire such weapons aspirant 
owners would have to turn to the illegal market.
Demand for firearms among young people
It was widely thought by household survey respondents and focus group participants
that a substantial number of young people have firearms. As argued above, it is 
probable that many of these weapons are not registered and were acquired either
through inheritance or illegal means. There are a number of reasons why young people
may choose to maintain unregistered weapons. This may be because such firearms are
intended for criminal purposes. Focus group participants believed the ‘face of crime’
to be changing, with an increasing amount of young people turning to crime and thus
wishing to own firearms. Increasing criminality amongst young people was attributed
to youth unemployment and the fact that the increased demands of the younger 
generations are not being met:
There are extreme differences between social poles within Georgian society. It is very
difficult to explain to a young person why one person has a US$400 mobile phone when he
has one that is not even worth US$100. It is certainly difficult for a 13- or 14-year-old to
understand such realities. They think they must oppose such inequality, and that they are
unjustly subject to it. Moreover, the only way to get a mobile phone at a young age is to get
some weapon and use it take one from another person. As the other kid has not earned the
mobile phone, young people see no injustice in taking it from him.
Focus group E, Tbilisi, laboratory manager, female, 44
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75 Interview, Shota Utiashvili.
4.2 Demand for
illegal firearms
However, significant levels of illegal firearms ownership among young people might
also be explained simply by the fact that those who wish to do so cannot afford to 
purchase a firearm legally.
The MIA was able to provide recorded crime statistics, including crime involving the
misuse of firearms, for the period 2004–2005. While registered crime in Georgia has
increased by 74.1 percent during this period, from 24,856 recorded incidents in 2004
to 43,266 recorded incidents in 2005,76 this increase is mostly attributable to improved
efficiency in recording crime and the adoption of a new Criminal Code in May 2005.
According to the Head of the MIA’s Information and Analysis Department, the new
code has resulted in significant changes in the way that statistics are recorded. As a
result, it is thought that for the first time statistics have real significance for strategic
planning and crime prevention, whereas before they were too vague to be operation-
ally useful.77 In addition, it is felt that a far larger proportion of crime is now reported
to the MIA, due to increased trust in the police amongst the general public.
The Georgian Criminal Code records firearm-related crime under two categories –
paragraph 236, ‘the illegal acquisition, possession, carriage, production, transfer,
transport or sale of firearms’ (further referred to as ‘illegal firearms incidents’), and
paragraph 179, ‘banditry’, which refers to crimes committed with firearms (without
breaking this down further by type of crime). According to official statistics, there were
1,925 incidents of banditry in Georgia in 2005 – 4.5 percent of all crime, an increase of
11.1 percent on 2004 – and 1,242 illegal firearms incidents – 2.9 percent of all crimes, an
increase of 0.3 percent on 2004. This provides a total of 3,167 firearm-related crimes in
2005 or 7.3 percent of all recorded crime:
Table 6: Firearms related crime in Georgia, 2004–2005 (Source: MIA Information Department)
Type of crime 2004 2005 Increase Percentage 
increase
Banditry 1,733 1,925 +192 11.1
Of which were serious crimes 1,609 1,708 +99 6.2
Of which involved cars 242 251 +9 3.7
Illegal possession etc. 1,238 1,242 +4 0.3
According to information provided by the General Prosecutor, however, armed rob-
bery alone comprised 17 percent of the ten most frequently occurring crimes in 2005.78
Comparisons between firearm-related and other crimes in 2004 and 2005 demonstrate
the significance of firearm crime for Georgian society. In 2005, there were only slightly
less incidents of recorded banditry than recorded robbery (2,087) and in 2004 there
were actually more recorded incidents of banditry than robberies (1,316). Recorded
incidents of banditry in 2005 were only slightly lower than drug-related crimes (2,074)
and traffic violations (2,625) and were substantially higher than most other crimes,
including grievous bodily harm (368 incidents), fraud (427), hooliganism (1,314) and
car theft (283). It should be noted, however, that this may well be due to the fact that
Georgians are more likely to report serious crimes involving firearms than more petty
crimes such as hooliganism.
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76 Information provided by the MIA’s Information and Analysis Department.
77 Interview, Shota Utiashvili.
78 Interview, George Jokhadze.
4.3 Criminal
impact
Domestic violence
No information was available regarding acts of domestic violence committed with
firearms, as registration of domestic violence only began started in February 2006.81
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79 For a breakdown of illegal firearm incidents by region see figure 4.
80 Calculations of firearm related crime per 10,000 people in 2005 provide a similar map of firearm related crime, with the
exception that such crimes are more frequent per 10,000 people in Mtskheta-Mtianeti and Guria: Tbilisi (7.8 firearm related
crimes per 10,000); Mtskheta-Mtianeti (6.7); Shida Kartli (3.9); Imereti (3.1); Samegrelo-Zemo Svaneti (3.1); Guria (2.2);
Ajara (2.1); Kvemo  Kartli (2.1); Kakheti (1.5); Racha-Lechkhumi (0.8); Samtskhe-Javakheti (0.8). Population figures provided
by Georgian Department of Statistics.
81 Interview, George Jokhadze.
Box 9: Banditry in contemporary Georgia
Car or minibus (marshrutka) hijacking for theft or ransom represents one particularly 
problematic crime involving firearms and is the only firearm-related crime that is categorised
separately in the Georgian crime statistics. There were 242 recorded cases of car hijacking in
2004 and 251 cases in 2005. Car hijacking was most frequent in this period in Shida Kartli
and Imereti, where there were 41 and 37 recorded incidents respectively in 2005. Focus
group participants also identified cars/minibus hijacking with firearms as a problem, often
with tragic results:
Four months ago some people with machineguns tried to stop a bus. The driver did not stop
so they started to shoot. The driver was wounded… [and]…one young man was fatally shot
in the head and died on the spot. The bandits got onto the bus and started robbing people,
and then they just disappeared.
Focus group N, Marneuli, public official, male, 45
Interviews conducted in Kutaisi (Imereti region) confirmed that car hijacking is a serious 
problem. For example, during 2005 two groups were hijacking 2–3 minibuses a week in
Kutaisi. The vehicle owners would be forced to pay the groups in order to have their vehicles
returned or to be protected from such attacks. One of the groups was in the possession of
two weapons, while the second group had one weapon.
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MIA statistics also provide a geographic breakdown of firearm-related crime 
(‘banditry’).79 These figures demonstrate that the vast majority of firearm-related
crime occurs in Tbilisi. In 2004, 846 (48 percent) of the 1,733 recorded incidents of
banditry in Georgia occurred in Tbilisi. The percentage was even higher in 2005, with
1,076 of 1,925 recorded incidents taking place in Tbilisi (56 percent). Outside of Tbilisi,
the four regions that suffer most from firearm-related crimes are Imereti, Samegrelo-
Svaneti, Shida Kartli and Kvemo Kartli, all of which are judged to have a large level of
both legal and illegal firearm ownership (see section 3.5):
Figure 8: Firearms-related crime (excluding illegal firearm incidents) excluding Tbilisi, 
2004–2005 80
(Source MIA Information Department)
Even now domestic violence is not recorded as a separate criminal category, but
instead as a motive behind crimes. However, results from the household survey and
focus group discussions indicate that domestic violence may represent a serious 
problem in Georgia. A total of 47 percent of survey respondents thought that firearms
had ‘some negative’ or ‘negative’ impacts on relations within the family and a number
of focus group participants were aware of families in which firearms were used to
commit domestic violence:
Our neighbour’s son had a gun that he brought back from the conflict in Abkhazia, which
he went on to register officially. Later on, when he became drunk, he would frighten and
beat his wife [with it].
Focus group J, Kutaisi, unemployed, female, 38
MIA statistics on firearm-related crime in Georgia can be contrasted with information
obtained from the household survey and focus group discussions, as well as previous
national and international crime victimisation studies. Information from these
sources have been analysed in terms of perceptions of personal security, fear of crime,
perceptions of crime levels and organised crime, and knowledge of the illegal carriage
and use of firearms.
Perception of personal security
In correspondence with a reduction in recorded crime, an increased sense of security
in Georgia in 2005–2006 was reported by both household survey respondents and
focus group participants. For example, 73 percent of survey respondents felt that they
were ‘quite safe’ or ‘very safe’ living and working in their community, with only 26
percent feeling unsafe. In addition, 29 percent of respondents thought their personal
security had improved over the previous year, while only 13 percent thought it had
deteriorated:
Figure 9: Compared to one year ago, how do you think that the level of your own personal
safety (security) has changed? 
(Base No. = 1,300)
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Focus group participants attributed the improved sense of security amongst the 
population to the introduction of the Patrol Police. However, it was thought that those
living in rural areas and the suburbs of large towns, where the Patrol Police are still not
yet fully operational, have not shared this increased sense of personal safety to the
same degree:
In the past many crimes were committed in the centre of town, but now criminals are 
robbing people in the outskirts or at gateways to buildings… There is a street with an old
railway station and locomotive shed. This area is so dangerous that you cannot go near it
since it highly probable that you will be robbed.
Focus group I, Kutaisi, teacher, female, 59
Indeed, a substantial proportion of rural residents (38 percent, in contrast to 14
percent of urban residents) continue to feel either ‘not safe’ or ‘not safe at all’ in their
community:
Figure 10: Do you feel safe living and working in your town/village/district? 
(Base No. = 1,300)
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82 Source: Alvazzi del Frate et. al. Criminal Victimisation in Urban Europe. Key findings of the 2000 International Crime Victims
Survey (UNICRI, 2004), <http://www.unicri.it/wwd/analysis/icvs/pdf_files/CriminalVictimisationUrbanEurope.pdf>, accessed
28 April 2006.
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Tbilisi may represent an exception to the trend. Tbilisi is the only urban part of
Georgia where a greater proportion of respondents felt that they were ‘not safe’ or ‘not
safe at all’ (57 percent) than ‘quite safe’ or ‘very safe’ (42 percent). Tbilisi respondents
demonstrated a lower sense of security and a heightened fear of crime across all 
questions. Indeed, feelings of personal security in the capital seem to have diminished
in the period 2000–2005. When an International Crime Victimisation Survey (ICVS)
of 1,000 individuals in Tbilisi was carried out in 2000, 61 percent felt themselves to be
safe against 39 percent who did not.82 As a result, in the period 2000–2005 there has
been a 19 percent decrease in the number of Tbilisi residents who consider themselves
to be safe, and an 18 percent increase in residents who feel unsafe.
In addition, while the overall criminal situation is thought to have improved, it was
noted that uncontrolled areas of ‘grey sovereignty’ continue to exist where the state
agencies are unable to fully provide security. This refers primarily to areas bordering
the regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, where criminality and insecurity are
thought to represent a major problem to local communities (as do both the threat and
actual use of firearms) and remote border regions. Security problems near conflict
zones are discussed further in box 11.
Fear of crime
Only 23 percent of household survey respondents were afraid that they or their family
might become a victim of crime. Indeed, overall fear of crime appears to be lower in
Georgia than in other post-Soviet countries (for example, the corresponding figure in
a recent survey of Moldova was 58 percent). Nevertheless, the household survey
unveiled a significant fear of gun crime and its impacts. After murder and burglary,
armed robbery was rated as the third most frequent type of crime causing insecurity:
Figure 11: What three types of crime are the biggest causes of insecurity to you personally
and to your family?
(Base No. = 1,300)
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83 ‘How do you think crime rates have changed in your town/village/district in the last year?’ (Base No. = 1,300)
0 10 20 30 40 50
Murder
Burglary
Armed robbery
Drug distribution and sale
Kidnappings
Assault-beatings
Sex-related crime
Car theft/car robbery
Drunken disorder
Revenge
Threats/blackmail
Domestic violence
Fighting
Theft of poultry/domestic animal
Other
Nothing
DK/NA
51%
43%
36%
36%
17%
9%
9%
8%
7%
6%
5%
5%
3%
2%
0%
2%
8%Ty
p
e 
o
f 
cr
im
e
Percentage of respondents
Fear of armed robbery was particularly high in Ajara (54 percent) and Imereti 
(48 percent). Significantly, 34 percent of respondents also stated that they worried at
least sometimes that they or someone close to them might be injured or killed with
firearms. This fear was especially widespread among residents of Tbilisi (71 percent)
and rural respondents (50 percent).
Perceptions of crime levels
In line with increased perceptions of security and low levels of fear of crime, the 
criminal situation was also thought to have improved in 2005–2006. In total, 46
percent of survey respondents thought that crime rates in their community had
reduced in the last year, against only 15 percent who thought they had increased.83
While the impression of falling crime rates was on the whole supported by focus group
discussions and interviews with regional police officials, mayors and civil society 
representatives, a number of focus group participants questioned whether criminality
had reduced as much as was portrayed on television. It was thought by a number of
participants that the mass media ‘showcased’ police successes and that this had created
an illusion of security:
The TV tells us that people are stealing less but I don’t think that anything has really
improved for the better.
Focus group L, Akhaltsikhe, male, 38
On the whole, respondents to the household survey and focus group participants 
considered firearms crime to be significant. For example, 19 percent of respondents
named armed crimes as one of the three most frequent crimes occurring in their 
community:
Figure 12: What three crimes occur most often in your town/village/district nowadays? 
(Base No. = 1,300)
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84 Of the 36 respondents that had actually been victims of crime, only two stated that the incident involved the use of a firearm
(5.5 percent). Unfortunately, this base number for this question is too low for it to be considered statistically relevant. 
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It should be noted that some response categories other than ‘Armed Robbery’ might
include firearm-related crimes (such as murder or car theft/robbery). In contrast with
the perception that armed robbery occurs frequently, as noted above, official statistics
state that only 4.5 percent of all crime in 2005 was firearm related (classified as 
‘banditry’). The overall discrepancy with official statistics may indicate either that a
significant amount of firearm-related crime is not reported to the police and is 
consequently not captured in police data, or that firearm related crime is high profile,
resulting in Georgians considering it to be more frequent than is the case.84 While this
is the case, the perception that armed robbery occurs frequently tallies with the fact
that armed robbery comprised 17 percent of the ten most widespread types of crime 
in the same year.
Respondents from Tbilisi (29 percent), Samegrelo-Svaneti (28 percent) and Imereti
(26 percent) were more likely to name armed crime as a regular occurrence in their
community. Again, this finding tallies with official crime records showing that firearm
crime is most frequent in these three areas. The difference between the prominence of
armed robbery in rural areas (28 percent) and urban areas (9 percent) is also striking.
Indeed, rural respondents were more likely to state that all types of crime took place in
their community, with the exception of drunken disorder and theft of animals and
poultry. In addition, only 14 percent of rural respondents thought no crimes took
place in their community, compared to 32 percent of urban respondents. These
responses support the analysis that increased police efficiency and the introduction of
the Patrol Police has had less of an impact on security in rural communities than in
urban communities.
Focus group participants were able to cite a range of criminal incidents in which
firearms had been used. Many of these cases resulted in injury or death:
A day or two ago drug users attacked a young woman in her home. They were using a
machine-gun and the woman was killed. Later on, they escaped to Azerbaijan. Who will
catch them now?
Focus group N, Marneuli. Bank cashier, male, 48
Not long ago some students came to me very scared because there had been robberies in
their apartment. People in masks had come with guns and taken their cell phones. These
girls were very scared. This happened two months ago.
Focus group B, Tbilisi, university lecturer, female, 39
Significantly, in contrast to the perception of declining overall crime rates, there was
no general trend amongst survey respondents as to whether firearm-related crime had
increased or decreased between 2002 and 2005. While 35 percent said firearm crime
was ‘falling’ and five percent said it was ‘falling a lot’, 24 percent of respondents thought
such crime was ‘rising’ and five percent thought it was ‘rising a lot’.85 A larger propor-
tion of respondents thought that firearm-related crime was rising, than thought that
such crime was falling, in Tbilisi (35 percent), Samtskhe-Javakheti (32 percent), Guria
(40 percent) and Mtskheta-Mtianeti (39 percent).
Perceptions of organised crime 
A total of 35 percent of household survey respondents thought that organised crime
had decreased during the previous year, compared to 24 percent who thought that 
levels have increased and 27 percent who thought that levels have remained the same.86
Improvements in this area have generally been attributed to a crackdown on organised
activity, co-ordinated by the central authorities to undermine the ‘reputation’ and
‘image’ of the crime lords. Reductions in the levels of organised crime in Georgia were
reflected in interviews with police officers in different regions.
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85 ‘How do you think the number of crimes using firearms has changed in the last three years?’ (Base No. = 1,300)
86 ‘How has organised crime changed in Georgia in the last year?’ (Base No. = 1,300)
Box 10: Organised crime in Imereti, Kutaisi town
A good example of reduced organised criminal activity is provided by the town of Kutaisi,
which has previously been portrayed as a city of crime lords. The mayor of Kutaisi believes
that this reputation might have dissuaded and continues to dissuade businesses from 
investing in the region. According to the Chief of the local Regional Police, up until the Rose
Revolution in 2003 the town of Kutaisi had suffered from a high level of activity by the so-
called vory v zakone (‘thieves in law’), groups of organised criminals that developed in prisons
throughout the former Soviet Union. About 70 vory v zakone operated in Kutaisi under the
previous government and had a significant influence in the region, controlling a range of
criminal and financial activities. These criminals also had quite a powerful support base in the
Kutaisi prison and had been able to instigate prison riots in the past. As a result of the 
national campaign, it is thought that the vory v zakone are no longer powerful role models
for the young people in Kutaisi and the Mayor of Kutaisi believes that the criminal situation in
the city has improved to the degree that it represents a very favourable investment climate.
There was, however, a slight discrepancy between results from the household survey
and views expressed in the focus group discussions on this topic. While focus group
participants agreed that common crime had decreased, they thought that organised
crime had on the whole increased, mostly due to the increased prominence of the
drugs trade in recent years.
Knowledge of illegal firearm carriage and use
The vast majority of household survey respondents have never seen firearms being
carried by persons other than police or army officers. However, a number of respond-
ents and focus group participants had personal experience of weapons being used in
society. As much as 14 percent of all respondents had personally witnessed a situation
where weapons were used, in the situations shown in figure 13:
Figure 13: In what kind of situations have you witnessed firearms being used? 
(Base No. = 180)
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While some of these usages were legal (game hunting, 12 percent; sports events, seven
percent), a significant number of respondents had witnessed firearms being used in
urban public places (44 percent), celebrations (34 percent) and nightclubs and bars
(five percent). Indeed, a significant number of focus group participants were able to
recall incidents in which firearms had been used publicly in an illegal manner:
I was at wedding party and there was this one man. At that time he worked in police and
had the legal right to carry a weapon. He had made a deal with somebody, he was drunk
and he put the gun to the guy’s forehead. Yes, he has a right to carry a gun, but shouldn’t 
he know when and where to use it? He did not shoot the guy, but shouted loudly.
Focus group K, Akhaltsikhe, unemployed, female, 27 
Box 11: Firearms use and misuse in areas
bordering the conflict zones, Zugdidi 
The availability and impact of firearms in regions bordering the conflict zones areas is thought
to be substantially greater than in the rest of government-controlled Georgia. Indeed, data
made available by the MIA indicates that outside of Tbilisi and Imereti, firearms crimes are
most frequent in Samegrelo-Svaneti (141 incidents in 2005) and Shida Kartli (120 incidents).
Both these regions border the separatist areas of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. In order to
assess whether firearms impacts in these regions diverge from those in the rest of 
government controlled Georgia, the research team conducted a detailed study of the Zugdidi
region in Samegrelo-Svaneti, which forms part of the ‘de-militarised’ zone along the 
Abkhazian border (see section 2.2). 
The Zugdidi region is thought to have suffered particularly badly from the post-conflict 
fallout through the relocation of a large number of internally displaced persons (70–80,000
from a total population of 478,000), increased crime, including firearm-related crime, the
presence of organised groups and a resultant higher level of insecurity amongst the general
population. According to focus group participants, civilians living in this zone are constantly
threatened by both local and Abkhazian criminal groups, which engage in orchestrated thefts
during the harvest season and kidnapping. As a result, insecurity was considered to represent
a real concern for their families:
It is difficult to make an accurate assessment of the impact of firearms on health in
Georgia due to the absence of systematic recording of firearm-related mortality and
morbidity. Nevertheless, using a number of sources, including available government
statistics, interviews with health officials, hospital archives and previous research, it
was possible to develop an approximate picture of how firearms usage affects health.
The research team calculates that about 1,250 firearm-related injuries were treated by
Georgian hospitals in 2005 (1,100 in Tbilisi; 63 in larger regional hospitals; and 90 in
small regional hospitals), of which 50 resulted in death.
Firearm-related injuries
The MoH collects statistics on firearm-related injuries according to the World Health
Organisation’s (WHO) International Classification of Diseases (ICD-10). According 
to ICD-10 data for the years 2001–2004, firearm related injuries have steadily
decreased. Over 86 percent of all victims are males, the majority of which are in urban
areas and over 30:
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We live in the region bordering the conflict area and we cannot even speak of minimal 
security. 
Focus group H, Zugdidi, unemployed, female, 27
Focus group participants believed that the continued presence of weapons in Abkhazia and
Zugdidi meant that there was a greater threat of violence in this area: 
It is always dangerous in places where weapons can be found; weapons pose a threat, and
they are a motivation for violence. Now in Abkhazia they say that they have guns for self-
defence, but nobody knows what will result when such weapons fall into the hands of the
wrong people… and that is why weapons must be controlled. 
Focus group I, Kutaisi, manager, male, 55 
While the level of insecurity in Zugdidi is greater than in most of the rest of Georgia, 
improvements have been made since 2003. Focus group respondents noted these 
improvements, stating that the number of armed robberies and kidnappings had reduced
recently. According to the Chief of Zugdidi regional police, serious crime in the region fell by
43 percent during 2005, while the number of armed robberies fell by 100 incidents compared
to the previous year. In the first month of 2006, only five of sixty-six criminal cases reported
involved the use of with weapons (attempted armed robberies). Household survey 
respondents from Samegrelo also thought that crime rates (77 percent of respondents, 
compared to the national average of 46 percent) and organised criminality (70 percent) had
reduced over the last year. 
According to CIVPOL, the presence of weapons and the number of incidents involving them is
much higher on the Abkhazian side of the demilitarised zone than in the Zugdidi region. For
example, there was only one major incident involving SALW in the Zugdidi region between
November 2005 and January 2006. During the same period, there have been a number of
such incidents in the Gali region, including three armed bus robberies, two abductions with
firearms every week and the murder of a young man by hit-men.
4.4 Impact on
public health
Table 7: Recorded firearm-related injuries, 2000–2004 (Source: MoH ICD-10 records)
Year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Sex Male 72 114 51 38 12
Female 10 21 7 4 2
Total 82 135 58 42 14
According to MoH officials, however, it is unlikely that this data captures all such 
incidents. This is due to both inconsistent reporting and the victims’ reluctance to have
their injury recorded as firearm-related. In many cases, victims of firearm injuries do
not want to involve the police, who are required to investigate all firearm injuries, and
ask hospital staff not to record their injury as such.
In order to check the accuracy of MoH data, the research team conducted interviews
with staff and collected statistics from the archives and surgical/traumatic journals of
five hospitals. Two of the hospitals are in Tbilisi – the Republican and Gudushauri 
hospitals – and three are in the regions – Shida Kartli (Gori), Kvemo Kartli (Bolnisi),
and Kakheti (Telavi). The information obtained demonstrates that firearm-related
injuries are more prevalent than suggested by MoH data, and that the ratio of such
injuries to other weapon-related injuries (eg caused by sharp implements and cutting
blades) is relatively high.
Hospitals in Tbilisi treat a larger number of firearm casualties than hospitals in the rest
of the country. The two hospitals visited treated an average of 73.5 such cases in 2005.
As there are a total of 15 hospitals in Tbilisi of similar type to those visited, this would
suggest that there were approximately 1,100 firearm-related injuries in Tbilisi in 2005.
Outside of Tbilisi, there are five large regional hospitals, at Kutaisi, Batumi, Zugdidi,
Telavi and Gori. On the basis of data collected at Telavi and Gori, it is estimated that
each of the larger hospitals treated an average of 12.5 firearm injuries during 2005. This
would provide a total of 63 such cases in the larger hospitals. The remaining 45 regional
hospitals in Georgia are smaller in size. The research team visited only one hospital of
this size, in Bolnisi. If this hospital were to be representative of other small regional
hospitals, then such hospitals treated approximately 90 firearm-related injuries in
2005:
Table 8: Recorded firearms injuries at Telavi, Bolnisi and Gori, 2001–2005 
(Source: hospital archives)
Hospital Tbilisi, Tbilisi, Telavi Gori Bolnisi Total
Republican Gudushauri
Year 2001 – – 8 11 8 27
2002 – 3087 16 27 4 47
2003 – 23 11 16 4 31
2004 85 36 4 59 3 66
2005 70 39 11 14 2 27
Percentage of all 30–33% 41.8–69.7% 20% 25% 20% –
weapons injuries
While the hospitals in Tbilisi displayed different ratios of firearm-related injuries to
other weapon-related injuries,88 in general the ratio is higher in hospitals in Tbilisi
than in regional hospitals. This is partly explained by the fact that many injured people
travel to Tbilisi from the regions in the expectation of a higher quality of medical 
service. As a rule this occurs when the injury sustained is relatively minor or after the
patient has already been provided with first aid at a regional hospital. In general,
hospital staff found that the ratio of firearm-related injuries to other weapon-related
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87 In this year six cases resulted in death, while the results of five injuries are unclassified.
88 Republican Hospital, 30–33 percent of all weapon-related injuries (2001–2005); Gudushauri Hospital, 41.8–69.7 percent
(2002–2005).
injuries has remained constant. The one exception to this was at Gori Hospital in 2004,
when there was a dramatic increase in firearm injuries as a result of the August conflict
in South Ossetia, when firearms injuries were thought to represent 75 percent of all
weapon-related injuries.89
According to the hospital staff interviewed, ‘almost all’ cases of firearm injuries were
related to criminal activities and only a small number of cases result from disagree-
ments, accidents or suicide. Hospital staff confirmed that both criminal and accidental
victims of firearms are very seldom willing to report their injuries to the police. This is
due to the perception that dealing with the police will be problematic, the attitude that
it is ‘bad to inform’ on others, or as a result of shock. Hospital staff also thought that
firearms present a continuous health threat to Georgian society. Nonetheless, they said
that knives have an even bigger impact on Georgian society than firearms, since knife
injuries were more frequent and could be just as serious as firearm injuries.
The frequency of firearms injuries in Georgia is demonstrated by the fact that almost
all focus group participants knew of someone that had been injured by a firearm.
The victims of these injuries are often children or family members:
Once we were at my friend’s place to celebrate a birthday and suddenly his colleague
arrived. The table was already set and the colleague was offended. He took out his gun and
I ended up shot and wounded. Of course, this person had permission to carry a gun.
However, despite this, he was unable to control himself.
Focus Group E, Tbilisi, manager, female, 29
Firearm-related mortality
No information on overall firearm-related mortality was available from either the
MoH, which does not collect such statistics, or the MIA. Interviews with hospital staff
have thus been used to gain an approximate picture. The manager of the reception
department of the Republican hospital in Tbilisi said that 70 percent of all firearm-
related injuries treated at the hospital were serious and between four and five percent
result in death.90 Similarly, a representative from Gori Hospital thought that 75 percent
of firearm-related injuries treated there are serious and between three and four percent
result in death.91 If these hospitals are representative of the whole of Georgia, this
entails that approximately four percent of all firearm injuries result in death.
This would mean that in 2005 there were approximately 50 firearm-related deaths in 
Georgia.
Firearm-related suicides
Statistics on firearm-related suicides are collected by the MoH in accordance with the
WHO’s ICD-10. These statistics suggest a very low level of firearm-related suicides in
Georgia, with a mean average of two suicides each year, peaking in 2003 with 12 cases.
The vast majority of recorded firearm-related suicides are urban males over 30.
Table 9: Recorded firearm-related suicides, 2000–2004 (Source: MoH ICD-10 records)
Year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Sex Male 2 1 2 11 2
Female – – – 1 –
Total 2 1 2 12 2
However, MoH officials admitted that hospital staff do not record firearm-related 
suicides consistently. It is therefore unclear whether these statistics truly reflect reality.
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89 Interview, Nukri Jokhadze.
90 Interview, Zurab Shalamberidze.
91 Interview, Nukri Jokhadze.
No additional statistical information on this matter was available in interviews with
hospital staff, and it is the MIA which is responsible for certifying firearm-related
deaths as suicides or homicides. Nevertheless, hospital interviewees were in agreement
that firearm suicides are very rare and that most suicides were committed with sharp
objects, such as knifes.
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Box 12: Firearms use and misuse in Ajara
Since the capitulation of Aslan Abashidze’s regime in the spring of 2004, security in the
autonomous region has improved markedly and unemployment and other social problems
are now thought to represent the main problem for the community. While Abashidze’s strong
grip on the region meant that the instability that afflicted Georgia in the mid-1990s did not
have as strong an impact in Ajara, the local population still experienced a high level of 
insecurity. This was partly due to the perceived power of local organised criminal groups and
the vory v zakone in particular. Up until Tbilisi re-established control over Ajara, the influence
of vory v zakone in the society was quite high. The widespread feeling of insecurity has also
been attributed to the large numbers of firearms that were distributed amongst the 
population by Abashidze’s secret police. 
Since the ‘Batumi Revolution’ in 2004, security amongst the region’s population seems to
have improved dramatically, especially regarding firearms misuse in the community. While
improved security is partly due to national initiatives in this area, it was though that the 2004
collection campaign was especially significant (see section 7.1). Improved security in Ajara is
reflected in results from the household survey. For example, 70 percent of respondents from
Ajara indicated that overall criminality had diminished over the preceding year. Organised
crime has also decreased since the ‘Batumi Revolution’, but it is unclear how much of a threat
remains. In total, 64 percent of respondents thought that organised crime levels were about
the same as in the previous year. According to a local journalist, the vory v zakone ideology is
still quite strong on the streets and people are still faced with the problem of which set of
laws to abide by – ‘the criminals’ or the state’s’.
It seems that improved security has diminished the desire to own firearms. Only 26 percent of
Ajaran respondents to the household survey stated that if they would own a firearm legally if
they could. This proportion is lower than in any other region of Georgia. Furthermore, only six
percent of respondents stated that criminal use was one of the three main reasons for people
to keep firearms. This is below the national average of 23 percent and much lower than in
Samtskhe-Javakheti (42 percent), Samegrelo (51 percent) and Kakheti (39 percent). Perhaps
the biggest indication of reduced firearms misuse is the reduction in celebratory gunfire in the
post-Abashidze period – there were no recorded celebratory shootings during the 2006 New
Year celebrations.
Small arms availability and misuse have had a significant impact on Georgian society
since independence from the Soviet Union. Most notably, the use of small arms
(amongst other weapons) in the conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia and the civil
war continue to have serious social repercussions for the country, including a large
number of internally displaced persons, economic decline and social and ethnic 
tensions. The household survey and the focus group discussions demonstrate that, in
spite of improvements in this area, a significant proportion of Georgians continue to
believe that they live in an insecure environment. Yet, while economic instability and
related factors were considered to be the greatest overall cause of insecurity and initia-
tives to tackle economic problems were identified as a key priority, further examina-
tion of responses suggest that Georgians are also concerned by the societal impact of
4.5 Societal
impact
firearms ownership and misuse. While perceptions were tested on ‘abstract’ notions of
economic insecurity, crime, etc., it should be noted that there is clearly interdepend-
ence between a sense of economic insecurity, perceptions of state weakness and
firearms ownership and misuse. While this report explores these links, it does not seek
to explain them in full.
Household survey respondents identified unemployment (58 percent of respondents)
and economic uncertainty (23 percent of respondents) as the key drivers of
insecurity,92 rather than small arms proliferation (0 percent of respondents).
In addition, only three percent of respondents cited control over the availability of
weapons as the principal priority in their area of residence – in contrast to job creation
(73 percent). Focus group participants and regional leaders interviewed by the
research team also agreed that unemployment represented the most important issue 
in their community.93 Indeed, as research in other countries has shown, criminality
and the availability of weapons are very much perceived as an effect rather than a 
cause of economic and social insecurity:
If the social situation does not improve, criminality will never reduce. Even the Police can’t
help this. On the contrary, criminality will increase until such time as people are able to
work.
Focus group K, Akhaltsikhe, unemployed, female
Figure 14: In your opinion, what are the three main priorities of your city/region/district/
village? (Base No. = 1,300)
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92 ‘What is the biggest cause of insecurity to you personally and your family?’ (Base No. = 1,300)
93 Interview, Natia Surguladze.
94 Rynn S et al. Taming the Arsenal – Small Arms and Light Weapons in Bulgaria, (SEESAC, 2005); Taylor Z et al. Living with the
Legacy – SALW Survey of the Republic of Serbia, (SEESAC, 2005); Op. Cit, Wood D et al. SALW Survey of Moldova (SEESAC,
2006). 
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The prominence of economic issues in discussions on social priorities and security
reflects a trend across Eastern Europe, where previous SALW Surveys in countries such
as Serbia, Bulgaria and Moldova have most frequently cited economic insecurity as the
main cause of insecurity (Serbia – 47 percent; Bulgaria – 33.9 percent; Moldova – 
36.7 percent) and arms proliferation is not considered to be a major cause of insecurity
(Serbia – 2.2 percent; Bulgaria – 0.7 percent; Moldova – 1.1 percent), irrespective of the
actual availability and impact of weapons.94
While economic instability is seen as the main cause of insecurity in Georgia, the 
negative impact of firearms ownership and firearm-related crime is still widely 
recognised. When asked in more detail about the role of firearms ownership and 
misuse in society, survey respondents and focus group participants were able to 
identify a range of substantive impacts. For example, a larger proportion of survey
respondents thought that the availability or use of firearms represented a major 
concern in their community (40 percent) than did not (26 percent).
Figure 15: To what extent do you agree with the following statement: ‘availability or use 
of firearms is a major concern in the place I live’? 
(Base No. = 1,300)
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95 ‘How common is it for conflicts in your community to involve firearms?’ (Base No. = 1,300) 
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A number of discrepancies from the general trend deserve comment. Firearms avail-
ability and use was more of a concern for non-ethnic Georgian citizens than ethnic
Georgians, and the effect of firearms in the community is perceived to be slightly
greater amongst rural respondents than urban respondents. In addition, a higher
number of respondents from Samtskhe-Javakheti thought that their community was
adversely affected by firearms ownership and use (54 percent) than in other regions.
Since the level of recorded firearms crime in Samtskhe-Javakheti is lower than other
areas of the country (only 16 incidents were recorded by the Police in 2005) this 
perception might reflect concerns over the closure of the Russian base at Akhalkalaki.
It could also, however, be further indication that ethnic minorities do not trust the
police and do not report firearm related incidents.
The household survey also indicated that firearms are often used to resolve inter-
communal conflicts. In total, 21 percent of survey respondents said that it was
‘extremely common’ or ‘quite common’ for conflicts in their community to involve
firearms.95 Figures were even higher in Tbilisi (69 percent) and amongst rural 
respondents (38 percent). Indeed, 42 percent of respondents thought that firearms had
‘some negative’ or ‘negative’ impacts on inter-communal relations, compared to 24
percent who thought that firearms had ‘some positive’ or ‘positive’ impacts. Negative
appreciation of the impacts of firearms on inter-communal relations was higher in
Samtskhe-Javakheti (76 percent) and Ajara (66 percent), but lower in Kakheti, where
49 percent of respondents thought that firearms had a positive impact.
This caution towards firearms amongst a large proportion of the public is probably
largely due to personal experiences of internal armed conflict since Georgia gained
independence. This can be seen in the Ajaran public’s response to the confrontation
between Batumi and Tbilisi in 2004. In the months leading up to May 2004,
Abashidze’s administration distributed substantial numbers of firearms amongst his
supporters and then destroyed the Choloki Bridge linking Ajara to the rest of Georgia
(see box 7). This action led to the collapse of support for the Abashidze regime and
intensified protests against it. Ultimately, ordinary people proved unwilling to engage
in armed confrontations. Those interviewed commented that this was mostly due 
to a fear of a return to the armed hostility that had been prevalent in Georgia during
the 1990s:
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Nobody wanted to fight. Everyone still remembers the bad times, Georgians killing 
Georgians, and they didn’t want it to happen again.
Natia Surguladze, Vice Mayor of Batumi, 18 January 2006
Policing provision
In addition to the punishments outlined in section 3.6 for illegal firearms incidents
(possession, sale etc), crimes involving firearms (‘banditry’) are punishable by five to
20 years imprisonment (Criminal Code, Article 224). General police efficiency and
capacity to combat firearm misuse has improved substantially in the period 2003–2005:
Table 10: Clear-up rate for all crime, 2004–2005 (Source: MIA)
Year Total registered crimes Cases cleared Percentage cleared
2004 24,856 13,016 52.4%
2005 43,266 15,975 36.9%
While it may appear at first glance that police efficiency has reduced in the period 2004
to 2005, as the proportion of reported crime cleared by the police had reduced from
52.4 percent to 36.9 percent, the number of cleared cases has actually increased from
13,016 to 15,975. The fall in the proportion of overall crime that has been cleared 
probably reflects an improvement in police recording of crime (itself a result of greater
trust in the police and hence a greater willingness to report crime to the police), rather
than reduced police efficiency.
The clear-up rate for reported incidents of banditry (crime involving the use of a
firearm) was close to the average for all types of crime in 2005 (38.2 percent clear-up
rate). However, the clear up rate for the illegal firearms incidents was much higher, at
75.6 percent, although significantly lower than in the previous year. The higher clear-
up rate for illegal firearms incidents can probably be attributed to the mode in which
such incidents are reported. This usually involves the police themselves uncovering
illegal owned or carried firearms, rather than such cases being reported to them by the
general public:
Table 11: Clear-up rate for banditry and illegal firearm incidents, 2005 (Source: MIA)
Type of crime Total Cases   Percentage 
registered cleared cleared
crimes
Banditry
2004 1,733 633 36.5%
2005 1,925 736 38.2%
Illegal possession etc.
2004 1,238 1,126 91%
2005 1,242 939 75.6%
While the ability of the police to enforce the law in this area has improved, it is not
clear what improvements have been made in crime prevention. Indeed, there does not
at present appear to be any strategic analysis of the risk of firearm misuse or any 
resultant programme to combat it.
4.6 Law
enforcement
Trust in the police
Improved police performance is reflected in a higher level of trust in the police
amongst the public. For example, 78 percent of household survey respondents would
turn to the police first for protection if they or their family were threatened with 
violence. This compares well with similar research in the rest of Eastern Europe,
where a smaller proportion of the national population would turn to the police first 
(eg Moldova – 54.1 percent; Bulgaria – 75.1 percent).96 Focus group discussions 
indicated that increased trust is for the most part a result of the introduction of the
Patrol Police and more people-orientated policing:
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Box 13: Police provision in the demilitarised zone
A number of interviews were conducted with police and government officials in the Zugdidi
region of Samegrelo in order to assess police capacity to provide security in the demilitarised
zone. While the region has suffered from high crime levels since the end of the armed
conflicts in 1995, human security in the region has increased substantially following the Rose
Revolution in 2003, despite the continued tense situation. It is thought that the improved
security situation is in part due to the introduction of community based policing and joint fact
finding missions. 
Police provision in the demilitarised zone has also been aided by UNOMIG, which has main-
tained a Civilian Police (CIVPOL) mission in the Georgian section of the demilitarised zone
since November 2003. CIVPOL is not involved with tackling weapons possession amongst the
population, but provides monitoring, training and advice to the Georgian police, especially
regarding the development of local community safety and crime prevention programmes.
Community policing: One regional and five district crime prevention committees have been
established in Samegrelo following a CIVPOL initiative. These committees have been used to
fight drug use in Senaki, Gobi and Zugdidi. Public-police relations have also been improved
through the appointment of policemen as uchastkovye (residential beat policemen) to villages
following their training in Tbilisi. At present there is one uchastkovye for every two to three
villages, based in crime prevention committees.
According to the chief of Zugdidi police these activities, together with improved professional-
ism and lower levels of corruption, has already increased the public’s trust in the police and
that this has in turn led to higher co-operation between the police and the public. Represen-
tatives from CIVPOL have supported this sentiment, stating that public trust in the Patrol
Police is presently at a high level. 
Joint fact finding missions: In the event of politically related incidents on either side of the
demilitarised zone, a joint fact finding mission is dispatched to conduct an investigation. Each
mission is staffed by 8–10 permanent representatives, including two from the Abkhazian and
two from the Georgian authorities, two from CIS PKF (Peace Keeping Forces) and two from
CIVPOL. According to CIVPOL, co-operation within the framework of the joint fact finding
missions is constantly improving, to the extent that the Abkhazian prosecutor asks more 
frequently for help from the mission in investigating incidents.
One potential way of further increasing trust and co-operation along the Gali-Zugdidi 
border would be the introduction of a UN CIVPOL office in Gali. According to the Chief of
Zugdidi police, increased trust between the police forces in the region, would result in greater
safety and lower levels of firearm possession amongst the local population.
96 Op. Cit. Wood D et al.; Op. Cit. Rynn S et al. 65 percent of respondents in Serbia answered ‘police’ to the slightly different
question, ‘Who do you consider most responsible for the security of you and your family’. Op. Cit. Taylor Z et al.
People now believe that calling a patrol for assistance will bring results. Previously, calling
the Police could result in trouble for the caller. You could even be arrested. Now fear of
uniformed police officers has been removed with the introduction of the patrol system.
Focus group H, Zugdidi, unemployed, female, 49
While this is the case, trust in the police has not increased universally across the whole
of Georgia, partly because the benefit of the Patrol Police’s activities was thought to be
more limited in rural areas and city suburbs. For example, the percentage of respond-
ents who would turn to the police first for assistance was significantly lower in Shida
Kartli (65 percent said that they would turn to the police) and Guria (21 percent). In
these two areas respondents were much more likely to feel a need to provide their own
protection – Shida Kartli (33 percent) and Guria (59 percent). Most significantly, trust
in the police was much lower amongst non-ethnic Georgian communities (see box
14). Some police officers interviewed, such as the Chief of the Kutaisi regional police,
recognised that public lack of trust and a related reluctance to report crime is still a
problem.97 It was accepted that this lack of trust was understandable, given that in the
past the Police used to take bribes and were not efficient if fighting crime. As a result,
more could be done to improve police-public relations. Such methods include the
mainstreaming of the community based policing approach that has been imple-
mented in the Zugdidi region (see box 13).
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97 Interview, Irakli Chimakadze.
98 Interview, George Jokhadze.
Box 14: Trust in the police amongst minority groups
While trust in the police has generally increased, it is higher among ethnic Georgians than
non-ethnic Georgians, who were more likely to feel the need to provide their own security if
threatened with violence (26 percent compared to 15 percent of ethnic Georgians). Some
ethnic Azeri focus group participants even claimed that they had been threatened by the law-
enforcement agencies themselves. Trust in the police is especially low for non-ethnic 
Georgians living in rural areas, such as Kvemo Kartli where the official state language is not as
widespread. Low levels of trust in the Police amongst non-ethnic Georgians may in part result
from the small number of ethnic minority police officers presently serving. The new police-
training programme is conducted entirely in Georgian and the Patrol Police is having difficulty
finding ethnic minority recruits (particularly Azeris) who know Georgian well enough to 
complete the training programme (Interview, Shota Utiashvili).
General Prosecutor’s Office and judiciary
The General Prosecutor’s Office is responsible for issuing government policy on 
criminal justice and for ensuring the progress of criminal proceedings for breaches 
of Georgia’s Criminal Code. This responsibility includes ensuring prosecution of
firearm-related crime. Since 2004 the capacity of the General Prosecutor’s Office 
to record and track criminal proceedings (including cases related to firearms) has
improved considerably. This is mostly due to improved procedures for collating 
information, thus minimising the possibilities for local prosecutors to ‘massage’
prosecution rates.98 As a result the General Prosecutor’s Office was able to provide
information on criminal proceedings initiated for ‘banditry’ (crimes involving the 
use of firearms) and illegal firearms incidents.
Information provided by the Organisational-Analytical Department of the General
Prosecutor’s Office shows that investigations into violations of Georgia’s civilian small
arms control system have resulted in the following criminal proceedings, court cases
and prosecutions:
Figure 16: Criminal proceedings for illegal firearms incidents 
(paragraph 236 of the Criminal Code) 99
(Source: Organisational-Analytical Department, General Prosecutor)
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99 The illegal purchasing, possession, transfer and marketing of firearms.
100 Crimes involving the use of firearms (eg robbery, carjacking). 
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Figure 17: Criminal proceedings for banditry (paragraph 179 of the Criminal Code) 100
(Source: Organisational-Analytical Department, General Prosecutor)
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According to the Head of the Organisational-Analytical Department of the General
Prosecutor’s Office, statistics on prosecutions were not well kept prior to 2004. As a
result, it is impossible to judge the accuracy of these statistics or to use them as the
basis for assessing the capacity of the judiciary to ensure correct punishments for
firearm-related crime. Consequently, while the number of recorded criminal proceed-
ings has risen faster than the number of convictions in 2004 and 2005, this probably
does not indicate decreased efficiency on the part of law-enforcement services, so
much as a more comprehensive method of recording criminal proceedings.
In 2005, only 50 percent of criminal proceedings for illegal firearms incidents resulted
in a court case (489 court cases out of 952 criminal proceedings, figure 16). The rate of
incidents brought to court is even lower if recorded firearm crime is taken into
account. The MIA recorded 1,242 such incidents in 2005. If it is assumed that all such
cases are processed in the same year as they are recorded (eg cases occurring in 2005
are processed in 2005), 39 percent of all recorded incidents in 2005 resulted in criminal
case being brought to court (489 out of 1,242 recorded incidents). In addition, only 
20 percent of criminal proceedings regarding banditry resulted in a court case in 2005
(477 court cases out of 2,535 criminal proceedings). Indeed, household survey 
respondents and key informant interviewees were on the whole very sceptical about
the ability of the justice system to prosecute crime. The low conviction rates for 
criminal proceedings related to the misuse of firearms are a potential cause for 
concern and deserve further investigation.
5 
Small arms production
and trade
ALTHOUGH IN THE PAST Georgia attempted to manufacture military weapons, at
present SALW production appears to be limited to the manufacture of components for
sports and hunting weapons. The domestic arms trade is also relatively small and the
number of licensed gun shops has reduced from 56 in 2003 to 20 in 2005. While this is
the case, the number of firearms imported to Georgia every year by gun shops 
fluctuates dramatically. As a result it is not clear how many firearms are presently being
traded on the internal market.
For the most part, Georgia’s legislative and regulatory framework controlling the 
production and trade of SALW is adequate to present needs. The one major weakness
is the low capacity of the MoJ to inspect licensed SALW traders and production 
facilities on a six-monthly basis, as allowed by law. This low capacity could become
more problematic if Georgia ever develops a substantial manufacturing base. In 
addition, agencies with a small arms control role do not have access to information 
on the domestic small arms trade. For example, the Permissions Department cannot
inspect gun shops’ weapon inventories. Poor access to information on the domestic
small arms trade could consequently undermine small arms control in other areas.
The principal laws governing the trade and production of SALW in Georgia are:
■ The ‘Law on Arms’ (8 May 2003), which regulates the production and certification of
firearms and military weapons and the trade in firearms
■ The ‘Law on the Fundamentals of the Issuance of Licences and Permits for 
Entrepreneurial Activities’ (13 May 2002), which regulates the licensing of production,
repair and trade in arms and dual-use goods
■ Presidential Decree N582 (1997), which defines technical documentation procedures
for the production of military goods
■ The Criminal Code specifies penalties for violations of Georgia’s small arms control
legislation.
5.1 Legislation
and regulation
Licensing of production
The 2003 ‘Law on Arms’ stipulates that the production of firearms, their parts and
ammunition is licensed by the MoJ. According to this law, a potential producer needs
to present the following documents in order to secure a production licence:
■ A certificate of registration as a legal entity or individual entrepreneur
■ Names of founders
■ A list of staff members
■ A document certifying the presence of the appropriate technical safety measures
■ A document certifying the payment of a licence fee 
■ A certificate to the effect that the applicant does not have a criminal conviction and 
is not registered as a drug addict or mentally ill.
Manufacturers are also responsible for maintaining accurate records of all 
manufactured goods.
Marking
The 2002 ‘Law on the Fundamentals of the Issuance of Licences and Permits for 
Entrepreneurial Activities’ stipulates that all weapons manufactured in Georgia must
be certified. The manufacturer is obliged to test and mark firearms, parts and 
ammunition on production.
Licensing of the domestic arms trade
Georgia’s domestic weapons market is also regulated by the ‘Law on Arms’ (Articles 17
and 18). The law stipulates that legal entities wishing to trade in arms have to receive a
licence from the MoJ. The documents and requirements necessary to receive a licence
to trade in arms are identical to those required for a licence to manufacture arms 
(see above). In addition, according to Georgia’s 2005 submission to the United Nations
Department for Disarmament Affairs (UN DDA), individuals and companies trading
in weapons and ammunition are obliged to:101
■ Hold certificates for the types of firearms being traded
■ Provide adequate record keeping of traded goods
■ Trade only with properly authorised persons and companies
■ Trade firearms with their registration number and document proving compliance
with state standards
■ Provide secure storage of weapons and ammunition 
■ Present projectile/case samples from traded weapons to the relevant state agency
■ Provide a monthly report on traded goods and customers to relevant agencies.
Storage conditions
The ‘Law on Firearms’ stipulates that arms manufacturers and dealers have to provide
adequate storage facilities for firearms under their possession and are required to 
submit certificates to the MoJ confirming that their premises comply with safety 
standards.
Verification and inspection
The Head of the MoJ’s Registration and Licence Department has stated that the MoJ
has the right to inspect licensed SALW traders/production facilities twice a year and
can close a shop if does not correspond to the required safety standards.102 However, it
should be noted that the Permissions Department does not have the authority to
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101 Georgia’s 2005 submission to the UNDDA on the UN PoA. It is not clear whether these obligations are stipulated in law.
102 Interview, Giorgi Gogiberidze. 
inspect a gun shop’s inventory or purchase and import records, as Customs 
declarations are considered to be commercial secrets.103
Industry outreach
There are currently no regular mechanisms for disseminating information to domestic
arms traders on changes to the licensing system. Some gun shop owners interviewed
by the research team stated that they had never received instructions from the MIA,
while others said that this had happened only ‘in rare cases’, such as with the intro-
duction of the ban on shotguns and bird hunting. In the absence of instructions from
the MIA, shops have had to rely on other sources, such as the mass media, the Internet,
acquaintances, or the parliamentary publication Legislative News.104
According to the MIA, no firearms or components are presently produced in 
Georgia.105 Post-Soviet attempts to produce military SALW in Georgia have been
unsuccessful. Prior to 1999, 15 different items underwent prototype production at the
MoD supervised enterprise Delta, including grenade and mine launchers, detonators
and anti-tank grenades.106 According to the then director of Delta, in 1999 the 
enterprise was in the process of designing a Georgian submachine gun (‘Gorda’) and a
pistol (‘Armazi’).107 It is also claimed that the enterprise produced a number of 82mm
grenade launchers for the Georgian army.108 As far as is known, Delta no longer 
produces SALW but is now employed to destroy MoD surplus SALW. According to a
previous study, production of military weaponry was also attempted at the Georgian
research centres Orbi and Skhivi.109 Again, no known production presently takes place
at these facilities. While there does not appear to be any military production of
weapons at the present time, export statistics indicate that Georgian manufactures
might be subcontracted to Italian sports/hunting gun manufacturers. For example, in
2004, US$170,763 of parts and accessories for sports/hunting shotguns and rifles were
exported to Italy, while only US$46,335 was imported (in 2003, US$178,886 worth was
exported and only US$6,048 imported).110
While it was possible to possess firearms in Soviet times, the number and type of
firearms available was limited, and there were no gun shops.111 The number of licensed
gun shops increased substantially in the post-Soviet period, peaking at 56 in 2003, but
has since reduced:
Table 12: Licensed gun shops (Source: MoJ)
Year 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Trade licences 5 3 – 11 40 42 20
Gun shops112 30 3 – 27 56 44 20
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103 Interview, Zaza Khachidze.
104 Interviews with gun shop managers. 
105 Interview, Shota Utiashvili. 
106 Army and Society in Georgia, April 1999. 
107 Ibid. 
108 Ibid. 
109 Op. Cit. Darchiashvili D.
110 Source: NISAT arms transfers database.
111 Interview, Zaza Khachidze.
112 Several gun shops can be included on one licence. 
5.2
Manufacturing
capacity
5.3 The internal
market
MoJ statistics indicate that a total of 95,993 firearms have been imported by gun shops
since 1999. It is unclear, however, how many of these firearms have consequently been
re-exported (see section 8.2). As a result, it is not certain how many firearms are
presently being traded on the internal civilian market.
According to Article 236 of the Georgian Criminal Code, the illegal production,
transfer, transportation or sale of firearms and ammunition can be punished by five 
to ten years’ imprisonment.113 While general figures were available for the illegal 
purchasing, possession, transfer and marketing of firearms (2004, 1,238 incidents;
2005, 1,242 incidents – see section 3.5), no detailed breakdown of this criminal category
was available. As a result, it is not clear how many of these incidents specifically refer to
the illegal production or sale of weapons.
The MoJ is responsible for issuing licences for entrepreneurial activities, and as such
licences both SALW production facilities and SALW traders. While the MoJ has the
right to check once or twice a year whether licensed gun shops/production facilities 
are compliant with the relevant legislation, it does not yet do so. This is partly because
the present law does not indicate which department of the MoJ is responsible for
inspecting storage conditions.114 Furthermore, the MoJ claims not to have sufficient
employees to conduct inspections of gun shops and production facilities.115 As a result,
although the law establishes certain storage standards for gun shops, and the MoJ can
close down shops that do not uphold these standards, it is currently not possible to
ensure these standards are maintained. The MoJ stated that it intends to establish a
special group tasked with checking gun shop and production facilities in 2006, but it 
is unclear whether this has yet taken place.
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113 2005 report to the UNDDA regarding implementation of the UNPoA.
114 Interview, Zaza Khachidze.
115 Interview, Giorgi Gogiberidze.
5.4 Law
enforcement
5.5
Administrative
capacity
6
State small arms
management
THIS SURVEY ESTIMATES that at the present time Georgia maintains between
76,000 and 91,000 state-held SALW, excluding those under the control of the Russian
forces in Georgia. In the past state stockpile management has been patchy, regarding
both Georgian Government stocks and those of the forces of the Russian federation
based on Georgian territory. While it is unclear how significant thefts from army
stocks have been, partly due to a lack of access to the Government’s list of lost and
stolen weapons, policy and practice in this area is improving and should continue to
do so. The space for change is provided by the planned closure of the remaining 
Russian military bases by the beginning of 2008 and the ongoing adoption of more
advanced needs identification and stockpile and inventory practices by the Georgian
MoD as part of its IPAP implementation programme. As a result, according to the
MoD, planning for the type and quantity of SALW required by the Georgian military is
now based on projected military needs as defined by a threat analysis.116 Georgia’s basic
military planning is outlined in the National Security Strategy (NSS) and the National
Military Strategy (NMS), which were adopted in November 2005.
In addition, the MoD and armed forces have done much to reign in the semi-
autonomous military factions that were prevalent in the 1990s and bring fuller control
over military SALW use. The Border Police has been de-militarised and subordinated
to the MIA, while the Internal Troops have been moved to the MoD. For their part, the
National Guard has been brought under the full control of the MoD as a voluntary
reservist force. These changes have resulted in a reduction in the number of military
forces tasked with ensuring security and defence under the Georgian Constitution.
As a result, possibly for the first time in its post-Soviet independence, the Georgian
armed forces are unified and well controlled.
While this is the case, there is still some reticence on the part of the Georgian MoD
regarding state SALW holdings, the present state of stockpile maintenance and 
security and related weaknesses that still need to be dealt with. Indeed, previous offers
of assistance from the international community to enhance stockpile security have not
been taken up, due to a lack of willingness on the part of the MoD to allow for inspec-
tion of military stockpiles.117 Until such inspections by international experts can be
undertaken it will remain unclear what needs exist in this area. In addition, Georgia is
presently engaging in significant military procurement, which should increase the
116 Correspondence with Mamuka Kikaleishvili, Ministry of Defence, June 2006.
117 Anonymous interviewee E, Western diplomatic staff. 
number and type of SALW at its disposal. Without full access to information on 
present SALW holdings, as well as projected needs according to the NSS and NMS, it is
not possible to assess Georgia’s state procurement needs and to what extent ongoing
military imports are essential.118 Finally, there are concerns over the excessive use of
force and firearms by MoJ and MIA staff. While much has been done to improve police
training in the use of firearms as well as to eradicate ill-treatment of suspects and 
prisoners,119 much still needs to be done to ensure that humane models of policing and
the graduated use of force are consistently applied across all state agencies.
Transparency regarding state owned SALW is low in Georgia. No state agencies that
maintain SALW provided the research team with information on the numbers or 
types of weapons in their possession. In general, such information was regarded as a
‘state secret’. Low levels of transparency regarding state SALW holdings are not 
unusual, particularly in transition countries and those that have experienced a recent
conflict. Indeed, many former Soviet states exhibit a similar approach to the provision
of information in this area. Consequently, whilst every effort has been made to obtain
official figures for the SALW holdings of all relevant agencies, the lack of information
has made it necessary to estimate state SALW holdings. On the basis of available 
information it is estimated that Georgian state agencies presently maintain between
76,000 and 91,000 SALW. The estimate of SALW holdings for each agency is provided
in the table below.
Table 13: Georgian state SALW holdings
Force Personnel120 Estimated armed Estimated quantity 
personnel of SALW
Armed Forces
Active Service 26,025 25,225 45,405–60,540
National Guard 6,300121 6,300 As above
Ministry of internal Affairs
of which
– Police Force 20,959 18,654 18,654
– Border Police 5,868 5,223 5,223
Ministry of Justice
of which
– Court Guard 190 169 169
– Prison Guard 2,788 2,481 2,481
State Protection Service 3,420 3,044 3,044
Financial Police 650 325 325
Customs Department 1,172 586 586
Total 67,372 62,007 76,000–91,000
(75,887–91,022)
Armed Forces (including National Guard)
No official information was available on the number or type of SALW held by the
Georgian Armed Forces. According to sources available, the Georgian military is
equipped almost exclusively with Soviet type SALW, inherited from the Soviet Army,
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118 Even if information on state SALW holdings and needs were available, it would not be possible to conduct such an
assessment at the present time due to the lack of information on sanctioned state imports (see section 8.2). 
119 Amnesty International Media Briefing, Georgia: Torture and ill-treatment still a concern after the “Rose Revolution”,
<http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGEUR560012006?open&of=ENG-GEO>, accessed 20 June 2006. 
120 Law on Georgian State Budget 2006; National Guard figure from US Office of Defence Co-operation; Border Police figure
from Interview, Kakha Khandolishvili. 
121 Number corresponds to unpaid volunteer reservists in 2006. Will increase to 7,000 men (20 battalions) when supplementary
funds become available. National Guard also maintains a list of 40,000–50,000 ex-servicemen who form a ‘ready reserve’.
6.1 State small
arms holdings
bought from other countries’ Soviet-era stockpiles (eg Uzbekistan) or imported from
producing countries (eg Romania). Only a small number of non-Soviet type 
weaponry has been imported into Georgia. Most significantly, this has included the
import of an undisclosed number of ‘Tavor’ assault rifles from Israel in 2004. It is
unclear whether the Georgian military has received any NATO weaponry, either from
the US as part of US military assistance, or during Georgia’s participation in peace-
keeping operations. Known weapon types include:122
■ AT-4 Spigot, Anti-Tank Guided Missile (Soviet Union)
■ AT-5 Spandrel, Anti-Tank Guided Missile (Soviet Union)
■ SPG-9 73mm, Recoilless Rifle (Soviet Union)
■ 23/37mm light anti-aircraft gun (Soviet Union)
■ 50/60/82mm mortars (Soviet Union)
■ Strela and Igla MANPAD (Soviet Union)
■ RPG-7/SPG-6/PG-25, Grenade launcher (Soviet Union)
■ RPG-18/RPG-22/RPG-26, Rocket launcher (Soviet Union)
■ MO-251 rocket rifles (Soviet Union)
■ 9mm CZ-Z, Pistol (Czech Republic)
■ 9mm SIG Sauer, Pistol (Germany)
■ 7.62mm Tokarev, Pistol (Soviet Union)
■ 9mm Makarov, Pistol (Soviet Union)
■ 7.62/5.45mm AK-74/AKS-74/AKM/AKMN/AKMS/AKMSN, Assault Rifle (Soviet
Union, Russia, Czech Republic, Romania, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Lithuania, Poland)
■ 5.56 Tavor assault rifles (Israel)
■ 7.62mm sniper rifles (Soviet Union)
■ 5.45mm AKSU-74, Machine Gun (Soviet Union)
■ 5.45mm RPK/RPK-74/RPK-74N/PK/PKM/SGIT/SGMB/PKT, Light Machine Gun
(Soviet Union)
■ 7.62mm PKS, Medium Machine Gun (Soviet Union)
■ 12.7mm/14.5mm/20mm DshK/NSV/KPVT, Heavy Machine Gun (Soviet Union).
According to the Georgian MoD, following the adoption of the NSS and NMS,
Georgia has also adopted a western-standard Table of Organisation and Equipment
(ToE), which defines the number of personnel and quantity of equipment needed by
each type of unit. As a result, the ratio of weapons per individual in the Georgian 
military should conform to NATO standards. While no NATO guidelines exist on this
issue, in general most NATO militaries maintain between 1.8 and 2.4 weapons per 
individual (covers rifles, personal protection weapons and crew served weapons).123
According to the Georgian military budget for 2005, the Armed Forces presently main-
tain 26,025 personnel (including 800 civilians). This would entail that the Georgian
military presently maintains between some 45,400 and 60,500 units of SALW. It is not
clear whether separate weaponry is kept for the National Guard, an unpaid volunteer
force of 6,300 (18 battalions of 350 men) that was incorporated into the MoD in 2002.
While each volunteer receives a weapon during training, these weapons are taken from
the central MoD stock, and it is probable that they comprise part of the military’s 
general pool of weaponry.124
It is also not clear whether the number and types of weapons at the Georgian military’s
disposal will change significantly in the next couple of years. The Georgian Armed
Forces are presently operating under three competing demands – territorial integrity
and the re-integration of the separatist areas, maintenance of peace support 
operations and ongoing reforms necessary in order to qualify for NATO. Due to these
demands, the Georgian military is in the process of procuring more weaponry and
military expenditure is increasing at a greater rate in Georgia than in any other 
country (see section 8.2). Some SALW procurement is necessary in order to meet
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Georgia’s peace keeping support commitments and to ensure that Georgian weaponry
conforms with NATO specifications. However, the number of armed personnel or
SALW necessary for state agencies to perform their responsibilities is not clear, in the
absence of a comprehensive and publicly available threat assessment. Indeed, it is
important that the Georgian Government responds to EU, US and NATO initiatives 
to ensure appropriate military staffing.125
A case in point is provided by the ongoing debate over the size of the National Guard.
While the National Guard has not as yet been allocated an exact mission statement, its
basic role is to provide a military reserve, defend strategic objectives (‘infrastructure
protection’) and general assistance during national emergencies. However, due to the
absence of a clear mission statement and legislation governing the National Guard,126
it is not clear what size reserve is needed. As a result, political statements continue to be
made about the future size of the National Guard. These statements have included
claims that the force will eventually comprise 20,000 or 40,000 reservists.127 According
to international observers, this level of personnel is not needed.128 There has also been
some debate about the role of the National Guard. The previous Head of the National
Guard (and former Commander of the Internal Troops) endeavoured to convert the
Guard into a potent attacking force that reported directly to the President. Under 
pressure from the international community and the MoD, worried about the negative
side effects of creating a second parallel military, a civilian was appointed as director 
of the National Guard until November 2006. While this move has underlined Georgia’s
commitment to ensuring that the National Guard’s role is restricted to infrastructure
protection and national emergency assistance, until the role and size of the National
Guard is confirmed by legislation, there exists the possibility for it to expand unduly 
or to fulfil full military tasks.
Ministry of Internal Affairs
Substantial reforms of the MIA have dramatically altered the number and type of
SALW available to it. Reforms have included the transfer of the Border Police to the
MIA, the transfer of the Interior troops to the Georgian Armed Forces under the MoD,
reductions in the number of Special Forces and the MIA’s merger with the Security
Ministry. Importantly, these changes mean that the MIA no longer has a significant
military role.
The research team was not able to obtain figures for the number or type of SALW held
by the MIA, for reasons of secrecy. However, the types of weapons used by the MIA’s
various police forces are known to include Makarov pistols; CZ-Z pistols, Israeli-made
pistols and AK assault rifles and sniper rifles. It is possible to estimate MIA SALW
stocks from personnel numbers. According to the 2006 Georgian state budget, there
are presently 26,827 people employed by the MIA. Of this number, 20,959 work in the
police departments while 5,868 are employed by Border Police. Since the change in the
MIA’s role to concentrate on policing rather than military tasks, it is not thought that
the MIA presently maintains any surplus weapons or stockpiles. It is consequently
probably the case that the number of SALW held by the agency is roughly equivalent 
to the number of personnel with access to weaponry. According to the Head of the 
Border Police’s International and Legal Affairs, 89 percent of border guards provide
guarding functions and should consequently have access to weaponry.129 It is probable
that this percentage holds true for the whole of the MIA. For example, according to the
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Head of the MIAs Information Department, most employees take up their right to use
firearms.130 Consequently, this would suggest that the MIA hold some 23,900 SALW.
The Ministry of Justice
The MoJ maintains a small amount of firearms for use by the 190 personnel that guard
Georgia’s courts and the 2,788 personnel that guard the country’s prisons. No official
information was available on the number of weapons held by these. However, similar
to the MIA, it is unlikely that the MoJ maintains any surplus weapons or stockpiles. If,
similar to the MIA, 89 percent of these guards are assumed to have access to weaponry,
this would entail that the MoJ presently maintains some 2,500 SALW.
Special State Guard Service
The Special State Guard Service is an independent state agency that provides physical
protection (static guards) to both government infrastructure and private companies
on a contractual basis. For example, the Special State Guard Service has contracts to
guard foreign missions, as well as the Baku-Supsa oil pipeline. The Service also 
provides close-protection (bodyguards) to the President and other important officials.
Although it is thought that the Service is armed entirely with SALW, it is not clear 
what these weapons are. However, if we assume a 1:1 ratio for weapon holdings to
active guards and that 89 percent of the Special State Guard Service’s personnel is 
comprised of active guards, the Special State Guard Service would presently control
approximately 3,050 SALW (total personnel, 3,420).
Other agencies
The Customs Department and Financial Police also maintain a number of armed 
personnel. Unfortunately, public information was not available on either the number
of SALW maintained by these agencies or the number of personnel with access to
weaponry. As a result it has been more difficult to estimate number of SALW stockpiles
in these cases. Broadly, it could be assumed that 50 percent of staff at these two 
agencies have access to weaponry and that there is a 1:1 ratio for weapon holdings to
such personnel. If this is the case, then the Customs Department would maintain 
some 600 SALW (total personnel, 1,172) while the Financial Police has access to
approximately 300 SALW (total personnel, 650).
In the early 1990s the nascent Georgian army was given control of more than 30 former
Soviet storage facilities in Georgia. The storage and security standards at these bases
were for the most part poor, providing an easy target for theft as well as a substantial
threat to the population (see section 3.4).131 The MoD has recognised that in the past it
had too many stockpiles spread-out in the country and that it has consequently been
difficult to maintain credible stockpile security. As result, a process is under way to
reduce and upgrade the number of stockpiles holding SALW and other armaments, as
well as centralise inventory control. As a result, the following actions have been taken
in the period 2003 to 2006:132
■ The number of central armaments/ammunition depots has been reduced. As a result
the following depots have been closed during this period:
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6.2 Stockpile
security 
6.2.1 Ministry of
Defence 
■ Skhvilisi depot for engineering materials
■ Klde depot for armaments, military hardware and ammunition
■ Kopitnari depots for artillery and aviation ammunition
■ Dedoplistsqaro depot for armaments, military hardware and ammunition
■ Acharis Tsqali (Ajara) depot for artillery ammunition 
■ Tbilisi depot for armaments and ammunition, which formerly belonged to the 
interior troops
■ Depot No. 7 for aviation armaments and military equipment in Tbilisi.
■ Demilitarisation arms-disposal plants were built in Dedoplistsqaro and Ponichala to
accumulate non-functional, obsolete, and excess ammunition awaiting further 
disposal 
■ SALW are in the process of being relocated from the old storage facilities of the Central
Army Depot to the newly reconstructed storage facilities near the Tank Factory in
Vaziani
■ Outdated and non-functional SALW have been completely removed from military
units and stored in the Central Army Depot.
While this is the case, little information was available on outstanding weaknesses
regarding stockpile security and maintenance. Indeed, Georgia’s Deputy Foreign 
Minister admitted to the research team that Georgia still experiences substantial 
problems securing its stockpiles, in terms of both equipment and guard facilities.133
Recording and inventory
The first inventory of MoD stocks probably took place in 1993, following the Abkhaz
and South Ossetian wars and upon a Ministerial Order.134 The MoD conducts a twice-
yearly inventory of SALW, according to which each firearm is allocated two 
registration numbers.135 According to the Head of the MoD’s logistics department,
management of ammunition stocks is less rigorous, with the amount of ammunition
simply being ‘noted’.136
According to the MoD the introduction of a ToE in line with western standards has
made implementing a comprehensive accounting and control system easier and that,
‘There are no doubts today that all armaments and ammunition of every military unit or
army depot have been accounted for and are under stringent control. Central logistical
services are carrying out parallel accounting and control.’137
However, according to a number of experts, the types and amounts of weapons in the
MoD’s possession are not comprehensively recorded, and significant cases of thefts of
weapons have gone unrecorded in recent years. As stated by one interviewee – 
‘Stockpile management and security in the Armed Forces is not so great, but also not so
bad’.138 In the near future however, Georgia’s national inventory system for arms and
ammunition should be augmented by the completion of an automatic computerised
accounting system.139
Surplus identification
As part of the Georgian system of stockpile management, periodic reviews of stocks
should be undertaken in order to manage the elimination of obsolete and surplus
SALW. All surplus equipment, including SALW, which is not needed according to the
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ToE should be collected by the Logistics Department and stored in the newly con-
structed depots. This process is already underway, as the MoD is presently conducting
an inventory of all arms under its control. An ad hoc commission of 25 persons has
been established to conduct the inventory, which is expected to be completed by the
summer of 2006. The findings of the inventory will be used to identify the total 
number and type of stocks presently maintained by the MoD, as well as surpluses that
need to be destroyed. It is claimed by the MoD that the reduction of the number of
central arms and ammunition depots have aided the process of identifying non-
functional armaments and munitions in the decommissioned arms depots.140
Each Patrol Police station maintains a stockpile of weapons, including automatic
weapons. According to the MIA, only a small number of MIA police weapons are lost
or stolen each year. For example, in 2005 there was only one case, in which a patrol
policeman’s firearm was stolen, while there were two cases in which a firearm was
lost.141 Those responsible for lost or stolen firearms are fired and can be imprisoned for
up to two years. Although individual firearms have been lost or stolen, there have been
no recorded thefts from stockpiles.142
As well as the peacekeeping forces in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, Russia still 
maintains two military bases in Georgian government-controlled territory, in Batumi
(Ajara) and Akhalkalaki (Samtskhe-Javakheti). As noted elsewhere, stockpile security
at Russian bases has in the past been patchy and still causes concern amongst the 
Georgian population (see section 3.4).
On May 30 2005, Russia committed itself to closing its remaining Russian bases in
Georgia by 2008. The Russian base at Akhalkalaki is due to close by 1 October 2007,
while the remaining base at Batumi will closed by the end of 2007.143 Given the patchy
history of stockpile security at Russia’s military bases in the Caucasus it is important
that the withdrawals are well planned and supervised in order to limit the possibility 
of weapon thefts. The closures could also provide the local staff with the opportunity
to ‘adjust’ the bases weapon registers, to allow for some weapons to go missing.144 It is
not thought, however, that such practices present much of a threat and may, at most,
lead to the theft of small amounts of ammunition.145
It is expected that most of the remaining useful weaponry will either be withdrawn to
Russia or to the Russian base in Gyumri, Armenia.146 However, it still not clear exactly
what kind of assistance will be needed in order to ensure safe removal of the remaining
Russian weaponry. This could include post-withdrawal clean-up of the remaining sites
and international verification, both in Georgia and in Russia, of the withdrawn goods,
with payments made for the cost of transportation. Nevertheless, it will be expensive
either to transport or destroy many of the remaining weapons. As a result, the OSCE
Mission to Georgia has established an OSCE Voluntary Fund to support the with-
drawal of the Russian bases. At the end of 2005, the Fund amounted to US$805,950.
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6.2.2 Ministry of 
Internal Affairs 
6.2.3 Russian bases
Ministry of Internal Affairs, police employees
All MIA employees, including civilian employees, have the right to carry a weapon.
However, the carriage of personally registered weapons by MIA personnel is 
prohibited. Fully trained policemen, who have been working at least six months, can
carry automatic weapons without any separate permission being needed. While 
automatic weapons are mainly used during special operations, pistols are used when
patrolling. However, Patrol Police do on occasion patrol with automatic weapons.
For example, according to the Head of the Patrol Police in Zugdidi, in 2005 the Patrol
Police only once chose to carry automatic weapons on patrol.147
The police have the right to carry weapons while on duty, but they must return them 
to the storage facility at the police station at the end of each shift. While this is the case,
officers do have the right to carry their weapons home, if there is emergency. In 
addition, according to the Head of Zugdidi police, some police officers are allowed to
carry their weapons for 24 hours.148
According to Ministry guidelines, there are 14 scenarios in which an officer is allowed
to use his weapon.149 In nine of these scenarios the officer is obliged to fire a warning
shot before firing at a human target. In the remaining five cases the police officer is
permitted to shoot on sight. A firearm-training course for police officers was 
introduced by the Police Academy in 2005. In order to be issued with firearms, police
officers need to pass this course. Previously, all officers were automatically issued with
a firearm after a three-month probation period. In addition the Open Society Georgia
Foundation (OSGF) has helped introduce a number of education modules at the
police academy. The 12 modules were developed by the Open Society Justice Initiative
and focused on use of force and firearms, dealing with victims, and communication
skills.
According to the Head of the Information Department at the MIA, present guidelines
are in line with the United Nations Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by
Law Enforcement Officers.150 However, at least one international commentator has
questioned the official view, commenting that police standard operational procedures
for the use of force do not comply with best practice as they practically allow police
officers to ‘shoot suspects on the spot’.151 Indeed, statements from Government 
ministers seem to have indicated support for police officers to shoot suspected 
criminals, leading to protests from opposition parties.152 According to a recent
Amnesty International Report, the use of firearms to threaten suspects and prisoners
has also not been eradicated.153 This analysis was supported by focus group 
participants, many of whom had a background in law enforcement, who thought that
the use of force and firearms by police officers is at present excessive. Such excessive use
was, for the most part, attributed to inadequate training in the use of force:
There was a formal announcement from the Ministry of Internal Affairs. They said that 
if criminals resisted arrest then the police would be able to take any necessary measures to
eliminate the criminals on the spot. A 22 year old boy was recently killed [as a result].
In our time, committing the same kind of action, unless it was absolutely necessary, would
cause us to be imprisoned in Siberia.
Focus group D, Tbilisi, former Traffic Police, male, 36
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6.3 Use of state
held firearms 
Ministry of Internal Affairs, Border Police employees
Only the Head of shift and the representative of the operative department have the
right to carry weapons at Georgia’s international checkpoints.154 Operative Depart-
ment personnel, who are used to patrol the green borders, carry weapons at all times.
Operative Department personnel are present at each checkpoint two or three times a
week. As Border Police recruits now undergo the same basic training as all other police
officers, training in the use of force and firearms should be the same as for Patrol and
Regional police staff.
Ministry of Justice employees
The use of firearms by MoJ employees has come under criticisms following the death
of several prisoners during fighting in a Tbilisi jail in March 2003. According to 
Georgia’s human rights ombudsman, Sozar Subar, the deaths were ‘the direct 
consequence of the Justice Ministry official Bacho Akhalaya’s decision to authorise armed
troops to open fire on prisoners’.155 While investigations into this incident were still
ongoing as this survey went to print, it seems apparent that the use of force and
firearms by MoJ staff needs to be revised in order to ensure that such use is appropriate
to each incident and complies with the United Nations Basic Principles on the Use of
Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials.
CIPDD & SAFERWORLD · SMALL ARMS AND HUMAN SECURITY IN THE CAUCASUS 69
154 Interview, Kakha Khandolishvili.
155 ‘Georgian ombudsman implicates senior officials’, RFE/RL NEWSLINE Vol. 10, No. 92, Part I, 22 May 2006.
7 
Collection and
destruction
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN POLICY AND PRACTICE on both the destruction 
and collection of SALW have been positive and provide a good basis for future actions
in this area. Plans are presently underway to develop a destruction programme for
military SALW during the period 2006–2009, and to this end the MoD’s Logistics
Department has already undertaken a comprehensive inventory of stockpiled SALW,
in order identify non-functional and surplus units. In addition, the May 2004 weapons
collection in Batumi was very successful and represented a marked improvement on
previous collection campaigns.
While this is the case, much still needs to be done to improve policy and practice
regarding the collection and destruction of weapons. The identification and 
destruction of surplus ammunition is not yet a priority for the MoD and it is not
national policy to destroy all weapons seized from the public. In terms of weapons 
collections, the success of the 2004 Ajara collection campaign lay in the goodwill 
created by the collapse of Abashidze’s regime. Future collection initiatives will have to
be better planned and must be supported by a comprehensive awareness raising 
campaign, especially amongst non-ethnic Georgians communities. Indeed, the 
ongoing general amnesty on surrendered weapons has proved ineffective as a weapons
collection campaign. It might be the case that time-limited collection campaigns,
preceded and followed by law enforcement drives, would better encourage weapons
surrender. In addition record keeping on past collections is poor, and it is not clear
exactly how many weapons have been collected since independence.
This section reviews weapon amnesty and collection activities since Georgia achieved
independence from the Soviet Union, with particular reference to public perceptions
of the effectiveness of these measures. This analysis can be used to inform the develop-
ment of future programmes to collect the remaining weapons in illicit ownership in
Georgia.
There have been three main initiatives to collect illicit firearms in Georgia since 
independence:
7.1 Past
weapons
collections
■ A collection following the end of armed hostilities in Abkhazia and South Ossetia in
1995–1996
■ A collection in Ajara following the collapse of the Abashidze regime in May 2004
■ A general amnesty on surrendered firearms introduced at the beginning of 2005.
The OSCE also undertook a weapons collection programme in South Ossetia, but this
initiative has not been considered due to the scope of the present study.
According to available information, between 13,750 and 23,350 weapons have been 
collected on Georgian government-controlled territory as of March 2006:
Table 14: Weapons collected on government-controlled territory, 1991–2006
Collection period Collection location Weapons collected
1995–1996 All Government controlled territory 9,700
May 2004 Ajara 3,150
January 2005 onwards All Government controlled territory 900–10,500
Total 13,750–23,350
1995–1996 collection programme
Following Eduard Shevardnadze’s election as President in 1995, the Georgian Govern-
ment implemented a policy of compulsory weapons collections. These collections
were restricted to government-controlled territory and did not include the separatist
regions of Abkhazia or South Ossetia or the autonomous area of Ajara. The collection
campaign formed part of a crackdown on paramilitary and criminal groups that had
been influential in Georgia since the Mkhedrioni-led coup that had deposed the 
previous president, Zviad Gamsakhurdia. There are no public records of the number
of weapons collected during this period, but a previous survey in 2002 found that
some 9,700 firearms were seized, predominately from former Mkhedrioni (60 percent
of weapons) and National Guard (28 percent of weapons) members, the remainder
being voluntarily surrendered by civilians.156 Collected weapons included 4,770 rifles,
2,344 pistols and revolvers, 2,253 grenade launchers and two missile launchers.
According to the 2002 study, the 1995–1996 weapons collection did not lead to a 
comprehensive disarmament of society, or even of all of the paramilitary groups.
Focus group participants thought that the 1995–1996 collection programme had been
quite effective in collecting the weapons that had proliferated during the conflicts, and
that stability in the country had increased as a result. However, it was also felt that a
large number of weapons owned by various paramilitary groups and volunteers were
not successfully recovered, particularly in Zugdidi and Svaneti. Indeed, in contrast
with the 1995–1996 collection, the above analysis of the geographic distribution of
illegal weapons indicates that any future collection campaign should be targeted in
areas with high levels of illegal ownership, taking into account the incentives for illegal
ownership on a case-by-case basis:
Seventy percent of weapons were confiscated and taken away. I will say that it was only 
70 percent. One needs to only consider those living in the Kodori Gorge and in Svaneti and
how they would have as many as seven automatic weapons, and how people decided to
bury their weapons.
Focus group F, Zugdidi, civil society activist, male
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Weapons Collections in Ajara157
Following the ‘Batumi Revolution’ on 6–7 May 2004, the Georgian Government imple-
mented a weapons collection campaign in Ajara. The campaign was widely advertised
through TV and radio announcements. The collection campaign was accompanied
with a limited buy-back initiative, with illegal weapon owners being remunerated
US$110–165 per weapon. In addition, local Government authorities engaged in an
active programme to seize unregistered firearms, aided by the registers that had been
used by the Abashidze administration to record weapons distributed to its supporters
and by tip-offs from the public. The collection campaign was facilitated by higher
public trust in the Government as a result of the ‘Rose Revolution’. Indeed, one 
commentator stated that people ‘seemed to be happy’ to surrender their firearms.158
Interviewees also suggested that people were also more willing to surrender weapons
out of fear that the new administration would take a much harsher line regarding 
illegal possession.
The collection campaign was considered to be very successful. As a result of the 
collection period, 3,000 automatic weapons and up to 150 grenade launchers were
seized or voluntarily handed in during a ten-day period.159 A number of pieces of
heavy weaponry were also seized in the mountainous regions of Ajara. It was thought
that about 70–80 percent of weapons were seized from the population in Ajara during
the collection period.160 However, official figures for seizures of illegal firearms during
2005 (125 incidents) demonstrate that that such a high collection rate is unlikely and
that there continue to be a significant amount of illegal firearms in Ajara. Police inter-
viewees from the region think that everyone who would voluntarily surrender their
weapon has already done so. As a result, further amnesty campaigns might not have
any substantial impact on the amount of illicit firearms in the region.
General amnesty, 2005 to the present
Since the beginning of 2005, an internal MIA instruction has provided an amnesty to
those who voluntary surrender illegally held weapons, provided these weapons were
not used in a crime. The general amnesty is planned to continue indefinitely. Accord-
ing to the MIA, it also conducts irregular monthly collection campaigns on Georgian
government-controlled territory, although no further information was available on
their results. One independent military expert has attributed the lack of official 
information to the fact that the MIA’s recording procedures are not detailed enough to
provide information on the number and type of recovered firearms each year, and any
information that has been recorded is not publicly available.161 The Permissions
Department did however state that an average of 60 to 70 weapons are legalised every
month as a result of the amnesty.162 This suggests that between 900 and 10,500 firearms
have been collected as of March 2006. The Permission Department estimates that
approximately one in every hundred surrendered firearms has been used in a criminal
act, although one in ten has previously been on the list of weapons considered
missing.163
On the whole, interviewees considered the general amnesty unsuccessful, arguing that
the number of firearms surrendered is quite low and that people have predominantly
surrendered obsolete weapons. The lack of success is attributable to a number of
factors. Firstly, the collection itself does not seem to be based on strategic planning and
has not been targeted at any specific target groups. Secondly, the amnesty has not been
accompanied by a publicity campaign. Although such a campaign was planned, it was
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not considered a high priority and was consequently postponed.164 In any event, the
implementation of any ongoing awareness or outreach campaign for a general
amnesty is unsustainable. Experience from other countries with a high level of illicit
firearm ownership indicates that short amnesties complemented with targeted aware-
ness raising campaigns are much more effective in encouraging weapons surrenders.
Thirdly, as the present amnesty is not time-limited and runs in conjunction with the
criminalisation of illegal firearm ownership it makes law enforcement in this area
problematic. This is because it is not clear whether the police’s priority should be to
encourage the surrender of weapons or to actively seize them. Indeed, even if citizens
in the possession of illegal weapons are aware of the amnesty, concurrent seizures by
the police of weapons will appear confusing and possibly undermine their trust in the
amnesty due to a fear of arrest. It may also be argued that while there is an open-ended
amnesty, owners of unregistered weapons will not really fear punishment and will not
have a strong enough incentive to surrender their weapons. Over time, this may 
actually hinder attempts by the law-enforcement authorities to reduce the amount 
of illegal weapons in circulation. Finally, while amnesties can be effective ways of
encouraging at least some weapons owners to hand in or register illegal weapons,
especially in a period when the MIA lacks the resources to take more asserted action,
an ongoing amnesty is a drain on police resources.
Past experience of weapons collections in Georgia suggests that any future collection
campaign should include the following:
Limitation of future collection campaigns to amnesties
Future collection initiatives are most likely to be effective if they are restricted to 
general amnesties, where weapons could be surrendered without sanction, rather than
other collection methods, such as lottery incentives and exchange programmes,
whereby community infrastructure projects would be introduced in response to high
levels of surrendered weapons. This analysis is supported by survey respondents, who
thought that, apart from increased police efficiency, a general amnesty would be most
likely to encourage people in their community to surrender illegal weapons and were
generally sceptical about the efficacy of other types of initiatives.
Time limited amnesties sequenced with strict law enforcement
In order for amnesty campaigns to be effective it is important that they are time-
limited and that the law is rigorously enforced at all other times, in order to provide an
incentive for the surrender of weapons. This analysis is supported by the household
survey. For example, when asked what three factors were most likely to reduce illegal
small arms distribution, apart from a more effective police force (53 percent), survey
respondents most frequently answered ‘a severe legal penalty for possession’
(38 percent). Indeed, the ‘fear’ of strict enforcement was one reason for the success of
the Ajara collection programme.
Build trust in the collection and collectors
Although trust in the police is improving, focus group participants still felt the lack of
trust in the security structures to be the main factor that would undermine any 
collection campaign, as owners of illegal firearms would be fearful of arrest and
harassment. As a result, it was thought that a large proportion of Georgians who own
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7.2 Lessons
learnt for
future
weapons
collections
unregistered weapons would be more likely to bury, hide or dispose of their weapons
in some way other than surrender to the police. Indeed, the success of the Ajara 
campaign was to a large extent due to the goodwill felt towards the incoming author-
ities. It is clear that further initiatives to improve trust in the police are needed,
whether this involves community based policing, outreach campaigns and/or greater
promotion of the police’s activities. This is especially the case amongst non-ethnic
Georgian communities. The establishment of an independent ombudsman to oversee
weapons collections might also help to allay fears of arrest and harassment by the
police.
Ensure higher levels of security
Put simply, many people are still unwilling to hand in firearms because of fear of crime
and a general sense of insecurity (see section 4). The majority of respondents to the
household survey stated that a more effective police force (53 percent) was the factor
most likely to reduce illegal small arms distribution, while the third most frequent
reply was a ‘justice system that works’ (26 percent). While policing and security have
improved in recent times, more needs to be done in this area, primarily through more
detailed law enforcement planning, the mainstreaming of community based policing
and greater outreach and promotion of the police’s activities:
There is no security and that is why I think they will never give up weapons.
Focus group N, Marneuli, male, 45 
Create knowledge of collections through awareness-raising campaigns
Past collection campaigns in Georgia have been undermined by the lack of awareness-
raising campaigns, as indicated by the low knowledge of past government collection
initiatives amongst both household survey respondents and focus group participants.
For example, only 60 percent of those surveyed were aware of the steps taken by the
Government to collect unlicensed firearms.165 On closer questioning, however, only 46
percent of respondents were able to identify the procedure for surrendering weapons.
This indicates that actual knowledge of past amnesty/weapon collections is lower than
people are willing to admit. Focus group participants themselves suggested that both
the present amnesty and any future collection campaigns would only be successful if
supported by awareness-raising campaigns to explain registration procedures and how
to surrender weapons.
Design specific awareness-raising campaigns to target ethnic minorities
There is a great discrepancy in knowledge of previous collection initiatives between
ethnic Georgians (63 percent awareness) and non-ethnic Georgian citizens (only 29
percent awareness). Knowledge of previous collection campaigns is significantly lower
in Kvemo-Kartli (34 percent), which has a large ethnic Azeri community, than in the
rest of Georgia (60 percent). Knowledge of the present amnesty is also lower in Kvemo
Kartli. This indicates that the Georgian Government has not been communicating
with non-ethnic Georgians on these issues as effectively as with ethnic Georgians:
No, we have not heard [about the amnesty] and we do not have information about the
registration or surrendering of guns. Nor do we know about any other programmes in
place to collect weapons.
Focus group N, Marneuli, male, 45
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Target collection campaigns in priority areas
Any future collection campaign should be targeted to those areas with high levels of
illegal ownership, such as Samegrelo-Svaneti or Kvemo Kartli (see Section 3.5), or
those with specific dynamics of illegal firearm ownership, such as Ajara, while taking
into account the specific drivers for illegal ownership in each case.
Comprehensive pre-campaign planning
A comprehensive assessment of the attitudes of Georgia gun owners in each targeted
region should be carried out during the preparation phase of any collection campaign.
Such studies, together with the information provided by this report, would help to
identify the methods most likely to respond to each community’s needs and 
vulnerabilities.
Destruction of seized civilian weapons
Georgia does not have a consistent policy regarding the destruction of weapons seized
from the general population. While weapons gathered during OSCE collection pro-
grammes have been destroyed, weapons collected during other campaigns have not,
but instead transferred to government ministries and agencies. For example, weapons
confiscated by the Ministry of State Security and the MIA from civilians, criminal
groups and the Ajaran authorities during the weapons collection in Ajara in 2004 were
handed over to the MoD, which is now reviewing all weapons in its possession (see
below). Non-functional arms and weapons with a criminal history will be written off
and destroyed.166 Weapons collected from the general population will be destroyed by
the state enterprise ‘Delta’ (as MoD weapons are). To date, Delta has disposed of
84 units of SALW seized from the general public, including 17 automatic firearms.167
Destruction of state surpluses
According to Delta’s Director, Georgian policy is that state SALW surpluses should not
be transferred to other states and that SALW, ammunition or explosives should not be
sold to private parties (only reprocessed propellant, gun powder and TNT for 
industrial use may be sold).168 In addition, the destruction process itself should abide
by the following principles: security; safety; efficiency; development of specific
destruction procedures; low environmental impact; and, accountability. According to
the MoD the following military surpluses have been destroyed with international
assistance in the period 2003–2005:169
Table 15: MoD surplus weapon destruction, 2003–2006170
Weapon type Quantity Cost Donor agency
AD missiles 500+ €1,250,000 PfP Trust Fund, NAMSA supervised
AAA and Arty rounds 50,000 €1,700,000 OSCE Funded
Destruction plans for the period 2006–2009 include a project for the disposal of
surplus SALW stockpiles, projects for the demilitarisation of SA, AA and AS missiles,
and the disposal of AAA, Arty and Avia bombs.
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166 Correspondence with Mamuka Kikaleishvili, Ministry of Defence, June 2006.
167 Ibid. 
168 Presentation by Mr David Nairashvili at the Parliamentary Workshop ‘Small Arms and Light Weapons in the CIS region, Tbilisi,
Georgia, 9–10 June 2006. 
169 Ibid. 
170 Some of the destroyed items may not be SALW. For example AD (Air Defence) missiles could range from those for use in
MANPADS to those for use in fixed missile systems. 
7.3 Small arms
destruction
Small arms destruction
The MoD is presently conducting an inventory of all SALW in its possession, with the
aim of identifying surplus and obsolete SALW for a destruction campaign. It is 
expected that this will show that between 30 and 50 tonnes of SALW held by the MoD
are obsolete and should be destroyed.171 The cost of destroying these surpluses is
expected to be between €100,000 and €150,000. The MoD has not yet identified the
funds for this destruction, but likely sources of assistance include USAID and NAMSA
(NATO Maintenance and Supply Agency), who have already indicated a willingness 
to support future destructions, and the OSCE Mission to Georgia.
Delta has been appointed for the destruction of surplus and obsolete military equip-
ment. As such it will be the ‘lead agency’ for implementing the planned destruction
programme. Following a competitive tender, a further two companies have been
selected to smelt SALW. These are the Institute of Metallurgy and the 31st Aviation 
Factory. According to the MoD, these enterprises have been selected based on their
experience and existing infrastructure.
The whole process will be under the MoD’s strict control. SALW earmarked for
destruction will be stored in MoD warehouses and sent to Delta in portions. After
Delta has cut the weapons into parts, they will be returned to the MoD. The weapons
parts will then be delivered to the Institute of Metallurgy and the 31st factory for 
smelting.
Ammunition destruction 
The MoD does not consider destruction of ammunition with a calibre less than 23 mm
to be a priority, since no large surpluses have been identified.172 However, the MoD
recognises the importance of having a destruction programme for ammunition in
place, and Delta is presently working on procedures for destroying ammunition.173
In the meantime, larger-calibre surplus or out-of-date ammunition is collected at the
demilitarisation arms-disposal plants in Dedoplistqaro and Ponichala for destruction.
According to the MoD, ammunition is only written off its inventory after it has been
blown up or after ammunition has been reproduced into scrap metal or explosives for
industrial use, sold and removed from the military base.
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8 
International transfer
controls and border
management
GEORGIA HAS MADE GOOD PROGRESS in establishing an effective transfer control
and border management system over the last decade. The key stages in this process
include, the creation of an inter-agency Military Technical Commission (MTC) to
oversee the national arms transfer system in 1997, the adoption of national legislation
regulating international arms transfers in 1998 and reform of the border services in the
period 2003–2006.
National legislation in this area was developed with US assistance, in order to better
correspond with international standards, and now regulates the majority of trade
including direct import and export, re-transfer and transit. Legislation also includes 
a number of progressive stipulations, such as end-user certificates, and post-delivery
verification for some items. While legislative progress has been significant, reform of
the border services has been particularly encouraging and has involved: the ongoing
civilianisation of the Border Police, its retraining and integration into the MIA; the
supply of equipment and training equipment to border guards and customs officials;
and improved interagency co-operation between the Border Police and the Customs
Department. While progress has been positive, the international transfer control 
system needs to be developed further in order to meet European best practice in terms
of legislation, border management and the licensing system.
National legislation continues to have weak provisions in a number of areas: there is
weak regulation of transits and transhipments; there are no specific provisions regu-
lating brokering; there is a discrepancy in controls over transfers of military and non-
military arms and dual-use goods technologies (ADGT); end-user certificates are not
required for transfers to recognised state bodies; verification of end use is not 
universal; and consent of the country of origin is not required for re-export. For the
time being these weaknesses are not that problematic given that Georgia is not cur-
rently an arms producer and has attracted limited interest in its Cold-War era military
surplus since 2000. Nevertheless, should production of weapons, arms, ammunition
or their parts resume on a significant scale, or should Georgia prove successful in 
transit trade, then these deficits in the control system, combined with the present poor
transparency on licensing decisions, would become much more problematic.
The ongoing reform of the Border Police is a positive step in ensuring a well function-
ing border management system. However, this process has been undermined by the
lack of clear objectives and the absence of a transitional plan. In turn this has been
dependent upon the failure of the Border Police to undertake a comprehensive risk
assessment and develop a National Border Strategy. Border Management is also
undermined by poor communication within the Border Police (between regional 
centres and Headquarters) and between the Border Police and the rest of the MIA.
Most significantly, co-operation between the Border Police and the Customs 
Department is under-developed. The relationship between the two organisations has
traditionally been unco-operative and there is still no memorandum of understanding
regulating their interaction. Finally, improved border management is also undermined
by poor national financing and an over-reliance on international donors.
Perhaps most importantly, the licensing system for arms transfers is still weak in a
number of areas and has actually moved further away from European and inter-
national best practice during 2005 as a result of two significant changes. Firstly,
following adoption of Presidential Decree N847 (October 2005) the MTC, the body
responsible for making final licensing decisions on arms transfers, has been made 
into a department of the MoD. The MTC was previously an inter-agency group 
subordinated to the National Security Council (NSC).174 As a result of this 
restructuring, the MoD now represents, ‘the main body dealing with defence and
national security’175, including arms controls. The MoD’s authority in this area is
unlikely to change in the near future.176 Secondly, arms transfers by state agencies 
and their subordinated bodies no longer have to be licensed by the MoJ or Ministry 
of Economy and Trade (MoE), as was previously the case. Instead, state agencies can 
conduct transfers on the basis of agreement with the MTC alone. These changes have
reduced oversight of the transfer licensing system and created a situation in which the
state ministries, and the MoD in particular, can transfer ADGT virtually without
external oversight. This is an important development, not least for the country’s 
internal security, as Georgia had the fastest growing military expenditure in the world
in the period 2005–2006, during which time significant amounts of SALW were
imported (see below). As the MoD has itself stated, ‘given the unresolved conflicts in the
country [Georgia], there must be no excess armaments in Georgia’.177 However, without
increased transparency and oversight of the licensing process this cannot be ensured.
In addition, the centralisation of decision making on transfer issues within the MoD
sets a bad precedence for inter-agency co-operation on small arms issues and oversight
of the security sector in general.
The following laws govern the transfer of weapons for civilian use, military equipment
and armaments and other military technical equipment as well as Georgia’s border
management framework:
■ The ‘Law of Georgia on Export (and Import) Control of Arms, Military Equipment
and Dual-Use Goods’ (28 April 1998, hereafter ‘Law on Export’) and its amendments
(May 2003, June 2004, November 2005, June 2006), which regulate the import, export,
re-export, transit and transhipment of all types of arms and military equipment and
endow government agencies with the responsibility of stopping the illegal movement
of production subject to export and import control at the customs authorities of
Georgia
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175 Interview, Mamuka Kikaleishvili.
176 Interview, Giorgi Doledtz.
177 Correspondence with Mamuka Kikaleishvili, Ministry of Defence, June 2006.
8.1 Legislation
and regulation
■ The ‘Law of Georgia on Arms’ (8 May 2003), which contains limited provisions 
regulating the export, import, re-export and transit of firearms
■ ‘Law on Licences and Permits’ (24 June 2005), which removes the need for state 
agencies to acquire permits/licences from the MoJ for SALW transfers
■ The ‘Law on Border Guards’ (1994), which regulates the activities of border guards.
A new ‘Border Police Law’ has been drafted and is awaiting adoption by parliament 178
■ The Customs Code, which regulates the activities of customs officials
■ The Georgian Criminal Code, which stipulates punishments for breaches of
legislation.
Georgia’s present international transfer control system also relies on a number of
Presidential Decrees. The following Presidential Decrees have had a significant impact
on the structure and functioning of the transfer control system:
■ Presidential Decree N582 (October 1997), which defines the procedures for technical
documentation for the export and import of military goods and established the inter-
agency MTC to regulate export and import of military purpose goods
■ Presidential Decree N103 (March 1999), which gives the MoJ responsibility for issuing
licences for arms transfers
■ Presidential Decree N847 (October 2005), which subordinated the MTC to the MoD.
International commitments and adherence
Georgia is also party to a number of international arms control instruments that 
cover SALW, including the UN PoA and the OSCE Documents on Small Arms and 
Stockpiles of Conventional Ammunition. Georgia is not, however, a signatory of the
UN Firearms Protocol. Communication with multilateral forums appears inconsis-
tent. For instance, reporting via UN channels has been irregular (a single report for the
year 2005 was submitted to the UNDDA, on implementation of the UN PoA).
No information is available on the regularity or detail of Georgia’s reporting on SALW
transfer within the confidential OSCE system.
Development of national policy
According to the ‘Law on Exports’, the Georgian Parliament is responsible for 
determining state policy on transfer controls, developing the transfer control system,
drafting the list of states subject to transfer restrictions and also has a right to supervise
the activities of the relevant executive agencies. However, the Georgian President has 
a more significant role in developing the transfer control system than the Parliament.
The President is responsible for: issuing normative acts regarding the transfer control
system; approving the list of products drafted by the MTC, which are subject to 
transfer controls; supervising the activities of the relevant executive agencies (eg MoD,
MoJ, MoE, and Customs Department) and determining their powers; and approving
the list of states subject to export restrictions. The importance of the President’s role
can be seen in the Presidential Decrees that have been issued regarding the transfer
control system. The most significant of these is Decree N847 from October 24 2005,
which subordinated the MTC to the MoD.
Licensing of transfers
The ‘Law on Export’ requires that arms traders must make an application to the 
Registration and Licence Department within the MoJ for each proposed SALW trans-
fer. Applications to transfer dual-use goods must be made to the Directorate of Export
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178 Georgia is also party to a number of bilateral and international agreements on anti-trafficking co-operation. These
agreements are listed in section 8.3. 
Examination within the MoE. Any civilian company or individual wishing to under-
take an arms transfer must provide the following documentation to the MoJ/MoE:179
■ Application defining the required type of permit
■ A copy of a signed contract or a letter of intent
■ A certificate of the country of origin
■ Information about the cargo’s insurance
■ A permit to undertake the transfer, issued by an authorised agency of the country in
which the contracted party or organisation providing the letter of intent is registered
■ An end-user certificate (except for imports or exports of combat arms by state bodies).
After the MoJ/MoE has completed an initial assessment of each ADGT transfer 
application and documentation, the ‘Law on Export’ requires that it then issues or
refuses the permit on the basis of a recommendation by the MTC. This means that
final responsibility for authorising ADGT transfers lies with the MTC. The MTC
makes its decision on examination of the submitted documents and the advice of an
inter-agency expert group, which is tasked with providing a detailed risk assessment 
of each proposed transfer on a case-by-case basis.180 According to the ‘Law on Export’,
Georgia’s transfer control system is based on the following principles:181
■ Observance of Georgia’s international commitments on the non-proliferation of
WMD and other kinds of weapons
■ The priority of political interests when implementing export and import control
■ Checks on the final use of materials and products subject to export and import control
in the framework of non-proliferation regimes.
The MoD states that it also takes into account the potential for transfers to be used in
the execution of human rights violations during the decision-making process.182
While these general principles are recognised as good practice by exporting states
around the world, best standard decision-making on transfer licences would be aided
by more detailed criteria. The EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports (EU CoC) is a good
example of more developed criteria.183 While Georgia is currently not obliged to
include the criteria in the EU CoC in its export legislation, it will need to do so 
eventually as part of its bid for EU membership. In addition, without more detailed
information on arms licensing decisions it is not possible to determine how decisions
are taken in practice and the role that the general principles listed above play in them.
Analysis of licensing decisions made by the MTC would be aided by the publication 
of an annual report on arms exports.
The MoJ/MoE can issue permits for transfers of a limited range of ADGT without
prior agreement from the MTC. These items are: all dual-use goods apart from 
intangible ADGT transfers (as listed in the Georgian dual-use goods list); smooth-
bored hunting weapons; sports guns; award weapons; gas pistols; shotguns; and 
vintage guns and their munitions.184 The MoJ/MoE is only obliged to inform the MTC
of the issuance of licences to transfer these goods after the event. Similarly to MTC
decisions on ADGT transfers, no information was available on the precise criteria for
licensing decisions by the MoJ/MoE.
The present division of responsibility for licensing decisions means that the Georgian
Government presently operates two ADGT transfer control systems: one for transfers
of military-purpose ADGT governed by the MTC; the other for transfers of non-
military purpose ADGT (mostly smooth-bored hunting weapons) governed directly
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182 Correspondence with Mamuka Kikaleishvili, Ministry of Defence, June 2006.
183 Accessible at <http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/cfsp/sanctions/codeofconduct.pdf>.
184 ‘Law on Export’, Article 8, Paragraph 8.
by the MoJ/MoE. The fact that non-military purpose ADGT are not subject to MTC
approval presumably reflects the relatively low risk they are perceived to present.
It should also be noted that it is possible to transfer individual hunting rifles across
Georgia’s international borders if that the appropriate documents have been acquired
both from the Georgian MIA and from the country to which the rifle is being 
transferred.185
Exemptions
Adoption of the June 2005 ‘Law on Licences and Permits’ removed the need for state
agencies to acquire permits from the MoJ/MoE for ADGT transfers. Instead, the basis
for transfers by state agencies is a ‘recommendation’ issued directly by the MoD’s
MTC. Although the MTC consults a group of experts from different ministries, this
arrangement still raises the risk of decreased oversight, since the same agency is now
responsible for both making decisions and issuing authorisations for transfers by state
agencies. Poor external constraint on SALW imports by state agencies and the MoD in
particular is a matter for concern given the contemporary social and political realities
in Georgia. Without such oversight it is possible that such decisions will be overly
politicised, or will not take into account the potential negative impacts of each 
transfer.
It is also important to note that the President has final responsibility for authorising
exports of ‘military production of strategic purpose’, ‘services connected with military
production’ and ‘transit of special cargo’. These three categories are not clearly defined
in the present legislation, meaning that the exact extent of the President’s decision-
making powers is unclear. The central role of the President in the transfer licensing
system can be interpreted in two ways. It is argued by proponents of this system that
the President’s personal involvement in approving sensitive transfers provides for
democratic control at the very highest level. While this may be true, international
practice argues for a reduction in the President’s role, since it may lead to politicised
decision-making. The argument is that emphasis should instead be placed on dis-
passionate and objective criteria-based judgements, which guard against the prospect
of vested interests dictating arms transfers.
In an environment of low transparency such exemptions clearly provide an 
unwelcome loophole by which a more rigorous criteria-based system of licence 
application processing can be circumvented.
Brokering
Present legislation does not provide stipulations regulating brokering activity either
for transfers across Georgian customs territory or for third-party brokering (shipping
that does not enter Georgian customs territory or physical trading of ADGT outside 
of Georgia). As such it is not clear how brokers and their activities are licensed and 
regulated, if at all. According to the MoJ, Georgia does not need to regulate brokering
through separate legal provisions since the current legal framework, although 
including no specific stipulations on brokering, already regulates this activity.186
However, because of the different forms that brokering can take (eg insurance,
financing, facilitating, shipping) and the difficulty that its regulation presents, current
international best practice is to include separate provisions for brokering activities in
national legislation.
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Re-export, transit and transhipment
While re-exports should be licensed according to the above system, the ‘Law on
Export’ allows re-export of ADGT from Georgia without a permit from the authorised
agency of the original exporting country. At present Article 9 Paragraph 3 of the law
states that ‘Re-export of products entered on the customs territory of Georgia shall be 
subject to export control and may be carried out without permission of the authorised
agency of the sending country’.
In addition, ADGT transits are not subject to the same scrutiny as other transfers, as
they do not have to undergo review by the MTC, with the exception of some dual-use
goods. In most cases the MoJ/MoE can issue permits for ADGT transits without prior
agreement from the MTC, which is instead informed after the event.187 Review by the
MTC is required for the issuance of transit permits for some intangible ADGT trans-
fers. A dual-use goods list specifies those dual-use goods requiring such scrutiny. This
provision is an important weakness since transiting ADGT are of as much potential
concern in terms of possible misuse or diversion as are other types of transfers. As it is
likely that the MoE/MoJ do not have the capacity to independently assess the risks
associated with each transfer on a case-by-case basis, this stipulation provides greater
potential for ADGT transits to reach sensitive destinations.
Further, while the ‘Law on Exports’ now regulates transhipments,188 the law does not
seem to provide specific mechanisms for the inspection of transhipments upon entry
into, and exit from, Georgia’s customs territory. This is problematic as this provides
the potential for parts of transhipment cargos to be diverted to unauthorised end-
users.
These facts limit the overall effectiveness of the control system by providing greater
scope for these lesser regulated types of transfers to reach inappropriate destinations.
Control lists
The MTC is responsible for drafting the control list of products and services subject to
transfer control and submits it to the President for approval. The Georgian list of dual-
use goods and technologies was developed with help from the EU and US. According
to a representative of the MoE, it is based on the EU dual-use goods list,189 with some
additions to suit local production.190 The MoE submits suggested changes to the 
control list on an annual basis, with the support of the US and the EU. Since the EU
and the US largely prepare their control lists for dual-use goods in an international
forum, the MoE states that, in effect, Georgia also follows these international 
standards. The Georgian list of dual-use goods and technologies is publicly available.
Arms transfers embargoes
The ‘Law on Export’ includes a provision prohibiting transfers of ADGT to countries
under UN embargoes. However, there is no specific legislation to prohibit transfers to
states under embargoes made by the OSCE (of which it is a member) or the EU (which
Georgia aspires to join). As noted below, Georgia has in the past licensed transfers to a
country under an EU embargo. A list of those countries under export restrictions from
Georgia is composed initially by Parliament and approved by the President. The
process of formulating the list of countries under export restrictions is managed by 
the MTC.
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190 Interview, Andrea Dvali. 
End-use certification
Previously, the ‘Law on Export’ stipulated that arms traders were required to provide
‘an end user certificate, provided the applicant itself is not recipient of the cargo’ when
making an application to transfer ADGT. This meant that end-user certificates were
not always required in order to receive a permit for the export, re-export or transit of
arms. However, a June 2006 amendment to the ‘Law on Export’ now makes the 
provision of an end-user certificate mandatory for all applications to transfer ADGT.
This requirement does not, however, apply to transfers of combat arms, provided that
the ‘other side of the export or import contract’ is a state body of Georgia or another
country.191 This amendment is a progressive one. However, according to the best 
practice guidelines developed by both the OSCE and the EU, transfers for state 
agencies should require an end-user certificate in the same was as all other transfers.192
There is presently no requirement for transfer contracts to stipulate that relevant
Georgian state agencies can check the final use of transferred ADGT, except ‘in the 
case of nuclear and special non-nuclear materials and dual-use goods’.193 Ideally, this 
stipulation should be required in all ADGT transfer contracts. Although Georgian
state ministries might not always be able to verify the end use of transfers due to a 
lack of capacity, the option should always exist.
Transparency and reporting
Georgia has developed mechanisms for ensuring public access to information on the
international arms transfer control system. Under Georgian law, any legal or physical
entity can officially address the MoJ with a request for information on ADGT transfers
or licensing decisions, apart from licence denials, which are classified.194 The Ministry
is obliged to issue the requested information within ten days after receipt of the
request. Further, according to representatives from the Customs Department, the
Department is able to release monthly and quarterly information on the quantity of
transferred ADGT. In response to requests from the research team, the MoJ was able 
to provide data on imports of non-military purpose SALW by gun shops.
While this is the case, the level of transparency on transfer issues in Georgia could still
be improved and information on the arms control system is not always accessible.
For example, information on exports and imports of military-purpose ADGT, licence
denials and on importing/exporting organisations or deliveries cannot legally be made
available.195 In addition at the present time there is no statutory requirement for
reporting of arms transfer information to parliament on a routine basis.
The main gap in transparency of the current arms transfer control is the fact that
Georgia does not publish regular reports on military procurement, transfers and 
production. Most EU states, and many non-EU states, publish regular reports detailing
all imports and exports they have authorised. Reporting on arms imports is less 
common internationally, and it is perhaps optimistic to hope that the Georgian 
Government would adopt such reporting mechanisms at the current stage. Doing so
would, however, act as a major confidence-building measure in a tense region.
Administrative capacity
Under the present transfer control system, the key licensing agency is the MoD’s MTC.
No information is available on how the MTC operates, making it difficult to judge the
capacity of the MTC to execute its responsibilities regarding transfer controls.
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A substantial amount of resources are required to establish and maintain an adequate
decision-making group on arms transfer controls that has the necessary training,
administrative resources, procedures and guidelines, as well as access to other agencies’
expertise. However, according to one government representative, as the issue of arms
control is quite new for the MoD, there is at present no clear picture or understanding
of how the MoD should deal with ADGT transfer control.196 Since members of the
MTC might require training to become fully operational, and international assistance
may be available for this purpose, a detailed needs assessment is necessary for the
MTC. While this is the case, as Georgia does not seem to either export or produce
significant amounts of SALW at the present time, any lack of capacity within the MTC
may not be of serious concern at the moment, except in regard to controls over 
brokering activities,.
While little is known of the MTC’s present capacity for risk assessments and case-by-
case reviews of licence applications, capacity is bound to be lower within the MoJ and
MoE, which do have access to the same amount of expertise and resources as the MTC.
Customs control on legal ADGT transfers
ADGT transfers are processed at Georgia’s international customs borders by the 
Customs Department and the Border Police. According to a representative of the 
Customs Department, the process for customs control of physical transfers is as 
follows.197 When processing SALW imports or exports, customs officials first check 
the licence issued by the MoJ/MoE or importing/exporting state agency (the MTC 
‘recommendation’). Customs officials are obliged to verify the make, licence number,
quality and quantity of the weapons and the name of the importing/exporting 
organisation. This is checked against the information provided in the licence. Only
after the licence has been checked does the cargo undergo normal customs procedures.
On the fifth day of each month the Customs Department sends a list of imported and
exported weapons, their quantity, names of importing/exporting organisations and
the licence number to the MTC. In addition, the Border Police is responsible for 
monitoring transfers of all hazardous materials, including SALW, across Georgia’s 
state boundaries and provides a separate report on these transfers to the MoD.198
According to interviewees, not all customs personnel are well acquainted with the 
correct procedure for processing arms exports. One gun shop owner, who regularly
imports firearms, expressed his discontent over customs officials, stating they did not
have a good understanding of the importing procedure and frequently asked for 
permits issued by the MoD, rather than the MoJ.199
Information exchange on licensing decisions
No information was available on record keeping on ADGT transfers and licensing
decisions within the MTC, MoE or MoJ. According to the MoD, full information on
arms transfers, all legal and physical entities involved in these transfers, and legal and
physical entities whose applications for transfer permits have been denied, is
exchanged between the MTC, MoE, MoJ, Customs Department and Border Police.
However, it is unclear how relevant officials from these departments access such 
information.
Interaction with industry
No information was available on outreach methods used by the Georgian Government
to engage with the industry to ensure compliance with national legislation in this area.
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196 Anonymous Interviewee B, foreign affairs official. 
197 Interview, Vakhtang Lashkaradze.
198 Interview, David Akhvlediani. 
199 Gun shop interviews (Annex 1). 
Indeed, it is difficult to envisage the extent of such outreach, especially regarding 
brokering and shipping firms, which do not seem to be registered or regulated 
separately from other parts of the industry.
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Box 15: Arms transfer controls organogram
Military Technical Commission, Ministry of Defence
■ Provides recommendation for issuance/denial of
licence for transfer of ADGT by non-state actors
■ Provides ‘recommendation’ for transfers by state 
agencies and their subordinate bodies 
State agencies
Licences their own ADGT
transfer activity, following
recommendation by MTC 
Inter-agency Expert Group
Provides advice to the MTC
on its transfer 
recommendations
Registration and Licence Department,
Ministry of Justice
■ Processes and reviews documentation
from applicant trader of SALW
■ Makes decision on issuance/denial of
transfers of non-military purpose SALW
■ Refers to MTC for decision on issuance/
denial of transfers of military purpose
SALW
■ Issues/denies licence
Directorate of Export Examination,
Ministry of Economy and Trade
■ Processes and reviews 
documentation from applicant trader of
dual-use goods
■ Makes decision on issuance/denial of
transfers of most dual-use goods
■ Refers to MTC for decision on issuance/
denial of small number of dual use-goods
■ Issues/denies licence
Applicant non-state trader
in SALW
Applicant non-state trader
in dual-use goods
Customs Department
■ Processes transfers on Georgia’s international boundaries 
■ Combats trafficking at international border crossings
Border Guards
■ Combats illegal trafficking and cross border movement of armed individuals
■ Monitors transfers of all hazardous materials, including SALW, across 
Georgia’s borders
Official data on transfers of ADGT to and from Georgia made available by the 
Georgian Government is limited to information on imports of weaponry by gun
shops. Nevertheless it is possible to establish a rough picture of the volume of
transferred SALW, their type, origination and destination from alternative sources,
including data from the UN Commodity Trade Statistics Database (COMTRADE)
and key informant interviews. It should be noted, however, that the data on transfers
compiled by the research team does not constitute a comprehensive account of all
transfers in the years covered. This is because SALW transfers may have taken place
and not been officially reported. Furthermore, a number of UN COMTRADE 
categories include both SALW and non-SALW items. As a result some transfers 
included may refer to non-SALW items. While the following analysis looks at transfers
8.2 Recent arms
transfers
of SALW, it does not cover the import and export of dual-use goods, due to the
absence of reliable information on transfers of these goods. It should be noted that 
the following analysis also excludes transits, transhipments and brokering activity.
In order for a comprehensive audit of recent arms transfers, these types of transfers
would need to be taken into account.
Small arms imports
According to information provided by the MoJ, 95,993 units of firearms have been
imported since 1999. The most noticeable year for imports was 2004, when over 67,000
units of firearms were imported.
Table 16: Guns shop imports, 1999–2005 (Source: MoJ)
Year Import Imported Imported Imported
permits SALW ammunition explosives
issued
1999 1 6,361 1 million rounds –
2000 9 361 5,720 rounds 269,2 tonnes
2001 21 4,370 637,500 rounds 731 tonnes 
2002 28 11,620 5,460,610 rounds 2000 kg
2003 30 3,785 
2004 50 67,211 
2005 13 2,285 f
The majority of these imports would have been for the domestic civilian market.
However, given the large number of weapons imported, it might be the case that some
weapons were re-exported or imported for state rather than civilian use, although it is
unclear why gun shops would be tasked with sourcing weaponry for the Georgian state.
For example, if the majority of these weapons have remained in civilian possession,
then imported weaponry would account for 60 percent of all legal civilian firearms 
(an estimated 159,000 units). This is not feasible as, according to the MIA, between 
600 and 900 new firearm licences are issued every month. If this figure were constant
between 1999 and 2006, a maximum of 75,600 weapons could have been registered 
(84 months x 900). This still leaves 20,000 imported firearms unaccounted for.
Information on the numbers and types of SALW imported for the Georgian security
services and their point of origin is not publicly available. The value of SALW 
imported by the Georgian security structures is also unclear. This is because the 
annual budget laws, which outline Government spending, although open to the 
public, are not detailed enough for this purpose. For example, the military budget for
2006 is GEL 392 million (over US$200 million).200 However, no indication is provided
as to what proportion of this budget will be spent on procuring SALW. Non-budgetary
sources provide another potential source of funding for the procurement of SALW for
Georgia’s security service. For example, in addition to the main budget that is
approved by parliament, the Georgian security services also receive funding from two
non-transparent funds, the ‘Army Development Fund’ and the ‘Law-Enforcement
Agencies Development Fund’. The donors who invest in these funds are not known.
The authorities have been criticised regularly for lack of public transparency over
these funds and the Georgian Minister of Defence has answered questions in parlia-
ment about them. According to the Minister of Defence, in 2005 the Law-enforcement
Agencies Development Fund was comprised of US$ 759,100, while the Army Develop-
ment Fund was comprised of US$1,920,500. It should be noted that the Minister of
Defence has claimed that neither of these funds was used for the purchase of arms or
ammunition, but for items such as shoes, uniforms and repairs.201 While the MoD
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200 Interview, David Nairashvili
201 ‘Georgian defence minister answers MPs’ questions on army, Ossetia shelling’, Radio 1, Tbilisi, in Georgian 0900 gmt 
27 October 2005 (BBC Media Monitoring). 
undertook to close the fund by 1 January 2006, there are no means by which to 
ascertain whether this has occurred.202
While no official information is available on state imports of SALW, an idea of the
overall value of such imports can be created from UN COMTRADE data. According 
to UN COMTRADE data collected by the Norwegian-based NGO NISAT (Norwegian
Initiative on Small Arms Transfers), the value of Georgian SALW imports over the
period 1996–2003 was relatively low, varying between US$476,100 and US$2,839,314
per annum. However, in 2004 the value of imports increased dramatically to
US$22,885,998 for the year:
Figure 18: US$ value of known SALW imports to Georgia from all countries, 1996–2004203
(Source: www.nisat.org)
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202 Interview, Koba Liklikadze.
203 It is unknown what proportion of listed imports was subsequently re-exported
204 Interview, Koba Liklikadze.
205 SIPRI Military Expenditures database, <http://first.sipri.org/non_first/result_milex.php?send>, accessed 24 June 2005. 
206 Ibid. 
207 Interview, Koba Liklikadze.
208 Interview, Kakha Katsitadze.
209 Interview, Koba Liklikadze.
210 Anonymous interview C, civil society representative. As the National Guard could be responsible for producing up to 20
battalions of trained reservists throughout the country, this would probably involve a large increase in firearms for this
service.
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The increases in imported SALW in 2003 and 2004 reported to UN COMTRADE are
reflected in information provided by key informant interviewees. According to these
interviewees, Georgia is going through a process of military upgrading and has 
continued to purchase significant amounts of military-purpose weaponry in the 
period 2003–2005. According to one military expert, the Georgian Government spent a
particularly considerable sum of money from July 2004 to the end of 2005 on military
imports.204 This analysis is supported by data collected by Stockholm International
Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), which shows that overall military spending increased
from US$36.4 million in 2002 to US$59.5 million in 2004, with a further increase of
250 percent in 2005 to US$146 million.205 As such in the period 2004–2005, military
expenditure in Georgia increased at a faster rate than any other country in the world.206
Key informant interviewees were able to provide some indications of the types of arms
imported for use by the Georgian security services and their origination. Apart from
non-SALW items (tanks, artillery pieces and infantry fighting vehicles), the Georgian
Government is also thought to be in the process of acquiring ‘thousands’ of SALW and
a large amount of ammunition.207 According to one military expert, Georgia has
brought, or is in the process of buying, SALW from the Czech Republic, Ukraine, and
maybe Poland and Bulgaria (weapons are no longer purchased from Romania as these
are considered to be of ‘low quality’).208 There is also thought to be some defence co-
operation with Israel that includes SALW such as sniper rifles for the Georgian Special
Forces.209 Some interviewees also claimed there have been undeclared imports for
troops engaged in and around South Ossetia and Abkhazia and for the Border Police
(subordinated to the MIA) and the National Guard (subordinated to the MoD).210
No evidence was provided to substantiate these claims.
A more detailed breakdown of UN COMTRADE figures for imported SALW 
demonstrates that the significant increase in the value of imports is mostly due to 
purchases of military purpose weaponry such as ‘military weapons’, ‘small arms
ammunition’ and ‘bombs, grenades, ammunition and mines’:
Table 17: US$ value of SALW imports by type, 1996–2004 (Source: www.nisat.org) 211
Year 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Other 697,404 17,239 12,315 14,783 13,679 5,079 77,812 22,230 1,124,028
Military weapons – – – 122,484 107,193 323,798 162,138212 268,892213 2,892,275214
– their parts and accessories 32,245 2,568 3,799 12,761 606 28,087 168,776 19,224 10,006
Pistols and revolvers 266,947 – 454,062 251,690 206,645 180,086 458,284 807,790 841,929
– their parts/accessories 21,582 8,578 23,821 16,105 7,075 1272 7,035 496 11,118
Sports/hunting 28,451 94,596 353,148 194,873 68,282 105,136 251,826 198,324 202,826
shotguns/rifles 
– their parts and accessories – 2,589 1,273 888 3,187 2,785 1,100 6,048 46,335
Bombs, Grenades, – 13,563 53,964 7,658 3,325 56,725 466,160 1,292,631 15,240,063
Ammunition and Mines
Small Arms Ammunition 75,307 137,398 373,920 1,641,936 66,108 51,850 153,545 223,679 2,517,418
While imports of ‘pistols and revolvers’ and ‘sports/hunting shotguns and rifles’ have
also increased since 2001, this increase has been much less significant than for strictly
military-purpose imports. Furthermore, the category ‘pistols and revolvers’, might also
include a number of military- or police-purpose SALW, rather than self-defence
firearms for civilian use.
In confirmation of statements by key informant interviewees, Bulgaria, the Czech
Republic, Cyprus and Ukraine are shown to be the highest-value exporters to Georgia:
Figure 19: Origins of known imports to Georgia in US$, 1992–2004
(Source: www.nisat.org) 215
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211 The categories ‘Military weapons’ and ‘Bombs, Grenades, Ammunition and Mines’ might include an amount of non-SALW
items. Further, a number of countries have denied licences for arms transfers to Georgia in the period 1999–2000. This
includes: Bulgaria 2002, air defence rocket launchers; Germany, 1999, hand arms and automatic weapons (three different
refusals) 2001, hand arms and automatic weapons (two refusals) and 2002, hand arms and automatic weapons (two
refusals); United Kingdom, 1999, arms and automatic weapons, <50 calibre and accessories. Source: www.nisat.org.
212 Including air-defence rocket launchers and SALW parts and accessories. 
213 Including 14,000 Kalashnikov assault rifles from Lithuania and ‘Weapons and specially designed components thereof’; 
ie SALW’ from the Czech Republic. 
214 Including: Tavor assault rifles from Israel; ‘Grenade Launchers, flame throwers and others’ from Macedonia; and 450
antitank grenade launchers, 6,000 antitank shells, and 120 antitank guided shells from Bulgaria (BBC Media Monitoring). 
215 Figures in this pie chart have been rounded to the nearest US$1,000. ‘Other’ includes imports with a value lower than
US$100,000 from: France, 893,000 (also rounded to the nearest US$1,000); Bosnia, 91,000; Lebanon, 82,000; Austria,
63,000; Serbia and Montenegro, 42,000; Switzerland, 20,000; Brazil, 18,000; Unspecified, 12,000; Spain, 12,000;
Denmark; 10,000; United Kingdom, 7,000; Canada, 5,000; Estonia, 4,000; Kazakhstan, 4,000; Slovenia, 2,000 and;
Indonesia, 1,000.
Bulgaria 10,431,000
Czech Republic 6,969,000Cyprus 6,068,000
Ukraine 3,962,000
Russia 1,486,000
US 1,355,000
Germany 1,032,000
Azerbaijan 671,000
Italy 525,000
Israel 411,000
Romania 390,000
Macedonia 242,000 Slovakia 227,000
Other 201,000
Turkey 143,000
Poland 113,000
Small arms exports
Officials interviewed by the research team maintained that Georgia exports only
insignificant amounts of SALW. Interviewees have attributed the absence of an 
important export industry to two factors. Firstly, Georgia does not presently produce
SALW, nor does it has it have a history of doing so. Secondly, it is claimed that 
reductions in the size of the armed forces since the end of the Soviet Union have not
resulted in surplus stocks that could be sold abroad, as Georgia did not inherit 
adequate SALW stocks on independence.216 Nevertheless, UN COMTRADE figures
collected by NISAT show that Georgia has exported SALW of an appreciable value in
the period 1998–2004:
Figure 20: US$ value of known SALW exports from Georgia to all countries, 1998–2004 
(Source: www.nisat.org)
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217 May contain non-SALW transfers.
218 May contain non-SALW transfers.
219 Exports of parts and accessories of shotguns and rifles to Italy: 2002, US$125,132; 2003, US$178,886; 2004, 170,763.
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The most significant exports of military purpose SALW took place in 1999 and 2000
and were comprised of ‘military weapons’, ‘bombs, grenades, ammunitions and mines’
and ‘small arms ammunition’:
Table 18: US$ value of SALW exports by type, 1998–2004 (Source: www.nisat.org)
Year 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Other 20 69,007 4,423 144,679 34,000 20,247 –
Military weapons217 – 4,893 1,012,787 – 5,537 – –
– their parts/accessories – 258 14,295 – 346 – –
Pistols and revolvers – 1,400 246,593 3,510 1,618 – 3,315
– their parts/accessories – – – – – – –
Sports/hunting shotguns/rifles 11,000 – 164,837 4,250 2,012 25,963 19,810
– their parts/accessories – 538 – – 125,132 178,886 170,763
Bombs, Grenades, 
Ammunition and Mines218 – 3,553,737 654,386 54,000 28,733 – 32,399
Small Arms Ammunition – 8,855 648,074 – 22,049 40,618 23,654
It is not known what proportion of the exports captured by COMTRADE figures are
re-transfers and what amount represents manufactured or surplus stocks.
The primary recipients of transfers in 1999 and 2000 were Ukraine, Russia and the 
Republic of Congo, in that order (see below). These exports probably consisted of
surplus military stocks inherited from the Soviet Union and it is likely that these
exports exhausted Georgia’s saleable military surpluses. It may also be the case that 
the figures include repatriated Russian SALW. This may, for example, be the case in
2000, when military weapons worth just over US$1 million were exported to Russia.
Since 2000, exports have primarily consisted of shotguns and rifles, their parts and
accessories and shotgun cartridges. As the majority of these exports are transferred 
to Italy,219 this may indicate that Georgian companies are subcontracted to an Italian
SALW manufacturer:
Figure 21: Recipients of Georgian exports above US$10,000,220 1998–2004 
(Source: www.nisat.org)
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1000.
221 Source: www.nisat.org. 
Ukraine 3,183,000
Russia 1,623,000
Italy 475,000
Ethiopia 362,000
Angola 312,000
Bulgaria 291,000
Uganda 129,000
Guinea 90,000
Armenia 63,000
UK 51,000
Azerbaijan 44,000 Slovakia 39,000
Spain 26,000
Israel 20,000
Germany 11,000
Congo 636,000
Transfers of concern
While those interviewed were not aware of any transfers to sensitive destinations or
transfers to states under embargo, UN COMTRADE data clearly shows that Georgia
has exported considerable amounts of munitions to countries at war, those afflicted by
internal armed conflicts or those bordering conflict zones. Known transfers to such
destinations are:221
■ Angola, 1999: US$311,961, bombs, grenades, ammunition, mines and others
■ Ethiopia, 1999: US$361,860, bombs, grenades, ammunition, mines and others
■ Republic of Congo, 2000: US$636,340, small arms ammunition
■ Guinea, 2000–2001: US$12,000, parts and accessories of military weapons; US$78,000,
bombs, grenades, ammunition, mines and others
■ Uganda, 2000 and 2002: US$108,869, bombs, grenades, ammunition, mines and 
others; US$19,954, small arms ammunition.
In the case of transfers to such sensitive or unstable destinations, there is the possibility
that these weapons may have been used to commit human rights abuses or to 
prosecute armed conflicts. The transfers to Angola in 1999, during which time UNITA
(National Union for the Total Independence of Angola) in Angola was under UN
Embargo in 1999, provide one such example. While Georgian transfers were probably
destined for recognised government forces and did not, therefore, contravene the
embargo, the possibility existed for these weapons to be diverted to UNITA or be used
to violate human rights. However, without further information on the end-use 
guarantees provided at the time, and in the absence of post-shipment monitoring by
Georgia, it is very difficult to determine the specifics of such a case. In addition, while
the UN Embargo against Ethiopia and Eritrea only came into force on 17 May 2000,
Georgia’s exports to Ethiopia in 1999 coincided with both a UN Non-mandatory
Embargo (12 February 1999–17 May 2000) and a EU Embargo (15 March 1999–31 May
2001). Though these were not illegal, exporting to these countries showed a lack of
willingness on the part of the previous Georgian authorities to ensure that transferred
weapons were not used to violate human rights or perpetuate violent conflict. Past
practices of exporting to sensitive destinations is also contrary to public opinion on
the subject. Responses to the household survey demonstrate that the public is strongly
against Georgia exporting firearms to states with repressive Governments, countries in
conflict and poor countries.
Government policy and practice regarding sensitive destinations seems to have
improved and there have been no reports of transfers of concern in recent years.
Indeed, the Georgian Government has stated its commitment to blocking such 
transfers. For example, the MoD claims that a recent application to export SALW to
Uganda was refused due to fears over end use.222 While this is a positive example of
good decision-making, improved transparency in the form of regular reporting would
further reassure Georgia’s international partners that no more transfers of concern
will take place.
Furthermore, current controls on imports, transit and transhipment may not be strict
enough to prevent the diversion of transfers to sensitive destinations or those under
embargo. One prominent example of the attempted diversion of arms destined for
Georgia to a sensitive destination is provided by the seizure of a Ukrainian transport 
in Bulgaria in April 2001. The transport was detained in Bulgaria after having sought 
permission to fly to Eritrea (which was under UN Embargo at the time). The 
transport, operated by the Ukrainian company Volare, was chartered to carry military
goods from the Czech company Thomas CZ to Georgia. It is not clear what arms were
being carried by the transport, with various sources quoting 30 tonnes of weapons and
ammunition worth almost US$444,000, Kalashnikov assault rifles and ammunition
worth US$300,000, arms worth US$250,000 or parts and ammunition for D-30
howitzers. Nevertheless, the incident highlights the possibilities that exist for transfers
destined for Georgia, or transits through Georgia, to end up in sensitive destinations
or countries under embargo.
Importers, exporters, brokers and shipping agencies
At present, 20 gun shops are licensed to trade in firearms, of which probably only three
or four are involved in importing weapons.223 No official information was available on
other companies and individuals registered to trade in ADGT. Neither was any 
information available on Georgian companies and individuals that operate as brokers
and shipping agencies. Due to the lack of specific legislation regulating the activity of
Georgian brokers and shipping agencies, whether operating domestically or outside of
Georgia, the relevant authorities probably do not maintain a list of such companies.
As a result, the research team was not able to estimate the number of Georgian 
companies and individuals involved in exporting and importing SALW, their 
shipment or brokerage of SALW transfers.
Enforcement at border crossing points
Responsibility for the control of border crossing points (including international 
airports and ports) falls jointly to the Border Police and the Customs Department.
The Border Police and Customs Department conduct weapons seizures at checkpoints
jointly. However, due to the lack of a memorandum of understanding between the two
organisations, the exact responsibilities of the two agencies in this area remain unclear
(see section 10.1). Georgia maintains one official checkpoint on its Northern border
with the Russian Federation, two checkpoints with Azerbaijan in the East, two with
Turkey in the South West, and three with Armenia. A number of local border cross-
ings, for use by local citizens, are also maintained.
According to the Customs Department, all cargo passing through Georgia’s inter-
national boundaries are searched.224 This would seem unlikely, as it is common inter-
national practice that only a selected proportion of cargos are searched. If only a
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8.3 Border
controls
proportion of cargoes are inspected, the research team is unaware of the rationale for
selecting cargoes (eg random, intelligence led, result of profiling). Individuals are not
routinely searched unless officials have received intelligence that they possess weapons.
While the smuggling of large quantities is thought to be practically impossible, due to
searches of all cargoes, it is thought quite possible to smuggle one or two units of
weapons. This is partly due to the absence of X-ray machines at most checkpoints.
Enforcement at blue and green borders
The Border Police is tasked with guarding Georgia’s green and blue borders and 
preventing the illicit movement of SALW and armed groups. While management of
the Southern and Western green borders and the Eastern blue border by the Border
Police is maintained consistently throughout the year, control of the Northern Border
with Russia is more difficult due to its remoteness and the significant changes in 
seasonal weather conditions. As a result, this border is policed differently by the Border
Police during the winter and summer seasons. As noted above, Georgia is also unable
to manage its borders in areas controlled by South Ossetia and Abkhazia.
Border guards have the right to detain persons who overtly attempt to cross the 
Georgian border illegally, including for the purposes of smuggling, or if a checkpoint
is attacked. Depending on the grounds for detention, the relevant ministries are then
contacted (eg MIA, MoJ, the Prosecutor’s Office). Competency for further investiga-
tion of the incident, or prosecution of the offenders, then becomes the responsibility
of these agencies. While the Border Police’s main area of jurisdiction remains the 
border zone, since 2004 the department has had the right to conduct investigations
and institute criminal proceedings across the country using an ‘Operative Investiga-
tion’ unit. However, this unit is not fully functionally at present, as the updated ‘Border
Police Law’ has not yet been adopted (see below).
Investigative framework
According to the Georgian Criminal Code, trafficking in small arms through the 
Georgian Customs area is punishable with between three and fifteen years’
imprisonment:
Table 19: Punishments for breaches of Georgia’s small arms control legislation
Crime Punishment Article in criminal code
Illegal production, transfer, transportation Imprisonment of between Article 236, paragraph 3
or sale of firearms and ammunition five and ten years
Trafficking in SALW through Georgian Imprisonment of between Article 237, paragraph 3
customs area three and ten years 
Trafficking associated with the operations Imprisonment of between Article 237, paragraphs 
of organised criminal groups seven and fifteen years 1,3 & 4
The research team could not identify any specific arrangements for investigating
potential abuses of the military and dual use goods control system, and is not aware 
of any prosecutions for violations of the relevant laws. If enforcement of legislation in
this area is weak, this may in part be due to the current lack of law-enforcement 
capacity within the Border Police (see below). Georgia does, however, have a 
developed law-enforcement system for the investigation of serious crimes, including
arms trafficking, which should be applicable in this area. Similarly to domestic small
arms proliferation, SOD is tasked with combating small arms trafficking. However,
neither SOD nor the border services analyse patterns of illicit firearm ownership and
trafficking. As a result, a comprehensive strategy or programme to combat trade in
illicit firearms has not been developed.
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Poor strategic planning and capacity on small arms trafficking is reflected in the fact
that the majority of household survey respondents did not think that the Government
was making enough effort to combat trafficking and distribution. In total, 73 percent
of all respondents thought that the Government made no effort or a small effort to
restrict trafficking, while only 20 percent of respondents thought it made a big effort.
Administrative capacity
The Georgian Government has paid more attention to reform of border security since
the Rose Revolution, with the development of the Border Police a particular focus. In
2003, the Border Police ceased to be an independent agency and was incorporated into
the MIA. Although the department is still semi-autonomous and maintains an inde-
pendent budget, it is undergoing a gradual process of integration into the rest of the
MIA, with the final aim of becoming a civilian law-enforcement agency. This process
involves legislative changes, restructuring and retraining.
The Border Police is currently governed according to the 1994 ‘Law on Border Guards’,
which was based largely on Soviet laws and gives the department a military status.
Border Police employees therefore hold military ranks and are covered by the ‘Law on
Servicemen’. A new ‘Border Police Law’ has been drafted with the assistance of the 
German Federal Police and the EUSR and was made public on 8 May 2006. When
adopted by parliament, this law will provide a legal basis for the Border Police’s civilian
status and police functions. Despite these changes, the border guards would still come
under the control of the Chief of Staff of the Georgian armed forces in an emergency
situation.
Restructuring has entailed significant reductions in staff in 2004 and 2005. At the start
of 2006, the Border Police had approximately 6,000 employees, of which roughly 
89 percent fulfil guarding functions and only 11 percent have administrative functions.
A central staff of approximately 180 employees is based in Tbilisi. While the Border
Police still relies on around 1,000 conscripts, it should be an entirely professional 
service by the end of 2007.
In the past, border guards have been trained as soldiers rather than law enforcement
officials. Given the Department’s restructuring as a civilian organisation, (re)training
is considered to be its foremost priority.225 Several international actors have provided
training assistance to the Department. The EU composed a three-phase curriculum
for border guards based on the system developed by the OSCE for the Kosovo Police
Service (KPS). The curriculum was introduced in January 2006. The first phase covers
basic police training (eg police law, human rights). The second phase covers basic 
border police training (eg land border related legislation, maritime law). The third
phase covers operative training, as required for posting to units. The first two phases
are taught in the Police Academy, while the last phase is taught to graduates of the
Police Academy by the Border Guard Department itself. It is hoped that this training
will aid integration with the rest of the MIA, as border guards share the first phase of
training with Patrol Policemen.
Reform is still at an early stage, however, and has not yet brought about major changes
the Border Police’s operations. In particular, restructuring has been undermined by
the failure of the Border Police to identify clear strategic objectives through a
trafficking risk assessment and by the failure to develop a National Border Strategy.226
This has in turn made it impossible to formulate a transition plan for the Border
Police, undertake an adequate job task analysis for the various levels of border guards,
or update standard operational procedures to reflect the Border Police’s law enforce-
ment role. In addition, while re-training is obviously important, it is not clear how
long it will take for a complete shift in attitudes to take place within the Border Police.
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This process has not been helped by frequent changes to the administration. Further-
more, there is some resistance to the restructuring from within the Border Police, due
to perceived poorer working conditions. For example, border guard personnel are 
anxious about reductions in future income, since military pensions are higher than
normal civilian pensions.
Successful restructuring also depends upon good communication and co-operation
within the Border Police itself, between the Border Police and the rest of the MIA, and
with other government agencies. More could be done to improve these different 
relationships. Although the Department considers itself to have the best communica-
tions systems in Georgia, and probably in the region, the central office in Tbilisi still
has some communication problems with the Northern border, which is extremely
remote and needs to be policed differently during the Summer and Winter. Further-
more, communication between the Border Police and the MIA is poor at the policy
and management level. As a result, co-operation at lower levels has also suffered.
This may be attributable to the fact that the present structure is still relatively new, and
more time is required for the parties to adjust. Commitment to change at both the
political level and within the MIA, as demonstrated by the present drafting of a new
‘Border Police Law’, should ensure that co-operation does improve.
In addition, the capacity of the Customs Department to uncover trafficked small arms
at international border crossings might be undermined by poor training in this area.
While the international community has supported training in the use of new equip-
ment (eg weighing machines, computer systems), training in new techniques and 
systems for the search and control of smuggled goods, including small arms, is quite
rare as such trainings are very expensive and the Customs Department cannot afford
them.227
Underlying all the previous challenges is the low level of funding available to the 
border control agencies. Georgia’s 2005 submission to the UN DDA stated that 
‘inadequate financing of the Georgian border guards service leads to the lack of equipment
and capabilities for the prevention of illicit trafficking of arms’.228 According to the Head
of the International and Legal Affairs Department, the Border Police has been under-
funded in comparison with other MIA departments, due to the lower emphasis placed
on border controls by previous administrations. Poor financing is reflected in low
salaries and poor infrastructure (buildings and observation posts), training capacity
and basic equipment.
Under-funding of the Border Police may have had a direct impact on its ability to
effectively guard Georgia’s borders. For example, while OSCE border monitors 
recorded 800 illegal border crossings in 2004 at Georgia’s northern border, during the
last year of the OSCE Border Monitoring Mission (see below), the Border Police has
recorded far fewer illegal crossings in 2005. This may reflect a genuine reduction in the
number of illegal crossings. However, it is also possible that lower capacity and poorer
equipment in the Border Police plays a role.229
Border management information exchange
Customs Department and Border Police officials report that numerous bilateral 
agreements and joint projects allow for co-operation with neighbouring and Western
governments against all types of organised crime, including arms trafficking. The 
Border Police and Customs Department claim to have good or improving bilateral
relations with all of Georgia’s immediate neighbours.
Relations with the Russian Federation have been soured at times by political state-
ments that Georgia does not control its international borders, especially regarding the
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movement of armed groups across the Georgian border with the Republic of
Chechnya. The Russian Federation has also protested that Georgia does not always
fully co-operate on small arms trafficking issues. For its part, the Georgian 
Government has highlighted a lack of transparency on movements across the Russian
borders with South Ossetia and Abkhazia.230 However, co-operation between the two
countries on border security seems to have improved in recent years. According to
Border Police representatives, there is good co-operation between border officials 
(if not politicians), and in 2004, Russia and Georgia signed an agreement on informa-
tion exchange between border services. This was followed by a one-year plan for joint
training and co-operation, which was successfully implemented. The two border 
services presently have a two-year training and co-operation plan, which even has 
provisions for joint patrols if necessary.231
Border Police officials meet with their counterparts from Azerbaijan at the local level
almost every week and field officers have stated that local level co-operation with their
Azeri colleagues is very good.232 Border co-operation also takes place during regular
bilateral meetings and at GUAM (Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova) meet-
ings. According to the Border Police, co-operation with the Armenian border services
could be developed further. Georgia is engaged in ongoing negotiations with Armenia
and Azerbaijan on establishing a joint customs regime for passenger trains. Under this
agreement, only one country’s customs officers will inspect each train. Georgia has a
customs information-sharing agreement with Turkey and discrepancies between the
data compiled by the two countries’ customs services are investigated. Turkey and
Georgia signed a memorandum of co-operation in February 2001 that includes
improved co-operation on arms trafficking.233
The Border Police and Customs Department also co-operate with their counterparts
from a number of other states on a bilateral level. The Department maintains monthly
information exchanges with certain countries, including Finland, France, Estonia (and
Lithuania in the near future). According to Border Police representatives, bilateral
information exchange with these countries tends to be quite good. At the end of 2005,
Georgia signed a customs information sharing agreement with Ukraine, similar to the
agreement with Turkey. Negotiations on customs co-operation are presently under-
way with China and the United Arab Emirates, spurred by the high volume of traffic
between Georgia and these countries and the consequent risk of goods smuggling.
Georgian also participates in a number of multilateral forums. The Georgian Customs
Department has signed a number of agreements with its counterparts in the Russian
Federation and Azerbaijan under the CIS framework, yet according to the Border
Police, there has been no substantive co-operation on border and small arms 
smuggling issues within the CIS. Georgia also participates in GUAM’s Virtual Law
Enforcement Centre (VLEC), set up on the basis of the SECI-Centre (Southeast 
European Co-operative Initiative) model for information exchange. The main goal of
this virtual centre (comprised of national focal points in GUAM member countries
exchanging information in ‘real-time’, rather than being based in a physical location) 
is to facilitate law enforcement co-operation in a variety of areas, from terrorism to
drugs smuggling and other serious crimes. Although VLEC has so far only established
a Drug Trafficking Task Force, which has engaged in an interdiction operation against
drug-traffickers jointly with the SECI Centre, the project is at a very early stage and
could include information sharing on small arms trafficking in the future.234
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International assistance
International assistance in the form of both bilateral and multilateral projects (such as
the OSCE Border Assistance Mission and the EUSR’s advisor mission to the MIA) has
contributed greatly to Georgia’s border management system. Regular informal 
meetings between representatives from the main donor agencies help to ensure that
international assistance to improve border management is co-ordinated and well 
targeted. For example, the EU is providing assistance at the operative and doctrinal
level (eg development of standard operation procedures) while the OSCE is imple-
menting training programmes and the US is providing infrastructure and equipment
assistance:
Table 20: International assistance to Georgia’s border controls
Programme Period
US Embassy
Georgian Train and Equip Programme (GTEP) May 2002–April 2004
Training to Border Police as part of wider training to Armed Forces –
Provision of equipment (eg small arms and ammunition, –
communications gear)
Georgia Border Security and Law Enforcement (GBSLE) program Ongoing
(Border Police, Customs Department, Coast Guard)
Renovated of Border Guards’ aviation maintenance facility at April 2001–August 2005
Alekseevsk airbase 
Renovation of joint customs/border checkpoint at Red Bridge March 2002–March 2003
Renovation of checkpoint, Kazbegi (northern border), Sadaxlo and Vale Ongoing
(southern Border)
Delivery ASYCUDA computerised customs management system 2002–2006
Various equipment to Border Police and Customs Department Ongoing
Financing of Coast Guards Ongoing
EUSR Border Assistant Programme From September 2005
Development of a training programme for border guards –
Development of comprehensive border security strategy and –
operational procedures
Mentoring of the Border Police in the field –
Continued assessment of the Georgian border situation –
With German Government, drafting of new ‘Border Police Law’ –
Developing the new Customs Code –
OSCE Mission to Georgia
OSCE Border Monitoring Mission 1999–December 2004
Identify illegal crossings and trafficking along Northern Border with –
Chechnya and Ingushetia
OSCE Training Assistance Programme (TAP) 235 June 2005–June 2006
Training in Tbilisi and three regional centres along the borders with –
Chechnya and Dagestan 
International Organisation for Migration (IOM) Ongoing
Provides training to border guards procedures for inspecting documents –
Provision of Personnel Identification and Reporting System (PIRS) software –
Turkish Government Ongoing
Donated sensor equipment, vehicles and communication equipment –
Limited Border Police training on leadership and management skills –
German Federal Police Ongoing
With EUSR, draft ‘Border Police Law’ –
96 TAKING STOCK: SMALL ARMS AND HUMAN SECURITY IN GEORGIA
235 An extension of the border assistance programme’s mandate beyond June 2006 has yet to be agreed, but it is planned to
extend the training programme to all border guard regional centres.
While few significant incidents of small arms trafficking have been reported in 2005,
several cases of either trafficking or armed groups breaching Georgia’s borders are
known to have occurred in the 1990s and early 2000s. The continued existence of
contraband smuggling and a past history of small arms trafficking indicates that such
trafficking could resume if demand for firearms increased.
Small arms seizures
There is general agreement amongst Border Police and Customs Department 
representatives that trafficking in small arms does not represent a major concern for
Georgia. According to figures provided by the Border Police, in 2005 border guards
seized the following SALW:236
Table 21: Border Police weapon seizures, 2005
Weapon type Number
assault rifle AK-74 4
assault rifle AKM 7
assault rifle AKMC 1
hand-held grenade launcher RPG-7 1
hand-held grenade launcher RPG-18 1
hand-held grenade launcher VP-18 (Mukha) 1
7.62mm ammunition 582
5.45mm ammunition 337
hand grenade RGD-5 1
grenades for hand-held grenade launcher RPG-7 3 packs
grenades for hand-held grenade launcher RPG-7 18
with jet-propelled launcher 
hand anti-tank grenade RKG-3 6
dummy training grenade RKG-3 2
dummy training grenade F-1 27
dummy training grenade RGD-5 14
anti-personnel mine 1
magazines for assault rifles 39
ammunition (various calibre) 204
blank ammunition (various calibre) 2,076
5.45mm training ammunition 754
machine gun belt boxes 15
machine gun belt 7
spare barrels for 7.62mm machine gun PKT 2
The research team was unable to ascertain whether these weapons were being
trafficked (or were simply seized close to the border) and whether their seizure 
resulted in criminal prosecutions.
These seizures figures are probably not representative of the full scale of small arms
trafficking across Georgia’s international borders for a number of reasons. Firstly, the
state has difficulties adequately monitoring state borders, especially the northern 
border, with the resources available. Secondly, it may be the case, as has been stated by
a number of informed sources, that border guards do not always detain armed 
individuals or groups near the Georgian border, if they are from border communities
with a strong gun culture. This has been strongly denied by the Border Police, who
maintain that all armed persons found near the border are detained, irrespective of
whether they come from local communities or those with a strong ‘gun culture’.237
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trafficking
Thirdly, deficiencies in the reporting system between the regional offices and 
Headquarters of the Border Police make it difficult to collate statistics on seized
goods.238 In addition, no assessment has been conducted into the present level of
commodity interdependence of goods trafficked into and through Georgia. Perhaps
most importantly, knowledge of the present level of trafficking across Georgia’s 
borders is undermined by the fact that Georgia’s border services have not yet under-
taken a risk assessment of small arms trafficking.
Results from the household survey also demonstrate that illegal small arms trafficking
may be more frequent than suggested by seizure figures. A total of 70 percent of all
respondents thought that illegal weapons trafficking causes ‘a lot’ or ‘some’ concern in
Georgia today. While respondents were less likely to think that trafficking in firearms
represents a concern for their particular community, 51 percent still thought that this
was the case. Focus group participants also considered trafficking to be substantial and
did not think that Georgia’s international borders are adequately protected:
Now there is a flow of weapons and nobody controls the borders. Our border is not 
controlled at two segments – Abkhazia and Tskhinvali [South Ossetia], but we have to
admit that the rest is not controlled any better than these two borders.
Focus group B, Tbilisi, scientist, male, 45
In the absence of methodical tools that would allow a more accurate assessment of the
current level of trafficking, the research team considered other information, such as
public perceptions of trafficking, historic patterns of small arms trafficking and 
evidence of smuggling in other goods, in order to develop a picture of the threats
posed by small arms trafficking at the present time. Apart from low capacity among
border control agencies, the following factors might have helped facilitate small arms
trafficking in the past and could do so again in the future, and should consequently be
taken into account when developing a strategy to combat small arms trafficking:
■ Difficult terrain along the Northern border and locals with experience of trafficking
■ Lack of resolution of the two separatist conflicts
■ Areas of ‘grey sovereignty’ along Georgia’s southern international borders and cross-
border communities
■ Regional factors, such as the proximity of a range of conflicts, ‘frozen conflicts’ and
post-conflict situations in the region, and the poor border management capacity of
Georgia’s neighbours.
Northern borders: Tusheti, Khevsureti and the Pankisi Gorge
Georgia’s northern border with the Russian Federation, including the Republic of
Chechnya, lies along difficult and often inaccessible terrain, and as a result is difficult
to guard effectively. In its 2005 submission regarding implementation of the UN PoA,
Georgia stated that its Northern border is intersected by a number of poorly patrolled
roads and open passages that are poorly guarded due to ‘the lack of customs/border
guards’ posts and the complexity of terrain’.239
The smuggling of firearms across the Northern border with Chechnya has received a
high level of coverage by domestic and international media in the past. Smuggling
seems to have reached a peak after the start of the second war in Chechnya in 1999, and
occurred mainly in the mountainous areas of Tusheti and Khevsureti, where a number
of organised groups were thought to be trafficking weapons. Goods seized by 
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Georgian border guards in this area included grenade launchers, automatic weapons
and ammunition.240
There have also been a number of incidents in which armed groups have illegally
crossed Georgia’s international borders. The most significant case took place in the
Pankisi Gorge, a 34-kilometer-long mountainous area bordering Chechnya to the
North, in 1999–2000. This was due to the arrival in 1999 of around 7,000 Chechen
internally displaced persons which may have included up to 500 fighters under the
command of Chechen ‘warlord’ Ruslan Galaev.241 This led to persistent warnings from
Russia over the use of the Pankisi Gorge as a safe haven by ‘Chechen terrorists’,
culminating in the seizure of the Georgian village of Pichvi by Russian airborne troops
in March 2000 and the bombing of positions inside the Pankisi Gorge by Russian
planes in November 2001.242 During this period, the Pankisi Gorge was to a large extent
an extension of the Chechen theatre of war, and control over this area by Georgian 
government forces was minimal.
The tensions along the Northern border at this time led to the creation of an OSCE
Border Monitoring Mission, which operated between 1999 and December 2004. The
OSCE Border Monitoring Mission confirmed that movements and trafficking across
the border was significant. During the last year of its operations in 2004, OSCE border
monitors observed 800 illegal crossings alone, ten percent of which involved armed
persons.243 While a proportion of these consisted of individual local citizens, some
crossings were made by groups, including horses laden with goods.244
The problems caused by Chechen incursions into Georgian territory also prompted
the US to develop a significant anti-terrorist training programme for the Georgian
military, GTEP (see section 1).
Separatist areas: Abkhazia and South Ossetia 
The separatist regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia control more than 200km of
Georgia’s internationally recognised borders. As such, Georgian officials argue that
they cannot monitor the situation along these borders, but believe they provide a
potential trafficking route for weapons into Georgia’s internationally recognised 
territory.245 If this is true, it might indeed be relatively simple to smuggle weapons into
Tbilisi-controlled territory since the Georgian Customs Department does not 
maintain permanent customs posts on the internal borders with these regions, though
there are army checkpoints in various places. While there is no substantial evidence to
prove or disprove claims of small arms smuggling into and across the separatist
regions, evidence demonstrates that there is significant smuggling in common goods
into Georgian-Government-controlled territory through Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
Indeed, accusations of smuggling from South Ossetia provided the rationale for 
placing Georgian Interior Troops along the South Ossetian border in the summer of
2004 as part of an ‘anti-smuggling operation’. This deployment served to create 
tensions in the area, culminating in a brief but fierce artillery duel and a number of
casualties on both sides.
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Areas of ‘grey sovereignty’ and cross-border communities: the Southern 
borders of Kvemo Kartli and Samtskhe-Javakheti
Border control is also a concern in certain areas that are under central Government
control but have problems with weak governance and still lack modern border 
facilities. These areas include the predominately ethnic-Armenian region of
Samtskhe-Javakheti (incorporating the cities of Akhaltisikhe and Alkalkalaki) and
parts of the Kvemo Kartli region, which has a large ethnic-Azeri population. The 
existence of areas of ‘grey sovereignty’ along Georgia’s international borders and
around the conflict zones may also have facilitated small arms trafficking. Indeed,
according to a representative from the Border Police, there is thought to be more 
corruption, smuggling and illegal crossings on the Armenian and Azeri borders than
the Northern border with the Russian Federation.246
The Kvemo Kartli region raises particular concerns in this regard. Illicit firearm hold-
ings in Kvemo Kartli are higher than the country average (see section 3.5). While illegal
firearms in the region and in neighbouring Samtskhe-Javakheti were acquired in a
number of ways, a 2004 study discovered that ethnic Azeri and Armenian Georgians
had sourced firearms from their neighbours across the border in Armenia and 
Azerbaijan during the 1992–1994 war in Nagorno-Karabakh.247 The claim that 
substantial levels of small arms have been smuggled into this region is supported by
the household survey and focus group discussions. Focus group participants and 
survey respondents thought that, apart from Samegrelo, all types of contraband 
smuggling were most frequent in Kvemo-Kartli. Responses from Kvemo Kartli indicate
that small arms trafficking probably occurs more in this region than in the rest of the
country, or has done so in the recent past:
Figure 22: To what extent is illegal weapons trafficking a concern in Georgia/in your town/
village/district?
(Base No. = 1,300)
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This is underlined by the fact that ethnic Azeri respondents, who were almost 
exclusively from Kvemo Kartli, were also more likely to think that firearms trafficking
represented a problem in their community than ethnic Georgians or Armenians, and
no ethnic Azeri respondents stated that trafficking represented no threat to their 
community.
Figure 23: What is your Ethnic Origin/To what extent is illegal weapons trafficking a 
concern in Georgia/in your town/village/district?
(Base No. = 1,300)
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Regional factors
The existence of a range of conflicts, ‘frozen conflicts’ and post-conflict situations in
the region provides potential markets for firearms, potential supplies, and groups 
willing to provide weapons at times of increased demand. The existence of border
areas outside the control of the central Government combined with a latent demand
for and a ready supply of weapons means that small arms trafficking could easily 
re-emerge as a problem for Georgia in the future. In addition the poor border manage-
ment capacity of some of Georgia’s neighbours provides further potential for small
arms trafficking. Indeed, a number of interviewees were of the opinion that Georgia’s
attempts to improve control of its international borders were undermined by the lack
of capacity, and widespread corruption, amongst neighbouring border services. One
informed interviewee suggested that it is still relatively easy to traffic weapons across
all of Georgia’s international borders, with the exception of the Turkish-Georgian 
border, which was though to be well policed.248 In particular, it was felt that the
Armenian border service did not function adequately.
9 
Transparency and
oversight
SIGNIFICANT STEPS HAVE BEEN MADE in increasing transparency on small arms
issues in Georgia and in ensuring that parliamentarians and civil society have an over-
sight role on them. A number of parliamentary committees act as a forum for debating
policy and practice on small arms issues. In addition, different layers of government
have come to recognise the benefits of interaction with civil society and have been
involving a range of civil society groups in policy formulation on small arms and
wider security issues. For example, the MIA police academy has introduced a number
of training modules developed by the OSGF, one of which covers the use of force and
firearms. However, the change in attitude is no more apparent than with the MoD,
which in 2005 organised a series of workshops with civil society on policy issues.249
While these changes are positive, information concerning transfers, collections and
destructions, trafficking, possession and manufacturing of weapons is not made 
routinely accessible to parliamentarians or private citizens. Public and parliamentary
oversight of security issues in general and small arms control issues in particular is
therefore not systematic. While limited transparency surrounding security-sector
issues is a common characteristic of countries undergoing conflict, since transparency
is deemed secondary to the perceived national interest in maintaining secrecy on 
security issues, it can nonetheless undermine security sector reform by inhibiting
informed debate about the role of the military and police and perpetuating habitual
feelings of mistrust and insecurity.
Probably the best single test for levels of transparency in Georgia on small arms and
wider security issues was the writing of this report. In many cases, co-operation with
government officials was excellent, and much higher than in many other countries in
the region. Nonetheless, levels of transparency varied widely from agency to agency.
The following table summarises levels of transparency across key ministries and 
agencies, based on the research team’s experience during the information collection
phase of the research. The two key areas in which the research team found it especially
difficult two acquire information were, state SALW holdings and international 
military SALW transfers:
249 Information on these meetings can be found at <http://osgf.ge/ccds/meetings.html>, accessed 20 July 2006.
Table 22: Government transparency on small arms and security issues
Government agency Level of transparency
Border Police Majority of requested information provided, particularly 
information on restructuring of border management and 
present capacity
Very good level of co-operation
Missing items:
Border Police SALW holdings
Customs Department All requested information provided
Adequate level of co-operation
Ministry of Foreign Affairs All requested information provided
Very good level of co-operation
Ministry of Internal Affairs Much of requested information provided, particularly 
information regarding crime statistics and trends as well as 
details of internal procedures and modes of operation 
Very good level of co-operation provided
Missing items:
List of registered weapons – due to problems with 
information collation
MIA SALW holdings
List of missing/stolen weapons
Ministry of Defence Part of requested information provided, particularly on 
stockpile management and destruction
Improving level of co-operation
Missing items:
Full details of international arms transfers authorised by MTC; 
detailed information on the decision-making process 
Full details of thefts from military stockpiles
Military SALW holdings
Ministry of Justice All information that can be obtained legally was provided
Very good level of co-operation
Ministry of Economy and Trade Majority of information requested provided
Adequate co-operation
Ministry of Health Majority of information requested provided
Good level of co-operation
Missing items:
Firearm morbidity and mortality data – due to poor recording 
practices
Office of the General Prosecutor All information that can be obtained legally was provided
Very good level of co-operation
Since the end of the Cold War, it has been increasingly recognised that civil society can
play an extremely positive role in ‘good’ governance of the security sector, and that
transparency in security affairs acts as a powerful confidence-building measure, both
internationally and with one’s own public. This is equally true in the sphere of small
arms controls. Georgia’s record in this sphere remains inconsistent, however. Though
there have been some positive examples of co-operation between the Government and
civil society on security affairs, a culture of secrecy remains across parts of the security
sector that will take time to eradicate.
One example of this ‘secrecy culture’ was the decision to classify Georgia’s IPAP, even 
as this document was committing the Georgian Government to developing ‘an active
and co-ordinated public information strategy to ensure that the security and defence
transformation and modernization, including democratic and civilian control over the
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armed forces, is understood and supported by the Georgian people.’250 This contradiction
was later corrected, however, and the Government then published the document
openly at the end of June 2005. The MIA appears to be more ready to make informa-
tion public, recognising the importance of public relations in effective policing. Fur-
ther positive examples of transparency are the professional-looking websites for the
MoD 251 and the MIA252 (which provides regular updates on crimes committed, includ-
ing firearms offences).
The level of civilian engagement in security affairs is also low by Western standards.
In part, this is due to the general weakness of civil society in the country. Though civil
society is perceived to be more active in Georgia than in many parts of the former
Soviet Union, being crucial for promoting democratic ideas and playing a major role
in the Rose Revolution, it still remains weak, particularly since many of its leading
lights left their organisations to join the Saakashvili Government in early 2004.
Furthermore, while much international assistance was put into supporting civil 
society development more generally, little attention has so far been paid to encourag-
ing civil society engagement in the security sector. The result is that few organisations
have the experience to work on such issues.253
Georgian civil society also shows a low level of interest in security issues, and in 
questions of SALW transfers in particular. According to several interviewees, few local
NGOs are ‘really saying or doing much on security matters’.254 Indeed, interviewees
expressed the opinion that civil society’s ability to provide oversight on security issues
had actually diminished in recent years. Some people argue that government policy
seems less directed to active co-operation with NGOs than was previously the case,
noting, for example, that civil society has not had a major role to play in the IPAP
process.255
Nonetheless, a number of influential Tbilisi-based NGOs do co-operate closely with
the Government both through formal mechanisms and on a personal or project basis.
For example, a number of organisations formed part of a ‘Civilian Council’ that met
regularly with officials from the MoD (including the Minister) in order to discuss
items of mutual concern. Similar co-operative mechanisms have at times operated
within the MIA. On the other hand, certain independent journalists have complained
that they have been unofficially ‘blacklisted’ by the MoD,256 and international actors in
Tbilisi have also reported difficulties in gaining information from and access to 
ministry officials.257 All this suggests that transparency and co-operation with civil
society does not yet occur on a systematic basis and that civil society is treated with
caution by some officials, yet embraced by others on a case-by-case basis.
Whatever the dynamics of Government-civil society relations, it is apparent that civil
society is not adequately representing the position of the wider public. For example,
opinion poll data collected for this study in December 2005 shows that the over-
whelming majority of Georgians are not in favour of Georgia exporting arms to
repressive governments, countries in conflict, countries that support terrorism, poor
countries, countries under embargo, or even NATO member countries.258 Yet, despite
the high levels of disapproval for arms sales to repressive regimes, poor countries and
countries in conflict, this has not translated into public action on this issue.
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As well as open questions in Parliament, a number of parliamentary committees 
provide specific oversight on small arms and security issues: the Defence and Security
Committee; the Euro-Atlantic Committee; the Legislative Committee; the Foreign
Affairs Committee, and the Human Rights Committee. In addition, the Parliamentary
Group of Confidence has the right to demand information or evidence on any matter,
including those that are related to small arms. As the majority party provides the main
representation in all of these committees, the Government and the security services
tend to respond to questions and investigations by these committees. However, it is
argued by some that there is still no real culture of debate on security issues either
within the committees or within Parliament as a whole.259 In addition, it is not thought
that the Parliamentary Group of Confidence utilises its privilege to investigate security
and small arms issues as much as it could. Hence, while the law regarding parliament-
ary oversight is adequate, parliamentary implementation of its rights in this regard is
poor.
While debate on wider security sector and military reform issues is more common,
the only human security issues that parliament currently deals with are drugs and
organised crime. Small arms issues, especially in and around the conflict zone, are 
considered to be more of an issue for the executive and are not generally discussed in
Parliament.
In terms of arms transfers, at the present time there is no statutory requirement for
reporting of arms transfer information to parliament on a routine basis.
Parliamentary oversight of transfers is as a consequence conducted on an ad hoc basis.
The Parliamentary Defence and Security Committee should have responsibility for
parliamentary oversight of the transfer control system. It is not clear, however, to what
extent the Committee fulfils this responsibility. While the Committee has questioned
the executive agencies over a transfer of armoured personnel carriers from Ukraine,
there are few known incidents of the Committee using its investigative powers in 
relation to SALW transfers. The one prominent exception was the raising of question
in Parliament regarding the possible use of non-transparent funds for the purchase of
military goods by the security services, and the subsequent report by the Minister of
Defence on military spending in 2005 to the Parliamentary Group of Confidence.
One positive example of the increasing awareness of the need for parliamentary over-
sight in small arms matters was a Regional Parliamentary Workshop on Small Arms
and Light Weapons held by the Georgian Parliament on 9–10 June 2005. The workshop
was hosted by the Chairperson of the Parliament of Georgia and organised by the
deputy Chair of the Human Rights Committee in association with Parliamentarians
for Global Action (PGA). Its purpose was to improve knowledge within the CIS of
small arms control issues, especially within the framework of the UN PoA. The work-
shop set a precedent for greater engagement by Georgian parliamentarians on small
arms and human security issues, and was attended by representatives of the 
Committee of Defence and Security, the Human Rights Committee, the Foreign
Affairs Committee and the Committee for Euro-Atlantic Integration. As the result of
the conference a ‘Tbilisi Action Plan’ was adopted to encourage greater controls over
small arms in Central Asia and the Caucasus (see Annex 2).
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9.2
Parliamentary
oversight
10 
Co-ordination and
policy formulation
WHILE GEORGIAN STATE AGENCIES CAN AND DO CO-OPERATE on small arms
control and human security issues, this co-operation often does not have a clear
framework and is not guided by strategic objectives. There is currently no inter-agency
co-ordination body tasked with the development and implementation of a compre-
hensive small arms control policy. The establishment of such a body would be an
important step to combating small arms proliferation more effectively and would send
a powerful signal about the priority that the Georgian Government gives to such 
matters. Current problems in inter-agency co-operation on international transfers and
domestic small arms control are outlined below, followed by an overview of national
and regional policy responses to small arms and human security issues.
Licensing process
Current inter-agency co-operation relating to arms transfers decision-making is
insufficient in a number of ways. The transfer of the MTC from the NSC to the MoD
can be considered a backward step, since the MTC is now composed of MoD staff. An
expert group is required to provide the MTC with a detailed risk assessment of every
potential transfer.260 However, the MoD is not legally obliged to consult with agencies
outside of the expert group and final decisions by the MTC do not need to reflect the
group’s advice.
In addition, at present, decisions relating to transfers of military-purpose ADGT are
taken within the MoD by the MTC, while decisions on civilian-purpose SALW and
most dual-use goods are taken by the MoJ and the MoE. There are no indications that
the MoJ or the MoE co-operate with other ministries over the transfers that they can
authorise independently of the MTC. This is especially worrying regarding ADGT
transits and transhipments that are authorised by these institutions, for which there is
a higher risk of diversion to sensitive destinations or countries under embargo.
Without high levels of co-operation with other ministries (eg the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs – MFA) it is difficult for the MoJ and MoE to make informed decisions on arms
transfer licences.
260 Correspondence with Mamuka Kikaleishvili, Ministry of Defence, June 2006. The expert group is staffed with experts from
the MFA, MIA, MoJ, Ministry of Environmental Security and Natural Resources, Ministry of Economic Development, Ministry
of Finances, Ministry of Defence and Special State Guard Service.
10.1 Arms
transfer
controls
Border management process
All interviewees agreed that co-operation between the Customs Department and the
Border Police in combating small arms trafficking has traditionally been poor and is
still not efficient. Previous low levels of co-operation were the result of competition
between the agencies. This has been compounded by the continued absence of either 
a Memorandum of Understanding between the two organisations or standard 
operational procedures guiding joint operations. Co-operation appears to be improv-
ing, however, as the result of legislative initiatives and the implementation of joint
operations at border crossings. One objective of the draft border guard strategy that is
under development with the support of the EUSR is to improve co-operation in the
sphere of border management.261 As such an agreement of co-operation between the
two agencies, based on EU best practice, is also currently being drafted.262 Legislation is
especially necessary to clearly define the responsibilities of border guards and customs
officials at shared checkpoints, such as the Red Bridge checkpoint, on the Azeri border.
Co-operation at Red Bridge, where border controls are conducted in parallel with 
customs controls, is quite good and sets an example of how co-operation can be 
developed at other checkpoints. However, according to the Customs Department, at
this stage such co-operation and exchange of information is only possible at the Red
Bridge checkpoint, as adequate infrastructure is lacking elsewhere.
It appears that currently there is limited interagency co-operation regarding domestic
small arms control. Due to the absence of procedural guidelines, there is no practice of
consultation or information sharing on small arms control between the relevant 
agencies. For example, neither the MIA’s Information Department nor the central 
Permissions Department is aware of the number of hunting and sports firearms 
registered by the Patrol Police in the regions. Meanwhile, figures for registered rifled
weapons are kept centrally, so regional police do not have figures for the total number
of weapons kept in each region. Although one police interviewee made reference to a
planned internal computer network that would allow access to a range of information,
including firearm registrations, no detailed information was available on when the
network would be ready.
There is also room to improve information exchange between the Permissions 
Department and the Customs Service. At present, the Customs Service does not
inform the Permissions Department about the number of weapons that have been
imported into Georgia. Rifled weapons intended for sale in Georgia pose a particular
problem in this regard, since the Permissions Department is not aware that such
weapons have entered the country until they are presented to the Department follow-
ing acquisition by a licensed civilian. In the case of hunting and sporting weapons, the
Permission Department is not informed at any point.
In addition, while the MoH is responsible for collating information on firearm related
injuries, it did not have information on the number of firearm-related suicides that
have occurred in Georgia, as firearm-related deaths are defined as suicides or 
homicides at a later stage by the MIA. The lack of access to this information obviously
undermines the MoH’s ability to assess the country’s health problems and plan for its
health needs. Similarly, it is not clear to what degree hospital staff co-operate with the
police on firearm-related injuries.
Finally, the operations of Georgia’s civilian control system have been severely under-
mined by its failure to create a State Weapons Register. In order for this register to be
created it will be necessary for all relevant state agencies to agree on a categorisation of
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10.2 Controls
over civilian
ownership and
use
weapons, especially regarding the distinction between civilian and military weaponry.
It is apparent that an inter-agency group working on small arms issues would provide
the most suitable forum for such inter-agency co-operation.
For reasons outlined in the introduction to this report Georgia’s response to its small
arms problems has been inconsistent throughout the post-Soviet period. In mid-2006,
at the time of writing, the national level response is still uncertain. While small arms
control has in the past been undermined by weak state capacity to undertake arms
control measures, an ineffective law enforcement system, ineffective state border 
controls and the lack of a central body (national commission) tasked with guiding 
policy on small arms control and its implementation, have meant that no one agency
has taken responsibility for:
■ Creating and implementing a national strategy to control small arms
■ Ensuring high levels of inter-agency co-operation and information 
■ Ensuring implementation of international agreements in this area, such as the UN
PoA.
As a result, co-ordination between the various government ministries and agencies
responsible for combating Georgia’s small arms control problems has traditionally
been poor, both at the level of policy and operations. The Georgian Government
recognised these problems in 2005 and at a seminar organised by Saferworld and
CIPDD in March 2005, the Government announced that it intended to set up an 
inter-agency group, or ‘national commission’, that would bring together all of the key
government agencies that play a role in small arms control. This announcement was
repeated in Georgia’s submission to the UN DDA in 2005 regarding implementation 
of the UN PoA, according to which the establishment of the Interagency Group was as
a result of the ‘need to establish a separate body dealing specifically with matters of small
arms control’ and would ‘improve internal co-ordination’.263 The inter-agency group was
to be composed of representatives from all the key ministries264 and was to have the
following responsibilities:265
■ Commission an independent report to comprehensively analyse all aspects of the
small arms problem and provide the basis for development of a national strategy to
combat small arms proliferation
■ Create an integrated database of weapons (including SALW), military equipment,
ammunition and dual-use goods
■ Submit recommendations to the MTC
■ Together with relevant Georgian NGOs, carry out research on weapons circulation
volume and its effect on the population
■ Conduct a multi-dimensional analysis taking into account the crime rate, public 
opinion of weapons proliferation and the capabilities of different state institutions.
The present study was intended for use by the Interagency Group as ‘…a sound basis
for the development of a national strategy to combat small arms proliferation.’266
While the Interagency Monitoring Group on Small Arms control was established
under the NSC’s Permanent Inter-agency MTC in June 2005, by October 2005 this
group had already ceased functioning following the MTC’s transfer from the NSC to
the MoD. Since the Inter-Agency Group was disbanded no overarching structure exists
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10.3 National
level response
within the Georgian Government to guide policy development, oversee its imple-
mentation and co-ordinate the work of different ministries and departments on small
arms issues.
There are currently no regional mechanisms or initiatives for combating illicit arms
trafficking and preventing the proliferation and misuse within the Caucasus region as
a whole. The lack of a framework for co-operation on this issue undermines national
attempts by the Georgian Government to bring domestic small arms proliferation and
misuse under control. As such, little progress has been made on this issue since a
roundtable in Tbilisi on curbing arms transfers as a conflict prevention strategy in the
South Caucasus in April 2000.267 This roundtable meeting highlighted the need for
such co-operation, either within existing regional security and political frameworks,
such as the CIS, GUAM and the Black Sea Economic Co-operation (BSEC), or through
the establishment of a Stability Pact for the Caucasus, similar to the South Eastern
Europe Stability Pact. The establishment of a regional framework on curbing small
arms proliferation and misuse would provide the opportunity to develop and imple-
ment a Regional Action, which could include measures to:268
■ Strengthen national capacity and regional operational co-operation in preventing and
combating small arms trafficking
■ Strengthen controls on transhipments of arms through the Caucasus
■ Improve systems to trace illicit flows in the region
■ Strengthen controls on legal possession and transfers in arms
■ Improve weapons stockpile management and security and promote the destruction 
of surplus and confiscated weapons
■ Enhance transparency, information exchange, consultation and democratic 
accountability on arms flows in the Caucasus
■ Ensure arms control measures are incorporated into ongoing reforms of the security
sector.
The difficulties of establishing a Caucasus-wide framework to co-ordinate small arms
control initiatives are understandable given the recent history of intra- and inter-state
wars, the unresolved ‘frozen conflicts’ and the often-hostile relations between various
states in the region. Nevertheless, recent experiences in South Eastern Europe, Central
America and East and West Africa have demonstrated that regional co-operation
mechanisms can have a major impact on stability and reduce arms proliferation.
Indeed, no matter how much effort the Georgian Government makes to prevent small
arms trafficking from or through its territory and combat small arms proliferation and
misuse internally, these measures can never be completely successful unless Russia,
Armenia, Azerbaijan and Turkey are also engaged on this issue. Such a framework
would recognise that ‘many of the problems associated with light weapons proliferation –
conflict, insecurity and crime – are regional in scope’.269
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10.4 Regional
level response
11 
Recommendations
THE GEORGIAN GOVERNMENT has made impressive progress on a whole range of
small arms control issues in the last decade, especially given the difficult conditions in
which state controls have had to be imposed. The Government should therefore be
praised for its proactive stance on these issues, especially in recent years. While this is
the case, much still needs to be done in order to minimise the potential for further
small arms proliferation, combat the negative implications of the availability of small
arms within the country and improve transparency and accountability in this area.
The following section provides a number of measures that the research team recom-
mend to the Georgian Government, civil society and the international community in
order to meet these outstanding challenges.
Improving human security and reducing the impact of small arms misuse
The principal focus of any small arms control programme should be to reduce the
impact of small arms misuse on society. Substantial progress has already been made to
improve the Government’s law enforcement and crime prevention ability. However,
additional measures in two linked areas – weapons collections and the provision of
security – are needed to tackle illicit firearms possession and misuse by the general
public.
Collect and register weapons
■ Hold an internal review of the current open-ended amnesty to assess its effectiveness
and consider the introduction of time-limited amnesty periods that are preceded and
followed by law enforcement drives.
■ Run small arms awareness programmes to challenge widespread public acceptance of
weapons possession. These campaigns should be targeted particularly at those 
communities or social groups that exhibit significant demand for weapons (Kakheti,
Mtskheta-Mtianeti, Kvemo Kartli, Shida Kartli and young people).
■ In order to maximise the chances of success, a comprehensive assessment of the 
attitudes and perceptions of Georgia gun owners should be carried out in each 
targeted region during the preparation phase of any collection campaign.
■ Run tailored collection campaigns in areas with high levels of illegal possession 
(eg Samegrelo-Svaneti, Kvemo Kartli) and specific dynamics of illegal firearm owner-
ship (eg Ajara), taking into account the drivers for illegal ownership in each case.
■ Encourage the legalisation of illegally held weapons in remote parts of Georgia, such 
as border communities in the mountainous North. Adopt special provisions to allow
people in such communities to legalise their weapons without travelling to Tbilisi 
(eg mobile registration units).
To the Georgian 
Government
■ Ensure that voluntary weapons collections are supported by public campaigns
designed to inform the public and change attitudes towards firearms possession.
Involve non-state actors in promoting amnesties (eg civil society organisations,
celebrities).
■ Any future weapons collection programme should take account of national SALW 
survey findings on the attitudes, perceptions and past behaviour of different social
groups in Georgia.
Improve the Government’s ability to provide security
■ Based partly on information contained in this report, create a police strategy for 
tackling firearm-related crime and illegal ownership that can be integrated into a
wider small arms control programme (see below).
■ Enhance the capacity of the Special Operative Department to analyse patterns of
illegal firearms ownership and firearms misuse.
■ Target police responses against firearms crime in areas identified as suffering most
extensively from firearms crime: Tbilisi, Samegrelo-Svaneti, Imereti, Shida Kartli and
Kvemo Kartli. Ensure that such responses are co-ordinated with comprehensive 
awareness-raising and collections campaigns.
■ Record domestic violence (including domestic violence involving firearms) as a 
separate crime rather than as a motive for crime.
■ Enforce strict penalties for the illegal possession and use of firearms and ensure that
the application of fines and plea bargaining is fair and consistent and does not unduly
favour particular groups.
■ Review state agencies’ policy and training in the use of force to ensure that firearm use
by police officers corresponds with United Nations Basic Principles on the Use of Force
and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials and does not threaten public safety.
■ Review the possibility of extending Patrol Police activities to rural areas and town 
suburbs.
■ Review ways in which public-police relations, and especially relations with minority
groups, could be improved. Potential methods for improving relations including the
adoption of community based policing models and community safety programmes.
Improving control of legal weapons
Enhanced control over the ownership and use of legal weapons is fundamental to 
minimising the potential for the misuse of firearms. Improvements should be sought
in three linked areas: legislation; government capacity and public knowledge; and 
control of the private security industry.
Improve legislation on civilian firearm ownership
■ Amend primary and secondary legislation to require that all applicants for firearm
licences undergo and pass a standard training course in the use and storage of firearms
before being issued with a licence.
■ Amend legislation to include a provision requiring applicants for self-defence
weapons to provide justification of the need to own such a weapon.
■ Publish a State Weapons Register defining the types of weapons that can be legally
owned by civilians.
■ Amend legislation to include a provision permitting the Police to inspect weapons and
their storage facilities within the home, and permitting the Permissions Department
to inspect the weapons inventory of gun shops and other weapon traders.
■ Ensure that the Permissions Department is informed of all weapons imported into the
country by both the Customs Department and the importing company.
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■ Increase fines for late re-registration of weapons in order to provide an incentive for
weapon owners to re-register their weapons in a timely manner.
Increase government capacity and public knowledge
■ Continue support for the implementation of a well-resourced and professional
weapons registration system:
■ On the basis of a needs assessment develop an incremental plan for building 
capacity and linking the licensing system with future collection campaigns
■ Approach external donors for support to enhance the recording system and licence
database.
■ Minimise the potential for corruption in the licensing system through random 
inspections and audits of regional Patrol Police licensing departments.
■ Carry out a national registration campaign, appealing for owners to re-register their
weapons.
■ Widely distribute information materials on the licensing system. Translate the relevant
laws into Azeri and other non-Georgian languages and distribute information packs
on firearms registration to minority communities.
Improve control of the private security industry
■ Make public the existing internal Ministry of Internal Affairs instructions on the 
private security industry.
■ Introduce specific legislation to regulate the activities of private security companies
and private detective agencies. This legislation should provided for: time-limited
licensing of companies; oversight and enforcement, including a clear division of
responsibility between government agencies for regulating the industry; use of
firearms and force; training and professionalism; and transparency and accountability.
■ Make specific reference in the new legislation to regulation of internal security 
divisions.
Ensuring strong controls of state arms holdings
High control standards are required for state weapons holdings to prevent them being
misused or creating other health and security threats. Government policy in this area
has already progressed well. The following steps are suggested for further improve-
ments.
Ensure appropriate arms holdings by state agencies
■ Use procedures based on objective criteria linked to force structures to regularly 
identify spare and surplus SALW and ammunition stocks for disposal (see below).
■ Ensure that imports of SALW for military use are in line with Georgia’s national 
security structure and meet Georgia’s needs as identified in a comprehensive threat
assessment.
Ensure small arms destruction
■ Destroy excess and obsolete SALW and ammunition in accordance with Georgia’s
international obligations (eg NATO IPAP, OSCE Document on SALW, UN PoA) and
raise public awareness of the importance of destroying surplus and obsolete SALW
and ammunition.
■ Implement a comprehensive inventory to establish surplus stocks of ammunition with
a calibre greater than 23mm.
■ Increase transparency of the destruction process through the provision of a detailed
public report on the number and types of weapons to be destroyed, and the destruc-
tion cost per unit, as well as by allowing for independent inspection of all destructions.
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■ Review government policy on seized weapons so that all such weapons are destroyed
rather than re-distributed amongst government agencies.
Improve stockpile management
■ Conduct a needs assessment of security systems together with international partners
and make more information on Georgia’s stockpile security needs publicly available.
■ Identify and commit the resources necessary to enhance security systems at stockpiles;
approach foreign donors where required.
Strengthening the regulation of international arms transfer controls
Progress in improving Georgia’s legislative and regulatory framework for the control
of international arms transfers has been good, and most types of transfer are now 
controlled according to a system established in law. While this is the case, current 
legislation can still be improved. In addition, the decision-making process for arms
transfers could be further developed in one of two ways. One way is to improve the
implementation of the current export control system, particularly the organisation
and work of the Military Technical Commission. Alternatively, these issues could be
addressed by creating an independent export control agency or an inter-departmental
Military technical Commission.
Amend the relevant legislation
■ Include specific references to brokering in relevant legislation. Refer to international
guides and documents where available (such as the legal definition of brokering and
the distinctions between brokering and shipping companies in the EU Code of Conduct
on Arms Exports).
■ Insert specific provisions into legislation to ensure that transhipments of SALW are
inspected upon entry into, and exit from, Georgia’s customs territory.
■ Require transfers to recognised state bodies to be accompanied by an end-user
certificate, in accordance with the OSCE Handbook of Best Practices on Small Arms
and Light Weapons and the User’s Guide to the EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports.
Include the right to verify delivery by post-shipment checks in all contracts and
explore workable mechanisms to put in place end-use monitoring and verification to
ensure that arms transfers are used at the point of receipt as envisaged.
■ Amend the Law on Export and secondary legislation so that re-exports from Georgia
can only be conducted following consent from the country of origin.
■ Require that all proposed arms and dual-use goods transits are reviewed within the
Military Technical Commission (or an inter-agency group) prior to licensing.
■ Make the issuance of all arms transfer licences the responsibility of the Ministry of
Justice and Ministry of Economy and Trade.
■ Undertake a feasibility study on bringing the parallel control systems for the transfer
of hunting weapons and arms, military goods and equipment under a single system.
■ Review the role of the office of the President in transfer control policy and practice
with a view to significantly downgrading or eliminating this role.
Option A: Improve the work of the Military Technical Commission
■ Adapt the legislative and regulatory framework to ensure that a range of government
agencies – including the MFA, the MIA, the Customs Department, the Border Police,
the MoE, the MoJ, and the MoD – are all required to determine whether proposed
transfers are suitable according to criteria, such as those set out in the EU Code of
Conduct on Arms Transfers.
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■ Publish clear and transparent operating procedures for the Military Technical 
Commission, stipulating, inter alia: when to meet; the format of meetings; decision-
making procedures (ideally each agency would have a veto on issuance of licences);
and information sharing.
■ Expand the remit of meetings to include regular information exchange on issues such
as: violation of Georgian and international law by licensed companies; diversion of
licensed transfers to other destinations; arms exporters, brokers and shipping 
companies of concern.
■ Clearly state all criteria for licensing decisions in national legislation and ensure that
they comply with best international standards, such as the EU Code of Conduct on
Arms Exports.
■ Undertake a needs assessment of the Military Technical Commission’s capacity to 
execute strict transfer controls.
Option B: Create a national arms trade control agency
A national agency for controlling the trade in arms and dual-use goods and 
technologies would:
■ Consider all arms transfer licence applications on a case-by-case basis by an inter-
agency group drawn from a range of government ministries and departments, with
detailed criteria-based assessments of the risks associated with each transfer being a
core part of the decision-making process.
■ Employ its own expert staff.
■ Report to the Prime Minister or Deputy Prime Minister.
■ Conduct all necessary background checks and research, including on-the-spot 
inspections before issuing licences and permits.
■ Control transactions at various stages and be responsible for contacting the 
authorities in end-user countries.
■ Co-ordinate the work of all other institutions in matters related to arms and dual-use
goods controls.
■ Maintain a database of all transactions and detailed information on all manufacturers,
brokers, authorised transport companies, end-users and arms producers.
■ Prepare materials and train law-enforcement agents or civil servants.
■ Keep track of, and exert control over, significant domestic transfers of arms and dual-
use goods and technologies.
Improving border management policy and practice
There is a great deal of positive momentum in current reforms to the Border Police.
However, the process is still held back by a lack of clear objectives and a transitional
plan. In order to support further reforms, the Government should:
■ Ensure that border reform continues by providing the necessary support, financing
and legislative changes, such as adoption of the new ‘Border Police Law’.
■ Review data collection and collation systems to identify how disaggregated 
information on different categories of border incidents can be compiled and released.
Such reviews also allow for analysis and targeted profiling of the trafficking threat to
different regions and assist intelligence led operations.
■ Identify clear strategic objectives by conducting a risk assessment and developing of a
National Border Strategy; include specific references to small arms control in this
strategy.
■ Map out a transitional plan and timeframe for meeting strategic objectives, including:
■ The development of an adequate job task analysis for various levels of border guards
and the establishment of standard operational procedures
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■ Increased financial support for restructuring.
■ Increase MIA/Border Police co-operation through: information exchanges; joint
strategic planning; joint anti-trafficking initiatives; joint prosecutions and 
investigations on small arms crimes.
■ Adopt a Memorandum of Understanding between the Customs Department and 
Border Police at the earliest possible opportunity as a step towards an integrated 
border management strategy. Include standard operational procedures in the 
memorandum on: joint working arrangements; joint information exchange 
arrangements; modes of routine communication; joint training on anti-trafficking
and investigative skills.
■ Strengthen anti-corruption measures by raising wages, rotating staff among 
checkpoints and carrying out internal inspections.
Increasing transparency and government accountability
Improved government accountability is key to ensuring high levels of control over
small arms proliferation and misuse. In particular, the Government should encourage
parliamentary involvement in this area and engage more actively with civil society:
Improve government transparency on small arms issues
■ Publish annual reports on arms transfers containing details of the type, quantity,
value, destination and end-use of goods licensed for export and/or exported. This
report should also include information on licences issued and denied, including the
reasons for denial, in order to allow for the scrutiny of licensed transfers against the 
established licensing criteria.
■ Prepare an inventory of all state SALW holdings and share with relevant international
partners.
■ Allocate a government agency with responsibility for providing information on 
Georgia’s transfer control system and all past Georgian transfers.
■ Ensure full and timely reporting on small arms issues to relevant international fora,
such as the UNDDA, the UN Register of Conventional Arms and the OSCE.
Strengthen parliamentary oversight
■ Introduce legislation requiring statutory reporting to parliament on arms transfers,
military procurement, arms trafficking and border management, and civilian small
arms control policy and practice.
■ Allow the Parliamentary Committee on Security and Defence to scrutinise decisions
on arms transfers both before and after the transfer is made. This Committee should
have the statutory duty to call ministers and officials from state agencies responsible
for transfer decision-making to provide evidence in camera, and should publish an
annual review on the enforcement of arms transfer legislation and regulations.
Engage more deeply with civil society
■ Implement Georgia’s obligation under IPAP to strengthen public involvement in 
security affairs.
■ Invite civil society organisations for public hearings in Parliament on small arms
issues.
■ Establish civil society-Government working groups on security issues.
■ Ensure that civil society is represented in a national commission on small arms and
human security issues.
■ Include civil society representation in Georgian delegations to all meetings regarding
the UN PoA.
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Improving co-ordination and policy formulation
Insufficient government co-ordination and poor policy formulation is probably the
most serious impediment to greater control of small arms proliferation and misuse.
The following measures are recommended:
■ Create a high-level, national small arms control co-ordination agency to co-ordinate
policy and practice, made up of representatives of all government departments 
concerned with conventional arms control. Appoint a single National Focal Point to
liaise internationally.
■ Develop a comprehensive national small arms strategy, informed in part by the survey
findings, to guide the Government’s work on small arms control. Ensure the strategy
includes: weapons registration, collection, destruction, stockpiling, production,
transfers, civilian licensing and possession by non-state actors, public education, anti-
trafficking and law enforcement. Include all relevant agencies in drafting the strategy
to ensure their support for it.
■ Pursue a regional agreement on co-operation on small arms and anti-trafficking
issues, possibly through the GUAM Virtual Law Enforcement Centre, a forum for 
voluntary customs and police information exchanges.
■ Ensure that all relevant agencies provide the necessary information and support to
officials who are responsible for submitting data on small arms control to 
international and regional organisations.
■ Clarify Georgia’s position regarding current international debates and proposals for 
a binding international arms transfer treaty.
The international community has been instrumental in improving Georgia’s small
arms control capacity in a number of areas, such as border controls and policing.
Such international support must continue to ensure that Georgia has the political will,
institutional knowledge and administrative capacity to continue with reform of small
arms control issues. It is recommended that the international community:
■ Provide technical support to the Georgian Government in drafting the required
changes to legislation, guidelines and operative provisions outlined above.
■ Ensure that, where possible, support for small arms control is integrated into a broader
framework (such as a national strategy) for weapons management in Georgia.
■ Ensure that support for small arms control is integrated into wider security sector
reform programmes. In particular, it is recommended that the EU develop security
sector reform programmes that include support for small arms control, in accordance
with the principles developed in the 2005 and 2006 EU Security Sector Reform 
Concepts.
■ Ensure that international assistance is co-ordinated and well targeted through regular
donor meetings and workshops.
■ Ensure that relevant international agreements with Georgia, such as the EU-Georgia
Action Plan, make specific reference to small arms control issues.
■ Provide the technical support necessary to assist Georgia in becoming fully compliant
with its international commitments on small arms under the OSCE Document on
SALW, the UN PoA and the EU SALW Strategy (pending any such future commitment
by Georgia).
■ Provide support to NGOs and the media to build local capacity to analyse and 
monitor small arms and human security issues.
■ Encourage information exchange between Georgian Members of Parliament and their
counterparts in countries with developed mechanisms for oversight of small arms
control issues.
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community
■ Help the Georgian authorities to check compliance with end-user and delivery
verification certificates through diplomatic representations in export destination
states where no Georgian representation is available.
■ Provide continued international support to border management reforms.
■ Continue to offer support for stockpile security upgrades and destructions of weapons
that pose a threat to security or public safety.
■ Encourage the re-formation of an inter-agency group on small arms issues.
Improved small arms control in Georgia is dependent upon civil society input at both
the policy and practice level. While there are outstanding examples of civil society 
involvement in small arms issues, overall involvement is poor. It is recommended that
civil society:
■ Becomes more engaged in small arms issues, by:
■ Devoting funding and resources to research and advocacy on small arms issues,
asking for donor support where relevant
■ Forming networks of NGOs interested in small arms issues to ensure that expertise
in this area is mainstreamed and NGO activities co-ordinated.
■ Support awareness raising at the community level on small arms issues such as the
licensing system, the negative impacts of small arms misuse and government 
collection campaigns.
■ Develop initiatives to reduce the threat of small arms misuse through measures such 
as community safety workshops.
■ Encourage the agreement of voluntary codes of conduct within the private security
industry in order to promote best practice.
■ Monitor national practice on international arms transfers and licensing decisions to
ensure that they are in line with international best practice.
■ Monitor the use of force and firearms by state agencies so that policy and practice in
this area meets with the principles set out in the UN Basic Principles on the Use of Force
and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials.
■ Ensure enhanced parliamentary knowledge on small arms issues and engagement 
with policy making in this area through:
■ Parliamentary trainings
■ Briefings on different aspects of government policy and practice on small arms 
control
■ Information exchange through working groups and committees.
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To civil society
ANNEX 1: Key informant interviewees and focus groups
Name Organisation Place Date
David Akhvlediani Border Police Tbilisi 12.06.06
Johnny Bakuradze Chief Batumi Patrol Police Batumi 18.01.06
Levan Baramidze Head of Public Health Department, Ministry of Health Tbilisi 20.01.06
Major Jan Baranovski EUSR Ministry of Interior Adviser Tbilisi 20.01.06
Major Miroslaw Bednarczyk EUSR Border Guard Adviser Tbilisi 20.01.06
Kakha Chikovani Deputy Secretary, National Security Council Tbilisi 16.12.05
Irakli Chimakadze Chief Kutaisi Regional Police Kutaisi 17.01.06
Davit Chkhartishvili Editor, Adjara Newspaper Batumi 18.01.06
Giga Chogovadze Mayor of Kutaisi Kutaisi 17.01.06
David Darchiashvili Executive Director, Open Society Georgia Foundation Tbilisi 15.03.06
Zaza Davitadze Secretary of Sakrebulo Batumi 17.01.06
Torsten Derrick EUSR Border Assistance Mission Tbilisi 12.06.06
Giorgi Dolidze Deputy Head, Arms Control and Security Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Tbilisi 16.12.05
Murman Dumbadze MP, Supreme Council of Ajara Batumi 18.01.06
Andrea Dvali Senior Specialist, Department of International Relations, Ministry of Economy Tbilisi 20.12.05
and Trade
Lt. Col. Zbigniew Fec OSCE Mission to Georgia Tbilisi 01.12.05
Merab Gergaia Chief of Regional Police, Zugdidi Zugdidi 19.01.06
Giorgi Gogiberidze Head of Licence Department, Ministry of Justice Tbilisi 20.12.05
Markus Gorol International Civilian Police Zugdidi 19.01.06
Ryan Grist OSCE Mission to Georgia Tbilisi 01.12.05
Niyazi Jalagania Deputy Prosecutor Zugdidi 19.01.06
George Jokhadze Head of Analytical Services, Office of the Prosecutor General Tbilisi 11.05.06
Davit Kasradze Chair of Batumi Sakrebulo Batumi 18.01.06
Kakha Katsitadze Military expert Tbilisi 16.01.06
Zaza Khachidze Head of Licence Department, Ministry of Interior Tbilisi 19.12.05
Lt. Col. Khvadagiani Head of Logistics Department, Ministry of Defence Tbilisi 15.03.06
Kakha Khandolishvili Head of International and Legal Affairs Office, Border Police Tbilisi 16.12.05
Mamuka Kikaleishvili Head of Law Department, Ministry of Defence Tbilisi 15.12.05
Vakhtang Lashkaradze Head of Information Department, Customs Department Tbilisi 20.12.05
Richard Lax EC Delegation to Georgia Tbilisi 09.03.06
Koba Liklikadze Military Observer, Radio Liberty Tbilisi 14.01.06
Giorgi Manjganadze Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Tbilisi 16.12.05
Rory McCorley Training Assistance Mission, OSCE Mission to Georgia Tbilisi 08.05.06
Irakli Mchedlishvili Project Director, Civil Council on Defence and Security Tbilisi 08.03.06
Lado Mgaloblishvili ‘Anti-Corruption Council’ NGO Batumi 18.01.06
Giorgi Muchaidze Director of International Relations Department, Ministry of Defence Tbilisi 15.03.06
Mamuka Mujiri Deputy Minister of Defence Tbilisi 06.12.05
Maria Van Ruiten Project Manager, Conflict Rehabilitation, Mine Action and Energy, EC Delegation Tbilisi 09.03.06
to Georgia
Natia Surguladze Vice Mayor of Batumi Batumi 18.01.06
Irodi Toradze Head of shift at the Red Bridge, Border Police Red Bridge 21.01.06
Shota Utiashvili Head of Information Department, Ministry of Interior Tbilisi 16.12.05
Giorgi Volskii Deputy State Minister for Conflict Resolution Tbilisi 14.03.06
Anonymous interviews
Anonymous interviewee A Public security official Tbilisi 08.03.06
Anonymous Interviewee B Foreign affairs official Tbilisi 12.05.06
Anonymous interviewee C Civil society representative Tbilisi 15.03.06
Anonymous Interviewee D International military adviser Tbilisi 13.03.06
Anonymous interviewee E Western diplomatic staff Tbilisi 15.03.06
Hospital interviews
Aslan Aslanishvili Surgeon, Bolnisi hospital Bolnisi 23.03.06
Nukri Jokhadze Director, Gori hospital Gori 03.04.06
Zurab Shalamberidze Reception Manager, Republican hospital Tbilisi 31.03.06
Nikoloz Lominadze, Surgeons, Ghudushauri hospital Tbilisi 22.03.06
Tamaz Gvenetadze, 
Otar Tatishvili, 
Zurab Chkaidze 
and Guram Ubilava
Guliko Shoshiashvili Nurse, Telavi hospital Telavi 27.03.06
Name Organisation Place Date
Private security company interviews
Anonymous Manager, Daraka Ltd Tbilisi 06.04.06
Anonymous Manager, Aligator Ltd Tbilisi 06.04.06
Zviad Abesadze Manager/owner, Guarantor of Security of People and Property Ltd Tbilisi 07.04.06
Anonymous Owner, ISG Ltd Tbilisi 08.04.06
Anonymous Manager, Voltra Ltd Tbilisi 10.04.06
Gun shop interviews
Vadim Mamuchashvili Manager, Gun shop A Tbilisi 03.04.06
Anonymous Manager, Gun shop B Tbilisi 03.04.06
Anonymous Manager, Gun shop C Tbilisi 03.04.06
Anonymous Manager, Gun shop D Tbilisi 04.04.06
Jimi Kurdadze Manager, Gun shop E Tbilisi 04.04.06
Anonymous Manager, Gun shop F Tbilisi 04.04.06
Focus Group Discussions
Focus Group A (9 participants) Mixed men and women aged 25–34 Tbilisi 05.12.05
Focus Group B (9 participants) Mixed men and women aged 35–65 Tbilisi 05.12.05
Focus Group C (10 participants) Ex Law enforcement officers Tbilisi 06.12.05
Focus Group D (11 participants) Ex Law enforcement officers Tbilisi 14.12.06
Focus Group E (10 participants) Women aged 25–60 Tbilisi 01.01.05
Focus Group F (9 participants) Mixed men and women aged 25–34 Zugdidi 10.12.05
Focus Group G (9 participants) Mixed men and women aged 35–65 Zugdidi 10.12.05
Focus Group H (14 participants) Internally displaced persons Zugdidi 09.12.05
Focus Group I (10 participants) Internally displaced persons Kutaisi 07.12.05
Focus Group J (10 participants) Women aged 25–60 Kutaisi 07.12.05
Focus Group K (10 participants) Mixed men and women aged 25–34, Armenian Akhaltsikhe 08.12.05
Focus Group L (8 participants) Mixed men and women aged 35–65, Armenian Akhaltsikhe 08.12.05
Focus Group M (8 participants) Mixed men and women aged 25–34, Azeri Marneuli 12.12.05
Focus Group N (10 participants) Mixed men and women aged 35–65, Azeri Marneuli 12.12.05
SAFERWORLD · SMALL ARMS AND HUMAN SECURITY IN THE CAUCASUS 119
ANNEX 2: Tbilisi Plan of Action 
(Tbilisi, 10 June 2006)
We Parliamentarians,
Meeting in Tbilisi from 9–10 June 2006, in the context of the Regional Parliamentary
Workshop on Small Arms, and Light Weapons;
Welcoming also the Eighth Central Asia and Caucasus Regional Forum on Export 
Controls held in Tbilisi, Georgia from 16–19 May, 2006;
Aware of the linkage between inadequate State oversight of small arms production
and/or ineffectual or inadequate small arms and light weapons export regulation and
the fuelling of conflicts in other States and Regions;
Aware also of the linkage between Small Arms and Light Weapons, Political instability,
insecurity and the hindrance of development;
Confirming our attachment to the principles and objectives contained in the United
Nations Charter aimed at safeguarding future generations against the scourge of war
and creating the necessary conditions for peace, security and stability in the world;
Hailing the adoption of important legal and political instruments including:
■ the United Nations Action Programme aimed at Preventing, Combating and 
Eliminating illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects;
■ the Additional Protocol against Illicit Production and Trade in Firearms, Firearms
parts, pieces and munitions, to the United Nations Convention against Organised
Transnational Crime;
■ The Wassenaar Arrangement Elements for Effective Legislation on Arms Brokering;
■ The Organization of American States (OAS) Model Regulations on Brokering;
■ The EU Common Position on the Control of Arms Brokering;
■ The OSCE Principles on Controlling Brokering.
Notes with Appreciation the ongoing important engagement in the area of Small Arms
and Light Weapons control in the region and in Neighbouring States by the UNDP
and OSCE;
Recognizing the importance of Civil Society and Gender in the area of Small Arms 
generally and the need to engage on a regular basis with Civil Society in identifying
more effective means of controlling Small Arms proliferation;
Convinced of the important role that Parliamentarians from the region and 
Neighbouring States have to play in the struggle to promote democratic principles and
good political governance, respect for human rights and peace, security and justice;
Commending Parliamentarians for Global Action (PGA) and the Parliament of
Georgia in taking the initiative of organizing this Regional Parliamentary Workshop;
Expressing its Appreciation to Parliamentarians for Global Action, the Parliament of
Georgia, the OSCE Mission to Georgia, UNDP, the Open Society Foundation Georgia,
the US Embassy, Tbilisi and Saferworld in their provision of support for this 
Parliamentary Workshop
Have agreed to implement the following Plan of Action:
I – At the national level
1. Introduce and support legislation addressing arms trafficking originating within 
and across our respective States, including by establishing and/or improving State
approved arms and munitions broker lists, enhancing tighter export controls and
introducing more serious penalties for infringements of applicable laws;
2. Conduct advocacy aimed at governments for the setting up of permanent and 
independent national commissions with sufficient human, material and financial
resources to effectively combat the proliferation of small arms and light weapons;
3. Initiate, in close collaboration with government agencies and civil society 
organisations, information, awareness and education campaigns aimed at the general
population on the issue of small arms and light weapons;
4. Form parliamentary networks on issues relating to democratic transition and the fight
against the proliferation and illicit trade of small arms and light weapons and post-
conflict justice;
5. Support the development of a legally-binding, global instrument regulating brokering
of small arms & light weapons at the UN Review Conference in New York at the end of
June 2006;
6. Support, and encourage our respective Governments to support, the drafting of
minimum common standards on international arms transfers at the UN Review 
Conference in New York at the end of June 2006, and other related initiatives towards
the subsequent development of an international Arms Trade Treaty;
7. Ensure that existing stocks of weapons and ammunition are secured, maintained 
and regularly inspected to the highest possible standards and seek the assistance of
international partners to improve standards where they are in any way a threat to 
security or public health;
8. Support the destruction of national surpluses of Small Arms and Light Weapons 
and ammunition while maintaining the highest safety standards;
9. Work to revise and update national legislation on small arms and light weapons to
ensure compliance and conformity with the UN Programme of Action;
10. Ensure that those States that have not already done so ratify and enforce the Ottawa
Convention on antipersonnel mines;
11. Encourage and support voluntary surrender campaigns for small arms and light
weapons;
12. Call for increased overall transparency with respect to national controls over small
arms and light weapons, in particular through making provision for greater 
parliamentary oversight in this area;
13. Encourage governments to strengthen judiciary institutions and create the conditions
for their independence;
14. Urge governments to take appropriate action to combat impunity, especially in post-
conflict situations;
II – At the regional and international levels
15. Work towards achieving greater cooperation and coordination among 
Parliamentarians and Governments from the Region and Neighbouring States in
achieving the objectives set out in Section I above;
16. Organize regular sub-regional and regional meetings to assess progress in the 
implementation of the Tbilisi Plan of Action;
17. For that purpose, create a support mechanism for the parliamentary networks.
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